Bug: LedgerSMB 1.0.0 and SQL-Ledger 2.6.18 and earler arbitrary code execution ( Ascii Version )

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LedgerSMB 1.0.0 and SQL-Ledger 2.6.18 and earler arbitrary code execution

Published
Credit
Risk
2006.09.18
Chris Travers
High
CWE
CVE
Local
Remote
N/A
CVE-2006-4731
No
Yes

CVSS Base Score
Impact Subscore
Exploitability Subscore
5/10
2.9/10
10/10
Exploit range
Attack complexity
Authentication
Remote
Low
No required
Confidentiality impact
Integrity impact
Availability impact
None
Partial
None

Hi all;

Summary:
A directory transversal issue was found in LedgerSMB 1.0.0 involving the
terminal variable. This vulnerability was inherited from the SQL-Ledger
codebase. Due to the fact that SQL-Ledger has a built-in text editor,
this issue could result in arbitrary code execution on the server. The
SQL-Ledger and LedgerSMB teams have both released patches to these
vulnerabilities.

Software affected:
SQL-Ledger, all versions prior to 2.6.19.
LedgerSMB 1.0.0
Other SQL-Ledger derivatives should presume themselves vulnerable (we
have not checked).

Patched versions:
SQL-Ledger 2.6.19
LedgerSMB 1.0.0p1
SQL-Ledger 2.4.4-2.4.17 are particularly vulnerable due to CVE-2006-4244.

Mitigating factors:
Authentication is required (only for LedgerSMB 1.0.0 and SQL-Ledger
2.4.3 and lower, or 2.6.18).

Detailed description:
The "terminal" query variable is insufficiently checked in the login.pl
and admin.pl files for validity and can lead to directory transversal
and arbitrary code execution in SQL-Ledger (2.6.18 and earlier) and
LedgerSMB (1.0.0 only). In particular, an attacker could upload a file
called "login.pl" using these facilities. The attacher could then pass
a specially malformed url to the web server that would cause it to
execute the code. The form of the url might be:
http://hostname/path/login.pl?termina=../css

In the course of our disclosure, we sent a notification to the developer
of SQL-Ledger who quickly patched his software.

All customers should upgrade to the newest versions of these packages at
their earliest convenience.

Credit for this disclosure should go to Chris Murtagh (a private
individual) and Richard Patterson of Quickhelp.

Best Wishes,
Chris Travers
Metatron Technology Consulting
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tel;cell:509-630-7794
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See this note in TXT Version

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Ascii Version