ACLS ineffective in SQL-Ledger and LedgerSMB

2007-04-12 / 2007-04-13
Credit: Chris Travers
Risk: Medium
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-Other


Ogólna skala CVSS: 7.5/10
Znaczenie: 6.4/10
Łatwość wykorzystania: 10/10
Wymagany dostęp: Zdalny
Złożoność ataku: Niska
Autoryzacja: Nie wymagana
Wpływ na poufność: Częściowy
Wpływ na integralność: Częściowy
Wpływ na dostępność: Częściowy

Hi all; I have decided to finally send to this list a serious security flaw in the design of SQL-Ledger (all versions). LedgerSMB (all versions) is also affected but the problem (with a workaround) has been mentioned in our documentation since the fork. Ordinarily I would not make a big deal out of this (since we are already clear about why we suggest using db accounts for security), but I feel that DWS is misrepresenting the security of SQL-Ledger and I think people need to be aware of the risk. The access control lists associated with users in SQL-Ledger and LedgerSMB do nothing more than enable or disable menu items. They do not, however, actually prevent access to the application in any meaningful way. The reason is that none of the application's functions actually check the access control lists before executing. For this reason, anyone can access any other part of the application simply by typing the required URL in the address bar (to get a valid url, try right-clicking on the data-entry frame and select "Show only this frame" in Firefox). Again, my big issue isn't that this is broken in SQL-Ledger but that the author seems content to let people not know that it is broken and that there are ways to properly secure it. The access control feature is advertised at http://sql-ledger.com/cgi-bin/nav.pl?page=feature/multiuser.html&title=M ulti-user As for a workaround, we have always suggested that this feature is inadequate for security purposes and that roles need to be isolated into separate database accounts (which the application does support). However, this process is cumbersome. The LedgerSMB project intends to automate this process properly in 1.3.0 (perhaps six months away). Best Wishes, Chris Travers begin:vcard fn:Chris Travers n:Travers;Chris email;internet:chris (at) metatrontech (dot) com [email concealed] tel;work:509-888-0220 tel;cell:509-630-7794 x-mozilla-html:FALSE version:2.1 end:vcard


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