Application: The Everything Development System Version(s): <= Pre-1.0 (current version at time of release) Author: sub < sub (at) room641a (dot) net [email concealed] > Released: 2/1/2008 There exists a vulnerability in The Everything Development Engine that allows a user to inject their own SQL to modify a SELECT query, leading to information disclosure, XSS, or privilege escalation. What's more, passwords are stored in the database as plaintext, making user accounts very easily compromised. In some versions of the software I have encountered, the following proof of concept will display a corresponding username and password in the "core" field and "reputation" field on the page, respectively. Proof of Concept: http://path.to/cms/index.pl?node_id=0/**/UNION/**/SELECT/**/null,101,nul l,1,null,null,passwd,null,null,nick,null/**/FROM/**/user/**/WHERE/**/nic k/**/!%3d/**/''/**/%23 In other, probably more recent versions, a 13-column query is required or the UNION. What does not change, is that of all of the various versions I've encountered, all are vulnerable to SQL injection. The ideal fix would be to ensure that the 'node_id' request variable is the appropriate data-type (signed int) before passing it as part of a SQL query. Vendor Status: A private ticket was created on the vendors Bug Tracker page prior to this release. However, I have decided to release this vulnerability without a reply from the vendor as the Bug Tracker, and development project, seemed to be 'abandonded.'