Microsoft Word 2003 + Fortinet Forticlient

2008.02.19
Credit: Ruben
Risk: Medium
Local: Yes
Remote: No
CWE: CWE-264


Ogólna skala CVSS: 7.2/10
Znaczenie: 10/10
Łatwość wykorzystania: 3.9/10
Wymagany dostęp: Lokalny
Złożoność ataku: Niska
Autoryzacja: Nie wymagana
Wpływ na poufność: Pełny
Wpływ na integralność: Pełny
Wpływ na dostępność: Pełny

Hi ---------------------------- 1.Microsoft Word Memory Corruption Vulnerability Microsoft Word 2003 is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability while parsing a specially crafted Word file. The vulnerability is caused by calculation errors while parsing certain fields within the barely documented, File Information Block (FIB). This could lead to remote arbitrary code execution in the context of the user who started the application. Microsoft has addressed this issue (among others) in its february bulletin: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS08-009.mspx Disclosure Timeline: 07/02/2007 - Vendor Contacted 07/02/2007 - Vendor Acknowledged 01/10/2008 - Vendor confirms vulnerability and plans to fix it. 02/12/2008 - Coordinated disclosure -------------------------------------------------------- 2. Fortinet FortiClient Local Privilege Escalation. Fortinet Endpoint Solution For Enterprise, FortiClient is prone to a local privilege escalation due to the improper device filtering carried out by its filter driver, fortimon.sys . The driver affected filters certain devices, enabling pass-through filtering. However, its own Device's DeviceExtension is not correclty initialized so any logged user could force the kernel to operate with user-mode controlled memory just by direclty issuing a special request to the driver's device. This leads to local arbitrary code execution in the context of the kernel. Even Guest users can elevate privileges to SYSTEM. This issue has been addressed in the following releases: + FortiClient 3.0 MR5 Patch 4 + FortiClient 3.0 MR6 Affected versions: + FortiClient 3.0 MR5 Patch 3 and lower Users can consult the patches via http://docs.forticare.com/firmware.xml Disclosure Timeline: 01/18/2008 - Vendor Contacted 01/18/2008 - Vendor Acknowledged 01/29/2008 - Vendor confirms vulnerability and plans to fix it. 02/13/2008 - Coordinated disclosure ------------------------------------------ Regards, Ruben. www.reversemode.com


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