Incorrect input validation in PyString_FromStringAndSize() leads to multiple buffer overflows

2008.04.19
Risk: High
Local: Yes
Remote: No
CWE: CWE-119


Ogólna skala CVSS: 9.3/10
Znaczenie: 10/10
Łatwość wykorzystania: 8.6/10
Wymagany dostęp: Zdalny
Złożoność ataku: Średnia
Autoryzacja: Nie wymagana
Wpływ na poufność: Pełny
Wpływ na integralność: Pełny
Wpływ na dostępność: Pełny

Title: Incorrect input validation in PyString_FromStringAndSize() leads to multiple buffer overflows Date Discoverd: ??-April-2008 Date Reported: 08-April-2008 Date Patched: 09-April-2008 Date Disclosed: 11-April-2008 Criticality: High Affected Products ----------------- Python 2.5.2, earlier and unstable version are likely to be vulnerable Synopsis -------- The Python core API provides multiple functions for the allocation of string objects, specifically providing an API call that allows for either the allocation or reallocation of a PyStringObject. This function, PyString_FromStringAndSize() takes two parameters: a pointer and a signed integer. If the pointer is non-NULL then the memory pointed to it is reallocated to the size specified by the second parameter. If the pointer is NULL then the number of bytes specified by the integer are allocated and returned. During the course of its operations this second parameter is not validated to contain a positive value. This in turn is summed with the size of a PyStringObject and passed as a length to an allocation function, potentially missallocating memory. The result of this was multiple buffer overflows in various components such as the previously disclosed zlib bug, the SSL module, et cetera. Furthermore, a Python developer, Alexander Belopolsky noted that the functions PyBytes_FromStringAndSize() and PyUnicode_FromStringAndSize() contained the same characteristics. Techical Details ----------------- Python-2.5.2/Objects/stringobject.c: 52 PyObject * 53 PyString_FromStringAndSize(const char *str, Py_ssize_t size) 54 { 55 register PyStringObject *op; 56 assert(size >= 0); 57 if (size == 0 && (op = nullstring) != NULL) { [...] 63 } 64 if (size == 1 && str != NULL && 65 (op = characters[*str & UCHAR_MAX]) != NULL) 66 { [...] 72 } 73 74 /* Inline PyObject_NewVar */ 75 op = (PyStringObject *)PyObject_MALLOC(sizeof(PyStringObject) + size); The type Py_ssize_t is defined to be one of a number of types dependant on platform, however it regardless of platform it will be signed. There is an assert() at line 56 that attempts to verify the sanity of the second parameter however in non-debug builds the assert() is omitted. Then at line 75 the size parameter and the size of a string object are summed together and passed as a parameter to PyObject_MALLOC(). Reproduction / Proof-of-Concept ------------------------------- When the length variable contains a value of -24 then the allocator is told to reserve 0 bytes of memory, however the allocator modifies the request and will allocate one byte of memory. For values ranging between -2 and -23 a small amount of memory will be allocated due to being summed with the size of a PyStringObject. Because of this being an API call, exploitation beyond that is dependant on the caller and current environment. Remediation ----------- This bug was patched in CVS, patching all three object types. Further details can be found at http://bugs.python.org/issue2587 and http://svn.python.org/view?rev=62271&view=rev and http://svn.python.org/view?rev=62272&view=rev


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