PRODUCT DESCRIPTION The Aztech ADSL family of modems/routes are shipped to residential and SOHO users that desires speed from 150-300mbps rate. This modem/router also supports IEEE802.11b/g/n as a Wireless LAN Access point. The vulnerable model numbers are: DSL5018EN (1T1R) (Shipped with Globe Telecom in the Philippines), DSL705E and DSL705EU. Vendor reference: http://www.aztech.com/prod_adsl_dsl5018en_1t1r.html 1. Denial of Service (DoS) The CGI script that resets the WAN connectivity of the modem can be called directly from the web server with no authentication. Sending a crafted HTTP GET request to the router via /cgi-bin/AZ_Retrain.cgi will allow an attacker to execute code that could potentially lead to Denial of Service (DoS) attack and may terminate or all established Internet connections in the network. Proof of Concept for this vulnerability Send a GET request to the cgi-bin/AZ_Retrain.cgi to reset the WAN connection: http://x.arpa.ph/fjpf/aztech-exploits/azreset.txt 2. Broken Session Management A successful authentication of a privilege (admin) ID in the web portal allows any attacker in the network to hijack and reuse the existing session in order to trick and allow the web server to execute administrative commands. The command may be freely executed from any terminal in the network as long as the session of the privilege ID is valid. Proof of Concept for this vulnerability 1. From computer A, open a web browser and login to the modem/router's web portal using the administrator ID. 2. From computer B, open a terminal session and make a POST request to the router: http://x.arpa.ph/fjpf/aztech-exploits/azpass.txt 3. File and Data Exposure The router's configuration file contains the hardware information as well as all of the user's credentials. This includes the customer's name and WAN account, the TR-069 credential of the telecom company and the web portal's admin username and password. A malicious attacker can send a direct GET request to the cgi-bin/userromfile.cgi script and download the ROM file. Although the ROM file is a ciphered text, this can be deciphered using a weak substitution technique (ROT 24) which could potentially lead to data exposure. Proof of Concept for this vulnerability a. Send a GET request to the router using cgi-bin/userromfile.cgi via curl: http://x.arpa.ph/fjpf/aztech-exploits/azgetconf.txt b. Decipher the downloaded rommfile.cfg using Caesar cipher. 4. Web Parameter Tampering Some of the router's restricted and disabled settings can be acquired by checking the hidden fields in forms. Most of these settings can be manipulated by intercepting the data and manipulating the values upon submission. The below example shows how we manipulated the Access Control List in order to enable Telnet in the WAN section of the control panel before submitting the data. Proof of Concept for this vulnerability a. Open a web browser and redirect traffic to localhost:8080. b. Open burb proxy and intercept traffic coming from the browser. c. Login to the router's web portal and go to the page where the protected values are located. d. Find the reference to the hidden values in the form and modify it. e. Submit the request to the router. Refresh the browser to see the modified protected values. Screenshots: http://x.arpa.ph/fjpf/aztech-exploits/aztech.img.tgz The following CVE's precedes the above and were found as fixed: CVE-2008-6588 _ Aztech ADSL2/2+ 4-port router has a default "isp" account with a default "isp" password, which allows remote attackers to obtain access if this default is not changed. CVE-2008-6554 _ cgi-bin/script in Aztech ADSL2/2+ 4-port router 3.7.0 build 070426 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the query string. CVE-2007-4733 _ The Aztech DSL600EU router, when WAN access to the web interface is disabled, does not properly block inbound traffic on TCP port 80, which allows remote attackers to connect to the web interface by guessing a TCP sequence number, possibly involving spoofing of an ARP packet, a related issue to CVE-1999-0077. Researchers: Federick Joe Fajardo / fjpfajardo(at)ph.ibm.com, Lorenzo Miguel Flores / floresl(at)ph.ibm.com