Multiple vulnerabilities in several IP camera products
Title: Multiple vulnerabilities in several IP camera products
Release date: 08/06/2011
Last update: 08/06/2011
Credits: Roberto Paleari, Emaze Networks S.p.A (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Class: Hidden functionalities, command-injection, weak encryption
The vulnerabilities described in this advisory are related to a firmware shared
among several devices of different vendors. Unfortunately, we have not been
able to identify the actual firmware manufacturer: we asked the name of the
firmware manufacturer to the vendors, without any success (see section
"DISCLOSURE TIME-LINE" for details).
We confirm the products of the following vendors are affected:
We speculate some IP camera products of the following vendors are also
Other products we are not aware of could also be vulnerable to these issues.
The firmware running on the affected IP cameras is subject to multiple security
issues that allow an attacker to gain administrative access to the device and
to execute arbitrary commands. In the following paragraphs we describe the
details of the vulnerabilities we identified.
a) Undocumented user
A user can authenticate to the web server running on the device using the
credentials "productmaker:ftvsbannedcode". The "productmaker" user can
access to a restricted number of web pages (basically, all the pages under
the "/cgi/maker/" directory).
b) Command-injection vulnerabilities
Some of the web pages the "productmaker" can access to are subject to a
command-injection vulnerability, as the server-side script does not properly
validate user-supplied input.
The following URL exploits a command-injection vulnerability inside
"unittest.cgi" page. The payload executes the "ls" command and displays
its output inside the generated web page:
http://<device IP address>/cgi/maker/unittest.cgi?action=asd;ls;date>/dev/null
A similar issue also affects the "sn.asp" page.
c) Hidden Telnet service
The "productmaker" user can enable a Telnet server by accessing the
following web page:
http://<device IP address>/cgi/maker/tools.cgi?telnet=1
The page spawns a Telnet daemon listening on TCP port 23. The Telnet daemon
does not require any authentication.
d) Weak password encryption
User passwords are stored in "/server/usr.ini", and are simply encoded in
e) Configuration encoding
Users can backup the configuration of the device through the web
interface. The configuration is saved in a tgz file ("config.cfg") that is
"encrypted" in a easy-to-reverse form. The following Python procedure
decodes the "encrypted" version of the configuration file:
# 'data' is the content of the encrypted configuration file, as downloaded
# from the web interface
r = ""
for c in data:
x = ord(c) ^ ord('j')
x = (~x) & 0xff
r += chr(x)
To encode a plain tgz file into a valid configuration archive, just apply
the inverse of the "conf_decode" procedure.
[UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THE DEVICE]
By leveraging the aforementioned vulnerabilities, an attacker can easily obtain
the authentication credentials for the "admin" user as follows:
1. Authenticate as the hidden "productmaker" user.
2. Exploit the command-injection vulnerability to obtain the content of the
3. The web server replies with the password for the "admin" user, encoded in
We are not aware of an updated firmware that corrects the issues described in
this advisory. In the meanwhile, users can modify the default credentials for
the user "productmaker", in order to inhibit unauthorized accesses to the
At this aim, users should perform the following actions:
1. Perform a backup of the configuration of the device.
2. Decode the configuration file (see point 'e' in the previous section).
3. Modify the config/server/usr.ini file inside the tgz archive, and replace
the password for the "maker" user with a new one.
4. Rebuild the tgz archive and encode it.
5. Upload the new configuration file to the device.
A Python script that automates these steps can be provided upon request.
We tried to contact two different vendors. Below we report the time-lines:
= VENDOR A =
* 07/03/2011 - The author contacts vendor A, asking for details about the
* 07/03/2011 - First reply from vendor A, asking for vulnerability
* 08/03/2011 - The author informed vendor A about his intention to
publicly disclose the details of the security issues after
the release of proper countermeasures.
* 16/03/2011 - No response from the vendor. The author re-sent the previous
* 29/03/2011 - Still no reply from the vendor. The author re-sent the
* 21/04/2011 - Again, no reply from the vendor. The author re-sent the
* 08/06/2011 - Disclosure.
= VENDOR B =
* 06/06/2011 - The author contacts vendor B, asking for details about the
* 06/06/2011 - Vendor B replies he is not interested into fixing these
* 07/06/2011 - The author informs vendor B about his intention to disclose
the details of the issues.
* 08/06/2011 - Disclosure.
Copyright(c) Emaze Networks S.p.A 2011, All rights reserved worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted to redistribute this advisory, providing that no
changes are made and that the copyright notices and disclaimers remain intact.
Emaze Networks has updated ipLegion, its vulnerability assessment platform, to
check for this vulnerability. Contact email@example.com to have more information
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acceptance AS IS, at the user's own risk. This information is subject to change