Linux Kernel netfilter nf_nat leakage of uninitialized buffer in IRC NAT

2014.01.29
Credit: Daniel
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-119


CVSS Base Score: 2.6/10
Impact Subscore: 2.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 4.9/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: High
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: None

netfilter: nf_nat: fix access to uninitialized buffer in IRC NAT helper Commit 5901b6be885e attempted to introduce IPv6 support into IRC NAT helper. By doing so, the following code seemed to be removed by accident: ip = ntohl(exp->master->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.u3.ip); sprintf(buffer, "%u %u", ip, port); pr_debug("nf_nat_irc: inserting '%s' == %pI4, port %u\n", buffer, &ip, port); This leads to the fact that buffer[] was left uninitialized and contained some stack value. When we call nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(), we call strlen(buffer) on excatly this uninitialized buffer. If we are unlucky and the skb has enough tailroom, we overwrite resp. leak contents with values that sit on our stack into the packet and send that out to the receiver. Since the rather informal DCC spec [1] does not seem to specify IPv6 support right now, we log such occurences so that admins can act accordingly, and drop the packet. I've looked into XChat source, and IPv6 is not supported there: addresses are in u32 and print via %u format string. Therefore, restore old behaviour as in IPv4, use snprintf(). The IRC helper does not support IPv6 by now. By this, we can safely use strlen(buffer) in nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet() and prevent a buffer overflow. Also simplify some code as we now have ct variable anyway. [1] http://www.irchelp.org/irchelp/rfc/ctcpspec.html - net/netfilter/nf_nat_irc.c 32 1 files changed, 27 insertions, 5 deletions diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_irc.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_irc.c index f02b360..1fb2258 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_irc.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_irc.c @@ -34,10 +34,14 @@ static unsigned int help(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp) { char buffer[sizeof("4294967296 65635")]; + struct nf_conn *ct = exp->master; + union nf_inet_addr newaddr; u_int16_t port; unsigned int ret; /* Reply comes from server. */ + newaddr = ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.u3; + exp->saved_proto.tcp.port = exp->tuple.dst.u.tcp.port; exp->dir = IP_CT_DIR_REPLY; exp->expectfn = nf_nat_follow_master; @@ -57,17 +61,35 @@ static unsigned int help(struct sk_buff *skb, } if (port == 0) { - nf_ct_helper_log(skb, exp->master, "all ports in use"); + nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "all ports in use"); return NF_DROP; } - ret = nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(skb, exp->master, ctinfo, - protoff, matchoff, matchlen, buffer, - strlen(buffer)); + /* strlen("\1DCC CHAT chat AAAAAAAA P\1\n")=27 + * strlen("\1DCC SCHAT chat AAAAAAAA P\1\n")=28 + * strlen("\1DCC SEND F AAAAAAAA P S\1\n")=26 + * strlen("\1DCC MOVE F AAAAAAAA P S\1\n")=26 + * strlen("\1DCC TSEND F AAAAAAAA P S\1\n")=27 + * + * AAAAAAAAA: bound addr (1.0.0.0==16777216, min 8 digits, + * 255.255.255.255==4294967296, 10 digits) + * P: bound port (min 1 d, max 5d (65635)) + * F: filename (min 1 d ) + * S: size (min 1 d ) + * 0x01, \n: terminators + */ + /* AAA = "us", ie. where server normally talks to. */ + snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%u %u", ntohl(newaddr.ip), port); + pr_debug("nf_nat_irc: inserting '%s' == %pI4, port %u\n", + buffer, &newaddr.ip, port); + + ret = nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(skb, ct, ctinfo, protoff, matchoff, + matchlen, buffer, strlen(buffer)); if (ret != NF_ACCEPT) { - nf_ct_helper_log(skb, exp->master, "cannot mangle packet"); + nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot mangle packet"); nf_ct_unexpect_related(exp); } + return ret; }

References:

https://git.kernel.org/linus/2690d97ade05c5325cbf7c72b94b90d265659886
Https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1058748
http://www.irchelp.org/irchelp/rfc/ctcpspec.html


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