_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \
( 0 | R | W | 3 | L | L | L | 4 | 8 | 5 )
\_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/
www.orwelllabs.com
security advisory
olsa-2015-8257
PGP: 79A6CCC0
* Advisory Information
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
(+) Title: AXIS Multiple Products Authenticated Remote Command Execution
via devtools vector
(+) Vendor: AXIS Communications
(+) Research and Advisory: Orwelllabs
(+) Advisory URL:
http://www.orwelllabs.com/2016/01/axis-commucations-multiple-products.html
(+) Class: Improper Input Validation [CWE-20]
(+) CVE Name: CVE-2015-8257
(+) Remotely Exploitable: Yes
(+) Locally Exploitable: No
(+) OLSA-ID: OWLL2015-8257
(+) Affected Versions: Multiple Products/Firmwares (check the list bellow)
(+) IoT Attack Surface: Device Administrative
Interface/Authentication/Authorization
(+) Owasp IoTTop10: I1, I2
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Vulnerability
+++++++++++++
AXIS Network Cameras (various models/firmwares) are prone to Authenticated
remote
command execution vulnerability. Exploiting this vulnerability a remote
attacker can
force the execution of certain unauthorized actions, which may lead to
further attacks.
Technical Details
+++++++++++++++++
The devtools.sh script is the responsible for vulnerability and it's 4
attack vectors through the following pages:
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_license.shtml?app=
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_license_custom.shtml?app=
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_index.shtml?app=
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_params.shtml?app=
An attacker can use the app parameter that waits for the name of a
legitimate application to inject commands in the operating system using
"%3B", for example, to read the contents of /etc/passwd:
http: //
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_license.shtml?app=ORWELLLABS%3Bcat%20/etc/passwd
The data entered in parameter "app =" is passed without any treatment for
devtools.sh script located at: {HTMLROOL}/bin/devtools.sh
This script contains several functions, namely:
list()
status()
menulist()
mainpagelink()
SETTINGSLINK()
confvariable()
echo_ssivar_licensekey()
load_auto_inst_form()
When these functions are invoked, they interact with the parameters passed
by the web application through
the affected scripts (e.g. ap_license.shtml? App =). By injecting the code
below:
http: //
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_license.shtml?app=ORWELLLABS%3Bcat%20/etc/passwd
The value passed in "app" will be passed directly to the script invoking
devtools.sh via shell -c as shown in the listing process below (third line
invoking confvariable function):
[SNIP]
2039 led 25472 S /usr/bin/enldgts -n
12014 root 0 SW [kworker/0:0]
13178 root 2548 S /bin/sh -c /usr/html/bin/devtools.sh
confvariable ORW..
13183 root 2728 R ps -aux PACKAGENAME
13312 root 0 SW [kworker/3:1]
13320 root 0 SW [kworker/2:0]
[SNIP]
The value "ORWELLLABS%3Bcat%20/etc/passwd" is then passed on to the
corresponding function (after passing through a conference on "confvariable
()").
confvariable() {
local val=
if [ -r "$PACKAGE_DIRECTORY/$1/$ADPPACKCFG" ]; then
. "$PACKAGE_DIRECTORY/$1/$ADPPACKCFG" || :
eval val=\$$2
echo $val
fi
}
Then enter the function "menulist ()" which we see the main stretch located
between the lines 127 and 143:
[SNIP]
127 [ "$ name", "/app_params.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ activeMenu1 = $ APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else - -> false <! - #
endif ->, null,
128 [
129 [ "Settings", "/app_params.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = param_ $ APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else - -> false
<! - # endif ->, null, []],
130 EOF
131 if [-z "$ LICENSEPAGE"] || [ "$ LICENSEPAGE" axis =]; Then
132 cat << - EOF
133 [ "License", "/app_license.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = license_ $ APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else - -> false
<! - # endif ->, null, []],
134 EOF
135 fi
136 if [ "$ LICENSEPAGE" = custom] && [-r "$ HTMLROOT / local / $ APPNAME /
license.inc"]; Then
137 cat << - EOF
138 [ "License", "/app_license_custom.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <!
- # If expr = "\ $ ActivePage custom_ = $ APP NAME" -> true <! - # Else ->
false <! - # endif ->, null, []],
139 EOF
140 fi
141 if [-r "$ HTMLROOT / local / $ APPNAME / about.inc"]; Then
142 cat << - EOF
143 [ "About", "/app_index.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = $ APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else - > false <! - #
endif ->, null, []],
Where the important lines are the menus below:
/bin/devtools.sh (127):
[ "$ Name", "/app_params.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If expr
= "\ $ activeMenu1 = $ APPNAME" -> true -> false <! - #endif ->, null,
/bin/devtools.sh (129):
[ "Settings", "/app_params.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = param_ -> true <! - # Else -> false < ! - # endif
->, null, []],
/bin/devtools.sh (133):
[ "License", "/app_license.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = License" -> true <! - # Else -> false <! - # endif
->, null, []],
/bin/devtools.sh (138):
[ "License", "/app_license_custom.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - #
If expr = "\ $ ActivePage = APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else -> false <! - #
endif ->, null, []],
/bin/devtools.sh (143):
[ "About", "/app_index.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If expr =
"\ $ ActivePage = $ APPNAME" - # else -> false <! - # endif ->, null, []],
In PoC presented above, the payload will be triggered in line vector 133 of
devtools script ( "License" menu) that will:
[ "License", "/app_license.shtml", "app = ORWELLLABS% 3Bcat% 20
/etc/passwd& "HostA, <! - # If expr =" \ $ ActivePage = License "-> true <!
- # Else -> false <! - # Endif ->, null, []],
And when executed echoes the results on the page.
Impact
++++++
The impact of this vulnerability is that taking into account the busybox
that runs behind (and with root privileges everywhere. in all the binaries
and scripts) is possible to execute arbitrary commands, create backdoors,
performing a reverse connection to the machine attacker, use this devices
as botnets and DDoS amplification methods... the limit is the creativity of
the attacker.
Affected Products
+++++++++++++++++
Multiple Axis Communications Products/Firmware including:
* AXIS Q6032-E/Q6034-E/Q6035-E PTZ Dome Network Camera -
Firmware 5.41.1.4
* AXIS Q6042-E/Q6044-E/Q6045-E PTZ Dome Network Camera -
Firmware 5.70.1.2
* AXIS A8004-VE Network Video Door Station -
Firmware 5.85.1.1
* AXIS P3384 fixed dome Network camera -
Firmware 6.10.1
* AXIS P5532-E PTZ Dome Network Camera -
Firmware 5.41.3.1
* AXIS Q60-E Network Dome PTZ -
Firmware 5.65.1.1, 5.41.*, 5.70.1.1
* AXIS Q7401 Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.50.4
* AXIS Q7404 Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.50.4.*
* AXIS Q7406 Blade Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.51.2
* AXIS Q7411 Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.90.1
* AXIS Q7414 Blade Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.51.2
* AXIS Q7424-R Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.50.4
* AXIS Q7424-R Mk II Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.51.3
* AXIS Q7436 Blade Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.90.1
The list bellow shows the firmwares affected (and probably these firmwares
are not available anymore, but just the last version of them, if you not
sure, check the hash). All these firmwares (in the second column) has the
same "devtools.sh" shellscript (responsible for trigger the RCE
vulnerability) embedded. The script can be found on directory:
"{HTMLROOT}/bin/devtools.sh".
========================================================================
PRODUCT FIRMWARE FIRMWARE HASH
========================================================================
AXIS A8004-VE 5.85.1.1 e666578d7fca54a7db0917839187cd1a
AXIS A8004-VE 5.85.1 50f114d1169f6fe8dbdadd89ad2e087d
AXIS F34 5.85.3 7a6ed55038edd8a2fc0f676fb8a04b10
AXIS F41 5.85.3 8a089a51a0ecd63543c7883c76db7921
AXIS F44 5.85.3 9e3b05625cfe6580ca3e41c5415090e7
AXIS M1013 5.50.5.4 231cdd7ba84a383ba7f2237612b1cc12
AXIS M1014 5.50.5.4 231cdd7ba84a383ba7f2237612b1cc12
AXIS M1025 5.50.5.4 90d59c56171402828fceb7d25b18be2e
AXIS M1033-W 5.50.5.4 7b96dd594f84fc8c3a4a3ab650434841
AXIS M1034-W 5.50.5.4 7b96dd594f84fc8c3a4a3ab650434841
AXIS M1054 5.50.3.4 39e279aa2c462e9ec01c7b90f698f76a
AXIS M1103 5.50.3 c10243b05fe30655ded7a12b998dbf5e
AXIS M1104 5.50.3 c10243b05fe30655ded7a12b998dbf5e
AXIS M1113 5.50.3 c10243b05fe30655ded7a12b998dbf5e
AXIS M1114 5.50.3 c10243b05fe30655ded7a12b998dbf5e
AXIS M1124 5.75.3.3 f53e0ada9f2e54d2717bf8ad1c7a5928
AXIS M1125 5.75.3.3 f53e0ada9f2e54d2717bf8ad1c7a5928
AXIS M1143-L 5.60.1.5 367aab0673fc1dec0b972fd80a62e75b
AXIS M1144-L 5.60.1.5 367aab0673fc1dec0b972fd80a62e75b
AXIS M1145 5.90.1 ece8f4ccd9d24a01d382798cb7e4a7c7
AXIS M1145-L 5.90.1 ece8f4ccd9d24a01d382798cb7e4a7c7
AXIS M2014 5.50.6 3ffe1a771565b61567f917621c737866
AXIS M3004 5.50.5.4 d65545ef6c03b33b20bf1a04e8216a65
AXIS M3005 5.50.5.4 b461fb6e6aab990d3650b48708cee811
AXIS M3006 5.70.1.2 b2864dcf48ac83053ba4516a2bda535e
AXIS M3007 5.75.1.1 a0cc2e9a6ddad758b16f7de518080f70
AXIS M3014 5.40.9.5 01d8917c9e60dde7741c4a317044b2f7
AXIS M3024-LVE 5.50.5.4 0b91bb66d37e208e130c7eb25099817b
AXIS M3025-VE 5.50.5.4 751f776668d340edf4149dc116ce26c6
AXIS M3026 5.70.1.2 3e78ce4badf994f6d10c5916b6d5513d
AXIS M3027 5.75.1.1 6d377ea9ea99068e910b416ccc73d8ca
AXIS M3037 5.75.1.1 ef69c662079018e19e988663ad1fc509
AXIS M3113-R 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS M3113-VE 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS M3114-R 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS M3114-VE 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS M3203 5.50.3.1 7da467702db8b0e57ea5d237bd10ab61
AXIS M3204 5.50.3.1 7da467702db8b0e57ea5d237bd10ab61
AXIS M5013 5.50.3.1 9183b9ac91c3c03522f37fce1e6c2205
AXIS M5014 5.50.3.1 9183b9ac91c3c03522f37fce1e6c2205
AXIS M7010 5.50.4.1 84f618087151b0cc46398a6e0c6ebc0d
AXIS M7011 5.90.1 362658a55d4f2043ed435c72588bd7e7
AXIS M7014 5.50.4.1 84f618087151b0cc46398a6e0c6ebc0d
AXIS M7016 5.51.2.3 b3de957bbca166f145969a6884050979
AXIS P1204 5.50.6 3ffe1a771565b61567f917621c737866
AXIS P1214 5.50.6 3ffe1a771565b61567f917621c737866
AXIS P1224 5.50.6 3ffe1a771565b61567f917621c737866
AXIS P1343 5.40.9.8 9bbd08a92881b1b07e9f497a436b6a60
AXIS P1344 5.40.9.8 9bbd08a92881b1b07e9f497a436b6a60
AXIS P1346 5.40.9.6 c89ee1e7c54b4728612277e18be1c939
AXIS P1347 5.40.9.6 f0f95768e367c3a2a8999a0bd8902969
AXIS P1353 5.60.1.5 0f59d0e34301519908754af850fdfebb
AXIS P1354 5.90.1 120c230067b7e000fa31af674f207f03
AXIS P1355 5.60.1.5 5dbec1d7b8b6f337581da6ec668a9aad
AXIS P1357 5.90.1 d83472c4d545763e5b05cd6d0c63430f
AXIS P1364 5.85.4 2db00322be0b8c939c89fe4f3e0fd67d
AXIS P1365 5.75.3.2 1eba3426b2046e696d80ea253fe5e9b6
AXIS P1405 5.80.1.1 4db97061feb3cf91eb0cded516f9c5af
AXIS P1425 5.80.1.1 e9213ed81dc68f07c854a990889995ba
AXIS P1427 5.80.1.1 dfe4cd28b929e78d42e8fc8c98616a7c
AXIS P1428-E 5.80.1.1 7a65a0b0e4050824de0d46a1725ad0ea
AXIS P1435 5.85.4.1 219467e77dcb3195d7203a79ecd30474
AXIS P3214 6.10.1 00fca61c0a97dfc5e670a308cbda14d4
AXIS P3215 6.10.1 00fca61c0a97dfc5e670a308cbda14d4
AXIS P3224 6.10.1.1 5fae8852b7790cf6f66bb2356c60acd6
AXIS P3225 6.10.1.1 5fae8852b7790cf6f66bb2356c60acd6
AXIS P3301 5.40.9.4 27b7a421f7e3511f3a4b960c80b42c56
AXIS P3304 5.40.9.4 df9e2159c4eadf5e955863c7c5691b1a
AXIS P3343 5.40.9.8 dd752099f8b2c48b91914ec32484f532
AXIS P3344 5.40.9.8 dd752099f8b2c48b91914ec32484f532
AXIS P3346 5.50.3.1 d30498356187ba44f94f31398b04a476
AXIS P3353 5.60.1.4 fa4924480563924a0365268f8eef8864
AXIS P3354 6.10.1 d2f317d88dea1f001ce8151106e0322b
AXIS P3363 5.60.1.5 4b3175a30893a270e5dca8fc405b5d7e
AXIS P3364 6.10.1 6128c6ba026a68a5759b08971504807e
AXIS P3365 6.10.1 f26b0616c595622abb17ce4411dee2b2
AXIS P3367 6.10.1 8dad67aae2ffaee6fb147d6942476f00
AXIS P3384 6.10.1 138ff1bdc97d025f8f31a55e408e2a1d
AXIS P3904-R 5.80.1 0b420fa6e8b768cafd6fa6b5920883be
AXIS P3905-R 5.80.1 0b420fa6e8b768cafd6fa6b5920883be
AXIS P3915-R 5.80.1 1dcf4a39c7e7349629ade723f563e892
AXIS P5414-E 5.90.1 f5782c5dbe8dcffd7863b248a55682ee
AXIS P5415-E 5.90.1 f5782c5dbe8dcffd7863b248a55682ee
AXIS P5512 95.50.4.2 a2d5aab90d51af80d924bb3cc8b249fc
AXIS P5512-E 5.50.4.2 4fd5d721e27fe0f4db7d652bd1730749
AXIS P5514-E 5.85.3 b1fc3d26f6293b94f042ac6ea3aa8271
AXIS P5515 5.85.3 99b2512b57ed8a12c6ad2e53adc8acf8
AXIS P5515-E 5.85.3 639388e504a0841cad2eee7374476727
AXIS P5522 5.50.4.3 8335552031bc297ce87666542f0e3106
AXIS P5522-E 5.50.4.2 218e1b6997f0e5338f86f0ed1b12f8a0
AXIS P5532 5.41.3.1 b1ab3dd8ed126dd68b4793dec9bf3698
AXIS P5532-E 5.41.3.1 f6322413687d169dce61459d8338a611
AXIS P5534 5.40.9.5 3b94922050bec9bc436dce3fcd9bcfaf
AXIS P5534-E 5.40.9.6 a931bc58ee0e882b359dbecd3d699c52
AXIS P5544 5.41.2.2 cb5bcec36f839914db93eaf17ae83e5e
AXIS P5624-E 5.75.1.1 b93952a6083aa628026f145a1dffa313
AXIS P5635-E 5.75.1.1 24d32e4fab54f16b5698ff4e477fc188
AXIS P7210 5.50.4.1 b0e19f8837754ac73aa146b5710a12b1
AXIS P7214 5.50.4.1 b0e19f8837754ac73aa146b5710a12b1
AXIS P7216 5.51.2.1 a77e96832f7d87970bf286288ce2ca81
AXIS P7224 5.51.2.1 5d5ecf065f456e66eb42d9360d22f863
AXIS P8514 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS Q1615 5.80.1.3 8d95c0f9f499f29fcfb95419b629ab44
AXIS Q1635 5.80.1.3 8d95c0f9f499f29fcfb95419b629ab44
AXIS Q1635-E 5.80.1.3 8d95c0f9f499f29fcfb95419b629ab44
AXIS Q1755 5.50.4.1 6ca8597f48ed122ce84c2172c079cdf9
AXIS Q1765-LE 5.90.1.1 7930bf5c4c947f2f948f8b7475f01409
AXIS Q1765-LE-PT 5.90.1.1 890ba75a8108d97f2ef1a4aecedf76b1
AXIS Q1775 5.85.3 f47bc9d46a913561e42b999cc6697a83
AXIS Q1910 5.50.4.1 71525d4d56d781318b64e8200806dcf0
AXIS Q1921 5.50.4.1 82f956fec96a9068941e24e12045cefd
AXIS Q1922 5.50.4.1 111a1a4f823e7281af1c872ba52f73c4
AXIS Q1931-E 5.75.1.3 5cf13a2c3d65644c3376ec6466dd9b49
AXIS Q1931-E-PT-Mount5.75.1.1 3ba7e187dc25e98ab73aef262b68e1b9
AXIS Q1932-E 5.75.1.2 b8efe54fc3eca7f2a59322779e63e8e1
AXIS Q1932-E PT.Mount5.75.1 513fc031f85542548eeccfeaa7c1a29e
AXIS Q2901-E 5.55.4.1 d2945717297edab3326179541cfa0688
AXIS Q2901-E PT.Mount5.55.4.1 a41aed45359f11d2ec248419c124a52d
AXIS Q3505 5.80.1.4 9394b3577bdb17cb9f74e56433a0e660
AXIS Q3709-PVE 5.75.1.1 e9fb87337c0a24139a40459336f0bcb3
AXIS Q6000-E 5.65.1.1 b97df19057db1134a43c26f5ddf484de
AXIS Q6032 5.41.1.2 8caad5cd7beeebaf5b05b011b8a1e104
AXIS Q6032-C 5.41.3 58213a4b1c7a980dcb3b54bbee657506
AXIS Q6032-E 5.41.1.4 b4aa977b254694b5d14d7e87e5652a6b
AXIS Q6034 5.41.1.1 4f44a8661534bac08a50651ee90a7d47
AXIS Q6034-C 5.41.3 25d455dc2e2d11639f29b0b381ddd7cb
AXIS Q6034-E 5.41.1.2 3bfab61354170e42ce27fc2477d57026
AXIS Q6035 5.41.1.2 9d124d096bf48fbfd2e11c34de3c880d
AXIS Q6035-C 5.41.3 42d23ae4d0b1456cc54e54734a586d53
AXIS Q6035-E 5.41.1.5 e2123a9e37fda4044847c810b7f25253
AXIS Q6042 5.70.1.1 4f253ed4bb0efaa4a845e0e9bd666766
AXIS Q6042-C 5.70.1.1 21bd154f706091b348c33dd9564438da
AXIS Q6042-E 5.70.1.2 9d5dc03268638498d0299bf466fa0501
AXIS Q6042-S 5.70.1.1 085fc5903d99899d78b48abb9cafdecd
AXIS Q6044 5.70.1.1 29e4cdb9ba2f18953512c5d1e17229c1
AXIS Q6044-C 5.70.1.1 dc3fc472b88e07278e6ff82eaee71a8d
AXIS Q6044-E 5.70.1.2 83d1e6c1fe5aa9c26710eed03721f928
AXIS Q6044-S 5.70.1.1 654ffd048fdb41ae3c86da4f41e2a31d
AXIS Q6045 5.70.1.1 2db9b247729e9487f476a35a6dd456ce
AXIS Q6045-C 5.70.1.1 9bb561126e2b4f69ac526cfccdf254f6
AXIS Q6045-C-MkII 5.70.1.1 2c9efccb0fba0e63fc4fff73e6ba0fea
AXIS Q6045-E 5.70.1.2 321a5d906863787fdc5e34483e6ec2a8
AXIS Q6045-E-MkII 5.70.1.2 d9d4242a83b1ed225dd3c20530da034d
AXIS Q6045-MkII 5.70.1.1 686f0fe8727e2a726091c9ddf3827741
AXIS Q6045-S 5.70.1.1 43473e42f360efb4ea6f84da35fd9746
AXIS Q6045-S-Mk-II 5.70.1.1 d747a5a3d69264af8448f72822e8d60b
AXIS Q6114-E 5.65.2.1 8cb9a3a88c79ebb2cf5def3cda0da148
AXIS Q6115-E 5.65.2.1 7d2dd3410ce505cd04a1c182917523a5
AXIS Q6128-E 5.85.2.1 49508ff56508f809a75d367896e8d56f
AXIS Q7401 5.50.4 99855c6c9777fdd5fc5e58349ae861a5
AXIS Q7404 5.50.4.2 ffdbee7c9daad303e89a432ba9c4711d
AXIS Q7404 5.50.4 6e31e9709cf9717968c244267aa8c6d0
AXIS Q7406 5.51.2 3cdb7935278157b9c91c334613012b1e
AXIS Q7411 5.90.1 26893adedcfc1953829084e8e7c3fbdd
AXIS Q7414 5.51.2 8ff659a8db077b545205f56dfef217d4
AXIS Q7424-R 5.50.4 d570ef1886c84ab53934fc51385e8aa7
AXIS Q7424-R-MkII 5.51.3 964a13f6b1aef17562cbbde11d936dee
AXIS Q7436 5.90.1 8fe1ef95b231bf6f771c3edc0fbc8afd
AXIS Q8414-LVS 6.10.1 9529cd9cf3b3bd66bec22c0b1c7448cd
AXIS Q8631-E 5.75.1 c7f882afc268ca3d60d07d5770db6a51
AXIS Q8632-E 5.75.1 f01d9a86d21335fe3d78e634858b9e77
AXIS Q8665-LE 5.90.1.1 1549b56d34250a93bbcf7b24b4f63699
AXIS V5915 5.75.1.1 a1c39a9cd545091825001a831d0c1ea4
Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds
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According to the Vendor, tickets was opened to correct this issue.
Credits
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These vulnerabilities has been discovered and published by Orwelllabs.
Timeline
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2015-09-10: First attempt to contact Vendor
2015-10-30: Vulnerability was reported to CERT
2015-11-30: CVE-IDs are assigned
2016-07-25: Since the first vulnerability was published (09.04.2016 -
EDB-ID: 39683)
a long conversation revolved around these vulnerabilities with the
manufacturer.
We maintained communication since 15/04/2016 until now.
As there is still disagreement regarding vulnerabilities (and botnets in
the wild: https://goo.gl/k79I8u),
we thought it good to publish this advisory, since it has already exhausted
all deadlines.
Legal Notices
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The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. We accept no
responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this
information.
About Orwelllabs
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# Loadind k4fK43sQu3 m0dule...
