ere are the details of the (patched) IPv4 evasion I found in Suricata IDS/IPS:
website : https://suricata-ids.org/
editor : Open Information Security Foundation (OISF) https://oisf.net/
# Impacted version
3.2.x before 220.127.116.11
3.1.3 and before
All execution mode are impacted : nfqueue, af-packet, ...
# Vulnerability description
Suricata did not used the IP protocol field value to identify
fragments from a same packet, whereas the RFC 791 states that 2
fragments should be defragmented together only if the protocol
field have the same value.
This flaw makes it possible to craft a packet that will only
be defragmented by Suricata (and not the destination host), leading to
a packet injection in the IDS detection engine.
# Impact on security
An attacker can fully evade any TCP signature, without any logs / alerts.
# Resources and links :
New patched Suricata versions :
Bug tracker and patch commit :
# Thanks and note
I'd like to give a special thanks to the suricata development team and
especially Victor Julien : I contacted him concerning the issue, got an answer
the same day, and it was corrected on github 2 working days after.
Really impressive guys.
If anyone needs more information about this, feel free to contact me at
jeremy [dot] beaume (a) protonmail [dot] com