iOS / macOS HID Event System Sandbox Escape

2018.10.20
Risk: High
Local: Yes
Remote: No
CVE: N/A
CWE: N/A

iOS/MacOS sandbox escape due to trusted length field in shared memory used by HID event subsystem io_hideventsystem is a MIG service which provides proxy access to various HID devices for untrusted clients. On iOS it's hosted by backboardd and on MacOS by hidd. The actual implementation is in IOKit.framework. I, and also pangu jailbreak team, had previously found a few bugs in the kernel IODataQueue code. It seems that io_hideventsystem also uses IODataQueues purely in userspace. That is, via shared memory between two userspace processes rather than between a userspace process and the kernel. It turns out that the userspace code for enqueuing and dequeuing from an IODataQueue has none of the hardening that the kernel code now has, so it's trivial to just replace the length, head and tail fields (which are in a header at the start of the shared memory buffer) such that the remote process tries to enqueue outside of the bounds of the IODataQueue's actual backing buffer. This is a very basic PoC thrown together to minimally repro the issue. Run build.sh and run.sh, use the mouse a bit and notice the hidd crash log. Don't try to attach lldb to hidd, you will struggle to interact with it! Specifically the server will allocate a buffer wrapped by a mach port (via mach_make_memory_entry_64) then in the client you can see inside IOHIDEventQueueCreateWithVM the port's memory being mapped. The attached dylib just interposes mach_vm_map to replace the size and tail fields once the shared memory is mapped in the client. I've also tested this on iOS just manually manipulating the shared memory after it's mapped. Depending on how clients use io_hideventsystem it might be possible to hop first in to backboardd then in to another client (if that client is also enqueuing events into a queue) but that will take some more research. Tested on MacOS 10.13.6 and iOS 11.3.1 (that's the highest version I have on a device with me right now.) Found by: ianbeer


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