-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Advisory ID: SYSS-2019-010 Product: Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 Manufacturer: Fujitsu Affected Version(s): Model No. GK381 Tested Version(s): Model No. GK381 Vulnerability Type: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data (CWE-311) Risk Level: High Solution Status: Open (product reached end-of-life (EOL) in May 2019) Manufacturer Notification: 2019-04-01 Solution Date: - Public Disclosure: 2019-10-23 CVE Reference: CVE-2019-18201 Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg (SySS GmbH) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 is a wireless desktop set consisting of a mouse and a keyboard. The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1, 2]): "The Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 is an excellent desktop solution for users with ambition. This durable keyboard set is equipped with secure 2.4 GHz technology and plug and play technology. The elegant mouse works on most surfaces due to its precise 1000 dpi sensor. It offers fabulous features and ultra slim, portable design." Due to an insecure implementation of the radio data communication without encryption, an attacker is able to remotely eavesdrop sensitive data, for instance passwords entered via the wireless keyboard. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: SySS GmbH found out that the wireless desktop set Fujitsu LX390 does not use encryption for transmitting data packets containing keyboard events like keystrokes. However, the payload and checksum of data packets are transmitted in an encoded way using so-called data whitening or data scrambling of the used 2.4 GHz radio transceiver. Thus, without knowing this data whitening mechanism and its configuration, an attacker cannot actually gain access to the cleartext payload contents of transmitted radio packets during a sniffing attack. By analyzing the Fujitsu LX390 keyboard and its radio communication, SySS was able to identify the used communication protocol, the data whitening mechanism, and how to find the correct data whitening configuration by sniffing the radio communication of a specific keyboard. With this knowledge, an attacker can remotely analyze and decode sent keyboard events of a Fujitsu LX390 keyboard as cleartext, for instance keystrokes, and thus gain unauthorized access to sensitive data like passwords. Knowing how to analyze the data communication of a Fujitsu LX390 keyboard also enabled SySS to synthesize valid data packets which allowed for key stroke injection attacks, which are described in the SySS security advisory SYSS-2019-011 (see [3]). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): SySS GmbH could successfully perform sniffing attacks against the 2.4 GHz radio communication of the Fujitsu LX390 keyboard using a software-defined radio and an in-house developed software tool utilizing GNU Radio [3]. For the protocol analysis,the software tool Universal Radio Hacker [4] was used. SySS GmbH could also perform successful sniffing attacks using another in-house developed software tool in combination with the USB radio dongle Crazyradio PA and the nrf-research-firmware by Bastille Networks Internet Security written by Marc Newlin (see [6] and [7]). The following output of the developed PoC software tool illustrates a successful keystroke sniffing attack. # python3 fujitsu_lx390_sniffer.py -l -p "3b:5b:53:bd:43" -c 28 _ __ _ _ ____ _ __ __ | |/ /___ _ _ ___| |_ _ __ ___ | | _____ / ___| _ __ (_)/ _|/ _| ___ _ __ | ' // _ \ | | / __| __| '__/ _ \| |/ / _ \ \___ \| '_ \| | |_| |_ / _ \ '__| | . \ __/ |_| \__ \ |_| | | (_) | < __/ ___) | | | | | _| _| __/ | |_|\_\___|\__, |___/\__|_| \___/|_|\_\___| |____/|_| |_|_|_| |_| \___|_| |___/ SySS Fujitsu LX390 Keystroke Sniffer - PoC Tool v0.1 by Matthias Deeg - SySS GmbH Based on different tools by Marc Newlin - --- 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:EF:F5:0A:2D 02:45:13:93:AB KEY_P 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:CF:F5:0C:CB 02:41:13:F3:CC KEY_P 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:EF:F5:0A:2D 02:45:13:93:AB KEY_P 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:CF:1D:70:ED 02:41:04:CD:A8 KEY_A 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:EF:1D:76:0B 02:45:04:AD:CF KEY_A 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:CF:1D:70:ED 02:41:04:CD:A8 KEY_A 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:EF:55:BF:C7 02:45:16:3E:FC KEY_S 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:CF:55:B9:21 02:41:16:5E:9B KEY_S 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:EF:55:BF:C7 02:45:16:3E:FC KEY_S 3B:5B:53:BD:43:DB 42:EF:65:89:94 02:45:1A:52:36 KEY_W (...) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: The Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 reached its end-of-life (EOL) in May 2019. Fujitsu has released two new wireless keyboard sets named LX410 [8] and LX960 [9] that are not affected by the described security issue. SySS recommends replacing LX390 wireless keyboard sets used in environments with higher security demands, for instance with one of the newer successor models LX410 or LX960. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2019-04-01: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2019-04-02: Fujitsu confirms receipt of security advisory and asks questions regarding the reported security issue; answered open questions 2019-04-11: Received further questions from manufacturer 2019-04-18: Answered open questions and postponed disclosure date 2019-10-08: Reminded manufacturer of the upcoming release of the security advisory 2019-10-18: Discussed details of coordinated disclosure with manufacturer 2019-10-21: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] Product website for Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 https://www.fujitsu.com/global/products/computing/peripheral/accessories/input-devices/keyboards/keyboard-lx390.html [2] Data sheet Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX390 https://produktinfo.conrad.com/datenblaetter/1300000-1399999/001375431-da-01-en-FUJITSU_DESKTOP_SET_WIREL_LX390_WEISS.pdf [3] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2019-011 https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2019-011.txt [4] GNU Radio https://www.gnuradio.org/ [5] Universal Radio Hacker (URH) https://github.com/jopohl/urh [6] Product website for Crazyradio PA https://www.bitcraze.io/crazyradio-pa/ [7] Bastille's nRF24 research firmware and tools https://github.com/BastilleResearch/nrf-research-firmware [8] Product website for Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX410 https://www.fujitsu.com/global/products/computing/peripheral/accessories/input-devices/keyboards/keyboard-lx410.html [9] Product website for Fujitsu Wireless Keyboard Set LX960 https://www.fujitsu.com/global/products/computing/peripheral/accessories/input-devices/keyboards/keyboard-lx960.html [10] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2019-010 https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2019-010.txt [11] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS Web site. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE0fCgNfBs5nXNuQUU2aS/ajStTasFAl2wG84ACgkQ2aS/ajSt TasGfA/6A2+us49Z3ZAYp/ctq+bCORNooowoZFf0eYW5+k0pLOuVusTA+sGwnxgN VZcCpAzGKkkXiqOI+vVgzyncjzFY33GAiFEat+pFjsxRL9clO0rKKWTymTKA5uIR 1nn4cR98gfgB5ik5u6WZSQeH6hmP/kEmjRMjS0B7LjrFu+oWU3rnIqS4RhcSYRdd 9JSEdj2wD9R3IHwglZE7t8d/p4OBXmq+Ith0fzssJW2J+salsqwuD8YK58fMe1J5 i8WutJry1LCW+eYrC9MQYWSYVlj82manqoyP8GLJtRkt9Wk1Zp+kNr4bn7t8GP0J N/QTLzUOrOfL9tsbsPxOU6t5rCS40iZdD3d2UFDQPgJHreUA6ocJN3f4ajnzwq7h Xj/Q+t43zhfi6IqbqBciDBzFskO/AVyo7odP7RRt5g4p8fE40+PogNegaO+n1vBv K2gTPGk3pgogkxT+Dk8fpPalVltr7eSRz+0/3KLun9JUgQMJc1SB2pjNDlV6nAFC vg7QJ6aWufrNKia4/NorKXrD48ubBkvA6R+CVDed1ePbbQSDpFzjgVRHoc+5vXsE BCU/QlEK6LmM2OylFvsmlEaHA/UDmXb2ppCrxTbgAywcKlJ3JogbgKaKrKfLXTn0 lpFMUy3CyDUJmP2mT5uzsGqp+nj97TBWgdPcaccd7xEeWxU9xW4= =Noe8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----