-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/ Multiple XSS in Sun Communications Express 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Multiple XSS in Sun Communications Express Advisory ID: CORE-2009-0109 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/sun-communications-express Date published: 2009-05-20 Date of last update: 2009-05-20 Vendors contacted: Sun Microsystems Release mode: Coordinated release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Cross site scripting (XSS) Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: No Bugtraq ID: 34154, 34155 CVE Name: CVE-2009-1729 3. *Vulnerability Description* Several cross-site scripting vulnerabilities were found in the following files/urls of the Sun Java System Communications Express [1] : 1. 'https://<server>/uwc/abs/search.xml?' 2. 'http://<server>/uwc/base/UWCMain' Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities [2], [3] allow an attacker to execute arbitrary scripting code in the context of the user browser (in the vulnerable application's domain). For example, an attacker could exploit a XSS vulnerability to steal user cookies (and then impersonate the legitimate user) or fake a page requesting information to the user (i.e. credentials). This vulnerability occurs when user-supplied data is displayed without encoding. 4. *Vulnerable packages* 4.1. *SPARC Platform* . Sun Java System Communications Express 6.3 (Communications Suite 5 or 6) without patch 122793-26. . Sun Java System Communications Express 6 2005Q4 (6.2). 4.2. *x86 Platform* . Sun Java System Communications Express 6.3 (Communications Suite 5 or 6) without patch 122794-26. . Sun Java System Communications Express 6 2005Q4 (6.2). 4.3. *Linux* . Sun Java System Communications Express 6.3 (Communications Suite 5 or 6) without patch 122795-26. . Sun Java System Communications Express 6 2005Q4 (6.2). 5. *Non-vulnerable packages* . Sun Java System Communications Express 6.3 with the patches described in sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* The Sun Alert for this issue has been assigned id 258068 and it is available at the following URL: http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-258068-1. 7. *Credits* These vulnerabilities were discovered by the SCS team from Core Security Technologies. 8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* Cross-Site Scripting (commonly referred to as XSS) attacks are the result of improper encoding or filtering of input obtained from untrusted sources. Basically, they consist in the attacker injecting malicious tags and/or script code that is executed by the user's web browser when accessing the vulnerable web site. The injected code then takes advantage of the trust given by the user to the vulnerable site. These attacks are usually targeted at all users of a web application rather than at the application itself (although one could say that the users are affected because of a vulnerability of the web application). The term 'cross-site scripting' is also sometimes used in a broader-sense referring to different types of attacks involving script injection into the client. For additional information, please look at the references [2], [3], [4], [5] and [6]. 8.1. *Vulnerability #1 - XSS (BID 34154, CVE-2009-1729)* Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities were found in the following file/url: /----------- https://<server>/uwc/abs/search.xml? - -----------/ This is part of the 'Personal Address Book->Add contact' functionality. Although the affected URL is originally accessed through a POST request, this vulnerability can be exploited both with a GET and with a POST request. Using the following variables: /----------- abperson_displayName - -----------/ The contents of the variables previously mentioned are not being encoded at the time of using them in HTML output, therefore allowing an attacker who controls their content to insert javascript code. The following code is a proof of concept of this flaw: /----------- https://<server>/uwc/abs/search.xml?bookid=e11e46531a8a0&j_encoding=UTF- 8&uiaction=quickaddcontact&entryid=&valueseparator=%3B&prefix=abperson_& stopalreadyselected=1&isselchanged=0&idstoadd=&selectedbookid=&type=abpe rson%2Cgroup&wcfg_groupview=&wcfg_searchmode=&stopsearch=1&expandgroup=& expandselectedgroup=&expandonmissing=&nextview=&bookid=e11e46531a8a0&act ionbookid=e11e46531a8a0&searchid=7&filter=entry%2Fdisplayname%3D*&firste ntry=0&sortby=%2Bentry%2Fdisplayname&curbookid=e11e46531a8a0&searchelem= 0&searchby=contains&searchstring=Search+for&searchbookid=e11e46531a8a0&a bperson_givenName=aa&abperson_sn=aa&abperson_piEmail1=a%40a.com&abperson _piEmail1Type=work&abperson_piPhone1=11&abperson_piPhone1Type=work&quick addprefix=abperson_&abperson_displayName=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28%27xss2%27% 29%3C%2Fscript%3E%2C+%3Cscript%3Ealert%28%27xss1%27%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&ab person_entrytype=abperson&abperson_memberOfPIBook=e11e46531a8a0 - -----------/ 8.2. *Vulnerability #2 - XSS (BID 34155, CVE-2009-1729)* Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities were found in the following file/url: /----------- http://<server>/uwc/base/UWCMain - -----------/ The contents of the url are not being encoded at the time of using them in HTML output, therefore allowing an attacker who controls their content to insert javascript code. This vulnerability can be exploited through a GET request, and the user does not need to be logged into the web application. This makes this cross-site scripting vulnerability perfect to be used by attackers on email-based attacks. An attacker can send via email a link to a 'calendar' and 'exploit' the victim. The following code is a proof of concept of this flaw: /----------- http://<server>/uwc/base/UWCMain?anon=true&calid=test (at) test (dot) com [email concealed]&caltype=t emporaryCalids&date=20081223T143836Z&category=All&viewctx=day&temporaryC alendars=test (at) test (dot) com [email concealed]%27;alert(%27hello%27);a=%27 - -----------/ 9. *Report Timeline* . 2009-01-09: Core Security Technologies notifies Sun Security Coordination Team of the vulnerability, setting the estimated publication date of the advisory to Feb 2nd. Technical details are sent to Communications Express team. . 2009-01-09: The vendor acknowledges reception of the report and asks Core to postpone publication of the security advisory in order to have enough time to investigate and fix the bugs. Vendor requests GPG key of Core's security Advisories team. . 2009-01-12: Core agrees to postpone the advisory publication but asks the vendor for a feedback of their engineering team as soon as possible in order to coordinate the release date of fixes and security advisories. . 2009-01-21: Core asks the vendor an estimated date for the release of patches and fixes. . 2009-01-21: Sun Security Coordination Team notifies Core that the vendor's engineering team is hoping to have patches released sometime near the end of February or the beginning of March. The time-frame is tentative due to the vendor's QA testing process that includes testing of all patches which may include fixes to bugs unrelated to those reported by Core. . 2009-02-06: Core re-schedules the advisory publication date to Feb 25th. Updated timeline sent to the vendor requesting confirmation that patches will be released by then. . 2009-02-16: The vendor asks Core to delay the advisory publication until the end of March, in order to finish a rigorous process of internal testing. . 2009-02-16: Core re-schedules the advisory publication date to March 30th. Core indicates that it would appreciate further technical details about the flaws from the vendors engineering team. . 2009-02-17: Vendor acknowledges previous email. . 2009-03-17: Core reminds the vendor that the publication of the advisory is scheduled for March 30th. Core also requests updated information about the development and release of fixed versions. . 2009-03-23: Vendor confirms that it is on track to have the fix ready for publication at the end of this month, March 30th, and provides a list of affected products and versions. . 2009-03-24: Vendor states that there was a confusion on his end, and that patches are scheduled to complete testing and to be published on 22nd April 2009. Vendor requests Core to delay publication of its advisory. . 2009-03-25: Core confirms that the advisory publication is rescheduled to April 22nd. . 2009-04-08: Sun engineering team informs that they have a fix for other flaw reported by Core [7]. This fix is currently undergoing Sun standard testing, and vendor expect to be ready to publish the patch on Monday 20th April 2009. . 2009-04-16: Sun engineering team confirms they are still planning to release the fix for [7] on 20th April 2009. . 2009-04-17: Core ask Sun engineering team for the vulnerability reported in this advisory (Sun Communication Express). Core requires an estimated date for the release of patches and fixes. . 2009-04-20: Sun engineering team informs that the issue which affects Communications Express is planned for publication later in the week. The vendor will get back to Core with a more final date once they have confirmed the details. . 2009-04-22: Sun engineering team informs that the fix related to Communications Express is currently undergoing internal testing and they expect to be ready to publish the fixes and the sun alert on 6th May 2009. . 2009-04-29: Core re-schedules the advisory publication date to 6th May 2009, asks Sun for an URL of the corresponding Sun alert and a list of non-vulnerable packages. . 2009-05-05: Sun engineering team informs that they are experiencing some difficulties related to the final release stages of the fix for this bug. The vendor will not be ready to go public with this fix tomorrow. . 2009-05-05: Core responds that it is possible to postpone the publication of the advisory, but asks Sun engineering team for an estimated date to reach the final release of the fix as soon as possible. . 2009-05-08: Sun engineering team informs they are still experiencing some delays with the final stages of this release process and asks to delay the publication of the advisory. . 2009-05-18: Sun engineering team confirms that they have resolved the outstanding issues related to this vulnerability and they expect to be ready to publish the fixes on Wednesday 20th May. . 2009-05-18: Core re-schedules the advisory publication date to 20th May. . 2009-05-20: The advisory CORE-2009-0109 is published. 10. *References* [1] http://www.sun.com/software/products/calendar_srvr/comms_express/index.x ml [2] HTML Code Injection and Cross-Site Scripting http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/CSS.html. [3] The Cross-Site Scripting FAQ (XSS) http://www.cgisecurity.com/articles/xss-faq.shtml [4] How to prevent Cross-Site Scripting Security Issues http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=KB;en-us;q252985 [5] How to review ASP Code for CSSI Vulnerability http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;253119 [6] How to review Visual InterDev Generated Code for CSSI Vulnerability http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;253120 [7] HTTP Response Splitting vulnerability in Sun Delegated Administrator - - http://www.coresecurity.com/content/sun-delegated-administrator 11. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs. 12. *About Core Security Technologies* Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help security-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a proactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship product, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing enterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network, endpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security Technologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class security consulting services, including penetration testing and software security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at http://www.coresecurity.com. 13. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2009 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2009 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely provided that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit is given. 14. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.a sc. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFKFEWVyNibggitWa0RAqSuAKCRr0zxGIvhYRVD92VLI7W1pJezQwCfVvSO SNbJmS6GjYkZPyIfI3+JIpw= =wOZe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----