SecurePoint UTM 12.x Session ID Leak

Credit: Julien Ahrens
Risk: Medium
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-200

RCE Security Advisory 1. ADVISORY INFORMATION ======================= Product: SecurePoint UTM Vendor URL: Type: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor [CWE-200] Date found: 2023-01-05 Date published: 2023-04-11 CVSSv3 Score: 9.0 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) CVE: CVE-2023-22620 2. CREDITS ========== This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Julien Ahrens from RCE Security. 3. VERSIONS AFFECTED ==================== SecurePoint UTM 12.2.5 SecurePoint UTM 12.2.5 SecurePoint UTM SecurePoint UTM 12.2.4 SecurePoint UTM SecurePoint UTM SecurePoint UTM Reseller Preview SecurePoint UTM Reseller Preview 4. INTRODUCTION =============== With secure networks, home office, site connectivity and the protection of your data are easy to implement. UTM firewalls and VPN gateways from Securepoint secure your networks - with suitable IT security solutions for small and medium-sized businesses for rent, purchase or as a complete service. (from the vendor's homepage) 5. VULNERABILITY DETAILS ======================== The firewall offers an administrative web panel on port 11115 and a user login panel on port 443. Both offer the endpoint at "/spcgi.cgi" which leaks the "sessionid" of the last active authenticated user to any unauthenticated user when the application processes an invalid authentication attempt. However, the attacker needs two more authentication attributes to be able to successfully authenticate using the leaked sessionid: 1. The attacker must have the same REMOTE_ADDR as the user whose sessionid is leaked. This isn't trivial to achieve, but exploitation is easy in configurations where any of the two panels are NAT'ed. 2. The attacker needs to know the User-Agent of the user whose sessionid is leaked. However, since the application does not enforce a rate limit on the authentication endpoint, it is trivially easy to brute-force the User-Agent belonging to the leaked session and then authenticate to the device. As the linked blog post describes, the number of possible User-Agents can be further reduced. Interestingly this exploit works across both authentication panels, so an attacker can also leak the sessionId of an administrator using the user login interface and vice versa. Successful exploits can allow an unauthenticated attacker to authenticate against the administrative interface without knowing the user's password. If the last authenticated user has administrative privileges, this means a complete compromise of the device since it is trivially easy to escalate from admin to root using legitimate features. 6. PROOF OF CONCEPT =================== Wait until a user successfully authenticates against the device and then issue an invalid authentication attempt like: POST /spcgi.cgi HTTP/1.1 Host: Content-Length: 86 Accept: */* Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8 Connection: close {"module":"auth","command":["login"],"sessionid":"","arguments":{"user":"","pass":""}} The application then returns the last active user's sessionid: { "sessionid": "8d4602543120a48a4ec30762c5cad3fa", "mode": "w", "result": { "module": "server", "code": 401, "status": "Unauthorized", "message": "failure: access denied" }, "version": "11.6" } This is also exploitable against the user interface on port 443. 7. SOLUTION =========== Upgrade to version or newer 8. REPORT TIMELINE ================== 2023-01-04: Discovery of the vulnerability 2023-01-04: MITRE assigns CVE-2023-22620 2023-01-05: Contacted vendor via their security@ 2023-01-05: Vendor response 2023-01-05: Sent full vulnerability details to vendor 2023-01-06: Vendor acknowledged the vulnerability 2023-01-06: Vendor asks to set the disclosure date to 2023-04-11 due to the # of affected customers 2023-01-06: RCE Security agrees to the proposed disclosure date 2023-01-06: Vendor publishes hotfix which fixes the vulnerability 2023-04-11: Public disclosure 9. REFERENCES ==============

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