Canon ImageRunner reveals SMB, IPX, and FTP username/passwords

2006.09.12
Credit: gunrnr
Risk: Low
Local: Yes
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-Other


Ogólna skala CVSS: 4/10
Znaczenie: 2.9/10
Łatwość wykorzystania: 8/10
Wymagany dostęp: Zdalny
Złożoność ataku: Niska
Autoryzacja: Jednorazowa
Wpływ na poufność: Częściowy
Wpływ na integralność: Brak
Wpływ na dostępność: Brak

gunrnr (at) earthlink (dot) net [email concealed] wrote: > The Canon ImageRunner multi-function device?s Remote UI web interface software will reveal username and password pairs contained in address book entries when the address book is exported. These address book entries are used for scanning to SMB, FTP, or IPX shares. In addition, passwords for password protected fax entries will be revealed. > > This security flaw was brought to Canon's attention through its vendor Ikon. Canon's recommendation is to enable the system manager ID to restrict access to the web interface. However, this is a limited security measure for if there are users that have access to that portion of the web interface but shouldn't have access to the usernames and passwords stored in the device, this will not protect against such. Also, if the system manager ID and password is compromised it will make accessible the user names and password pairs stored on the device. > > Tested and verified on Canon iR C3220, iR 5020, iR9070, iR C6800, iR C6870, and iR 8500. Also, machines running the Fiery software have the same exploit as the Fiery software works in conjunction with the Remote UI software. As the Remote UI software is the same across many machines, it is likely that the problem exists in all devices running Remote UI. > > Following is an example of an exported address book: > > === > # Canon AddressBook version: 1 > # CharSet: WCP1252 > # SubAddressBookName: > > dn: 201 > cn: FTP address > cnread: FTP address > url: ftp.myftpserver.com > path: ftpdir/ > username: foo > pwd: bar > accesscode: 0 > protocol: ftp > objectclass: top > objectclass: extensibleobject > objectclass: remotefilesystem > > dn: 202 > cn: Fax address > cnread: Fax address > dialdata: 5551212 > pwd: 123456789 > txstartspeed: 33600 > commode: domestic > lineselect: auto > faxprotocol: g4 > accesscode: 0 > protocol: t30 > objectclass: top > objectclass: extensibleobject > objectclass: g3fax > > dn: 203 > cn: SMB address > cnread: SMB address > url: smb.mysmbserver.com > path: pathtoshare/ > username: foo > pwd: bar > accesscode: 0 > protocol: smb > objectclass: top > objectclass: extensibleobject > objectclass: remotefilesystem > > dn: 204 > cn: IPX Address > cnread: IPX Address > url: ipx.myipxserver.com > path: pathtoshare/ > username: foo > pwd: bar > accesscode: 0 > protocol: ipx > objectclass: top > objectclass: extensibleobject > objectclass: remotefilesystem > === > > -GR Tested and verified on an iR 2620.


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