Jiwa Financials - Reporting allows execution of arbitrary reports as SQL user with full permissions.

Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes

Date: 28/5/2006 Product: Jiwa Financials 6.4.14 - http://www.jiwa.com.au/ Vulnerability: Reporting allows execution of arbitrary reports as SQL user with full SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE SQL permissions. Product Background --------------------- On execution Jiwa Financials authenticates users against a username/password database On a SQL server to access that users access level. To do this it gets its SQL connection details from a .ini file located on the users Application Data folder called Jiwalog.ini The contents of the file are as follows: [Connections] Count=01 Connection01=<DatasourceName>,Z:maininifile.ini [Parameters] LastSQLLogin=jiwauser LastUserName=<last user> LastConnectionODBC=<DatasourceName> Within maininifile.ini it sets out the users menu amongst other things ie. ' Menu Start '=========== ShowGST= 0 [Modules] Count=09 Module001=Inventory,1 Module002=Debtors,2 Module003=Contacts,8 Module004=Sales Order Entry,3 Module005=Creditors,7 Module006=Purchase Orders,5 Module007=General Ledger,4 Module008=Monthly Reports,2 Module009=System,6 Ok so there?s the main menu drawn for the user ? note a standardized .ini file for the entire site is common place Placing all modules on the main menu and just restricting access per module when one tries to access it. Reporting --------- When a user executes any menu option to run a report, it loads the report module which is standard across the board and passes To the reporting module, the report object that was listed on the menu the user selected. The report files are all Crystal Reports and are stored on a common mapped network drive ? generally J drive. The full path and filename to the .rpt file is detailed on the screen in a textbox with a command button to the right of it that Allows the user to browse for another location or report ? THIS INCLUDES ANY OTHER MAPPABLE DRIVE AND THE LOCAL COMPUTER DRIVES ie. The local My Documents for the evil user. This is a feature apparently because it allows the users to specify different report file versions etc Ok now for the issue -------------------- User logs into Jiwa Financials, goes into Sales Order Processing which is standard for anyone that generates an invoice ? ie. People working out on the front desk selling products over the counter ? not a staff level you want to give access to your general ledger or anything else. Create a blank crystal report file and point it at a Jiwa table called HR_Staff for example. Create the report using a dummy database. The username, password and data source including database name is passed to the report at runtime ? all you need correct is the table name that you could just get anyway from Systables? Now because the guy that works at front counter - although having some remote clue on how to use the Crystal Report Wizard ? he doesn?t have access to save the .rpt file to the network drive with the other reports nor would he want to because he may get caught that way so he either saves it to his USB drive and it appears as a locally available drive. He goes into his sales order report to look up a customers previous quote or anything remotely using the reporting module - given the application does pretty much everything output wise through different Crystal Reports, that?s pretty easy. He then clicks the Command button to change the location of the .rpt file to his USB Drive ie. E:Evil_Jiwa_RPTUserlist.rpt He then selects ?Print To Screen? to the left of the command button. He then clicks the ?Print Button? and waits for the few seconds it takes to return EVERY JIWA USER?S USERNAME, CLEAR TEXT PASSWORD, FIRST NAME, SURNAME, POSITION IN THE COMPANY AND OTHER DETAILS. What has actually happened -------------------------- Because the Jiwa application passes the username/password/data source details directly to the .rpt file, it uses the same SQL user account that the rest of the application uses that has full SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE AND EXECUTE rights. An example of one of the standard stored proceedures in the Jiwa distribution allows you to drop the primary key from a table with the table name - these stored proceedures are executable from this reporting user. Conclusion ---------- This applications technology leaves a lot to be desired. When you execute the application, the login screen has ?ActiveX Three Teir Client Server? up the left hand side and ?Client Server Accounting? written horizontally above the username/password textbox?s. The only thing installed on the ?SERVER? is Microsoft SQL Server and the Jiwa Database plus a truckload of .rpt files. In no way whatsoever is this application a three tier client server solution and that is something the company refuses to accept. All usernames and passwords are TRANSMITTED in clear text to the local SQL Server ODBC driver from the application. All usernames and passwords are STORED in clear text in the SQL Server Database in the table HR_Staff Not even simple base64 encoding has been used. There is no administrative control over users menu options. Far too many variables are available and changeable on the user end outside the control of the network administrators. There is no remote attempt to validate access to reports vs users seen in any previous revisions I have seen and 6.4.14 is current. Bottom line ? if you have this application on your site ? you are vulnerable ? at this stage there is no current patch. Company Response ---------------- Mr Mike Sheen of Jiwa Australia has responded calling this a low risk. As far as I?m concerned, the general ledger, lists of creditors and debitors is a considerable risk to any company let alone one turning over millions of dollars per year. Jiwa have promised to encrypt the passwords in the database in their next commercial release. To quote his email on 28/5/06: The vulnerability of walking up to any machine running Jiwa, pointing it to an "evil" report to cause malicious damage or reveal sensitive information will remain. So it seems the company doesn?t care? Regards, Robert Passlow

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