Two crash vulnerabilities in Freeciv 2.1.0-beta1 (SVN 15 Jul 2006)

2006.08.01
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-Other


CVSS Base Score: 7.5/10
Impact Subscore: 6.4/10
Exploitability Subscore: 10/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: Partial
Availability impact: Partial

####################################################################### Luigi Auriemma Application: Freeciv http://www.freeciv.org Versions: <= 2.1.0-beta1 and SVN <= 15 Jul 2006 Platforms: Windows, *nix, *BSD, MacOS and more Bugs: A] memcpy crash in generic_handle_player_attribute_chunk B] invalid memory access in handle_unit_orders Exploitation: remote, versus server Date: 23 Jul 2006 Author: Luigi Auriemma e-mail: aluigi (at) autistici (dot) org [email concealed] web: aluigi.org ####################################################################### 1) Introduction 2) Bugs 3) The Code 4) Fix ####################################################################### =============== 1) Introduction =============== Freeciv is an open source clone of the well known Civilization game. The game supports also online gaming through its own metaserver (which can be seen on the web too) and GGZ (http://www.ggzgamingzone.org). ####################################################################### ======= 2) Bugs ======= -------------------------------------------------------- A] memcpy crash in generic_handle_player_attribute_chunk -------------------------------------------------------- handle_player_attribute_chunk (which points to generic_handle_player_attribute_chunk) is a function used by both client and server when a PACKET_PLAYER_ATTRIBUTE_CHUNK packet is received. The function acts like a reassembler of data for an allocated buffer which can have a size of max 262144 bytes. Exist two problems in this function: - the length of the current chunk received (chunk_length) is not verified so using a negative value an attacker can bypass the initial check and can copy a huge amount of data ((unsigned)chunk_length) in the data buffer with the subsequent crash - the check "chunk->offset + chunk->chunk_length > chunk->total_length" can be bypassed using a very big positive offset like 0x7fffffff which will allow the copying of data from our packet to the memory located at the malformed offset of the allocated buffer. Doesn't seem possible to execute malicious code with this bug since the destination memory is usually invalid From common/packets.c: void generic_handle_player_attribute_chunk(struct player *pplayer, const struct packet_player_attribute_chunk *chunk) { freelog(LOG_DEBUG, "received attribute chunk %d/%d %d", chunk->offset, chunk->total_length, chunk->chunk_length); if (chunk->total_length < 0 || chunk->total_length >= MAX_ATTRIBUTE_BLOCK || chunk->offset < 0 || chunk->offset + chunk->chunk_length > chunk->total_length || (chunk->offset != 0 && chunk->total_length != pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.length)) { /* wrong attribute data */ if (pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.data) { free(pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.data); pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.data = NULL; } pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.length = 0; freelog(LOG_ERROR, "Received wrong attribute chunk"); return; } /* first one in a row */ if (chunk->offset == 0) { if (pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.data) { free(pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.data); pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.data = NULL; } pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.data = fc_malloc(chunk->total_length); pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.length = chunk->total_length; } memcpy((char *) (pplayer->attribute_block_buffer.data) + chunk->offset, chunk->data, chunk->chunk_length); ... ---------------------------------------------- B] invalid memory access in handle_unit_orders ---------------------------------------------- The server's function handle_unit_orders doesn't check the maximum size of the packet->length value which should not be bigger than 2000 (MAX_LEN_ROUTE) while is possible for an attacker to use any positive number. The crash could require different tries (usually 3) before happening. From server/unithand.c: void handle_unit_orders(struct player *pplayer, struct packet_unit_orders *packet) { struct unit *punit = player_find_unit_by_id(pplayer, packet->unit_id); struct tile *src_tile = map_pos_to_tile(packet->src_x, packet->src_y); int i; if (!punit || packet->length < 0 || punit->activity != ACTIVITY_IDLE) { return; } if (src_tile != punit->tile) { /* Failed sanity check. Usually this happens if the orders were sent * in the previous turn, and the client thought the unit was in a * different position than it's actually in. The easy solution is to * discard the packet. We don't send an error message to the client * here (though maybe we should?). */ return; } for (i = 0; i < packet->length; i++) { ... ####################################################################### =========== 3) The Code =========== No proof-of-concept available, you must modify the source code of the client for forcing the sending of the malformed data. ####################################################################### ====== 4) Fix ====== The bugs have been fixed in the SVN of the 16 Jul 2006 ####################################################################### --- Luigi Auriemma http://aluigi.org http://mirror.aluigi.org


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