OSU httpd for OpenVMS path and directory disclosure - is this a bug or a feature?

2006.09.21
Risk: Low
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-Other


CVSS Base Score: 5/10
Impact Subscore: 2.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 10/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: None

*** rfdslabs security advisory *** Title: OSU httpd for OpenVMS path and directory disclosure - is this a bug or a feature? [RLSA_02-2006] Versions: OSU/3.11alhpa, OSU/3.10a (probably others) Vendor: David Jones, Ohio State University (http://www.ecr6.ohio-state.edu/www/doc/serverinfo.html) Date: 18 May 2006 Authors: Julio Cesar Fort <julio *NO_SPAM* rfdslabs com br> Iruata Souza, the VMS freak <iru.muzgo *NO_SPAM* gmail com> September 18th: HAPPY BIRTHDAY, MUZGO! :D 1. Introduction OSU is a http server for Compaq/HP (rest in peace, DEC) OpenVMS operating system. It supports a wide variety of TCP stacks for VMS like UCX, MultiNet, among others. Besides this OSU supports CGI (written in DCL), SSI and many others. 2. Details 2.1 - Path disclosure (tested on OSU 3.11) This one is pretty simple. If one requests a non-existant file to the server it simply returns like this: Error: File /staff$disk/www_server/home/NONEXISTANT (/NONEXISTANT) could not be opened VMS especification: staff$disk:[www_server.home]NONEXISTANT index.url present Exposing path information that, in our opinion, should not be exposed. 2.2 - Directory and file disclosure This occurs by the faulty handling of wildcards (VMS '*' char) on URL specifications as in: http://muzgo.is.a.freak.foo.bar/a*/ Which leads to the content of the first directory starting with the letter 'a' being shown and totally browsable. Sometimes there might be hidden or useful information: ---------------------------- | Files | | | | ACRAPPY.DOC{stat error} | | APROGRAM.EXE{stat error} | | AN.OBJ{stat error} | | PR0N.XXX{stat error} | ---------------------------- Just a single click and you can view the content or download the exposed files. A smart attacker (not brazilian kiddies, of course) could create a very simple script to perform brute-force attack to guess directory names and access them directly. 3. Solution Nothing yet. 4. Timeline Apr 2006: Vulnerability detected; 18 May 2006: Advisory written; 09 Jun 2006: Vendor contacted; 09 Jul 2006: No response from vendor; 18 Sep 2006: Advisory released. Thanks to barrossecurity.com, gotfault.net brothers, risesecurity.org, Lucien Rocha, Victor Galante, and friends everywhere. Iruata Souza also would like to thank Diego Casati. www.rfdslabs.com.br - computers, sex, human mind, music and more. Recife, PE, Brazil


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