ContentNow CMS 1.39 Sql Injection + Path Disclosure Vulnerabilities

2006.11.30
Credit: Revenge
Risk: Medium
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-89


CVSS Base Score: 7.5/10
Impact Subscore: 6.4/10
Exploitability Subscore: 10/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: Partial
Availability impact: Partial

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ContentNow CMS 1.39 'pageid' Sql Injection + Path Disclosure Severity : Medium Risk Vendor : http://www.contentnow.mf4k.de/ Author : Revenge [--------------------------------------------------] [#] Description ContentNow is a PHP Content Management System web 2.0 compliant, more info can be found at vendor site. ContentNow v1.39 is vulnerable to a sql injection and path disclosure. [--------------------------------------------------] Vuln #1 : Sql Injection Impact : Admin credentials disclosure Exploit : http://www.0xcafebabe.it/sploits/contentnow_139_sqlinj.pl (Works regardless of magic quotes) The "pageid" parameter in "index.php" isn't properly sanitised before being used in a sql query, this can be exploited to manipulate existing SQL query by inserting arbitrary SQL code, which can disclose sensitive information like admin credentials. The problem is due to: [ index.php ] ... ... // get/set id or startpageid from config --> $pid = $_GET['pageid']; if (empty($pid) || $pid == 1) $pid = $cnEngine->configArray[0]['startpageid']; --> if (false == $cnEngine->checkPid($pid)) die ('<span style="font:13px sans-serif;">Error loading site. No pid found.</span>'); $cnEngine->setId($pid); ... ... [ function checkPid($pid) and getActualContent($param) from /cn/library/class.engine.php ] ... ... function checkPid($pid) { $cnDatabase = NewADOConnection(ADODB_DB_TYPE); $cnDatabase->Connect(CN_DB_HOST, CN_DB_USER, CN_DB_PASSWORD, CN_DB_NAME); $sql = "SELECT pageid FROM ".CN_TBL_SECTIONS." WHERE pageid = ".$pid; $res = $cnDatabase->Execute($sql); if ($res->RecordCount() > 0) { return true; } else { return false; } } ... ... function getActualContent($param = '') { $cnDatabase = NewADOConnection(ADODB_DB_TYPE); $cnDatabase->Connect(CN_DB_HOST, CN_DB_USER, CN_DB_PASSWORD, CN_DB_NAME); $sql = "SELECT ".TABLE_FIELDS_CONTENT." FROM ".CN_TBL_CONTENT.$this->contentLanguageSuffix." WHERE pid = ".$this->pageid." AND deleted = 0 ".$param." ORDER by sort ASC"; $res = $cnDatabase->Execute($sql); if ($res->RecordCount() > 0) { while ($row = $res->FetchRow()) { $row['contenttitle'] = stripslashes($row['contenttitle']); $row['contentsyskey'] = stripslashes($row['contentsyskey']); $row['contentsubtitle'] = stripslashes($row['contentsubtitle']); $row['content'] = str_replace('"','"',$row['content']); $contentArray[] = $row; } } $this->contentArray = $contentArray; return $contentArray; } As you can see there's no input validation on "pageid" parameter. Vuln #2: It is also possible to disclose the full path to index.php by requesting index.php?pageid=' [--------------------------------------------------] [#] Solution Download 1.40 version. [#] Disclosure timeline 2006/11/20 Bug discovered 2006/11/20 Vendor contacted 2006/11/21 Vendor response 2006/11/21 New version 1.40 released 2006/11/21 Public Disclosure Revenge -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFFY0nJcLZvqfjeuvcRAlguAJ49Bdab5lNyX69OYmxIuzOb2yjvPwCcCq2+ OCNrT290ArsWjsqKG/Lk+OM= =ICDL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


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