-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Symantec Vulnerability Research http://www.symantec.com/research Security Advisory Advisory ID: SYMSA-2007-004 Advisory Title: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Xythos Server Products Author: Brian Reilly / brian_reilly (at) symantec (dot) com [email concealed] Release Date: 26-06-2007 Application: Xythos Enterprise Document Manager (XEDM) and Xythos Digital Locker (XDL) 5.0 and 6.0 Platform: All Severity: Remotely exploitable / Full application control Vendor status: Verified by vendor, patches available CVE Number: CVE-2007-3254, CVE-2007-3255, CVE-2007-3256 [Requested] Reference: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24521 Overview: Xythos Enterprise Document Manager (XEDM) is a web-based document management system that provides features including document check-in, check-out, version control, workflow, sharing, classification, retention schedules. Xythos Enterprise Document Manager 6.0 is compliant with the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) 5015.2-Standard (STD) for records management systems. XEDM is vulnerable to multiple HTML and JavaScript injection attacks. The application fails to sanitize user input in a number of locations, and these vulnerabilities can be leveraged to conduct stored and reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Although XEDM 6.0 uses unique action tokens to decrease the risk of CSRF, these tokens can be obtained via XSS thereby allowing an attacker to circumvent this countermeasure. Successful exploitation can lead to an attacker gaining complete control of user accounts, directories, files, and the XEDM administrative interface. All XEDM users also have the ability to set the Content Type of their files, and subsequently share them with other XEDM users or external Internet users. There is no administrative or server-side control to remove this ability from selected users, nor is there a way for administrators to globally set the Content Type based on file extension or actual file contents. As a result, malicious XEDM users have an easy way to distribute URLs from a trusted XEDM server that link to files which may appear to be "safe," but actually contain dangerous content. Please note that XEDM was the only application tested by Symantec Vulnerability Research. Based on information provided by Xythos, Xythos Digital Locker (XDL) is also affected by vulnerabilities #3, #4, and #5 described in this advisory Details: Vulnerability #1: Persistent XSS and CSRF Vulnerability in a File Workflow Name XEDM?s Workflow feature allows users to manage and monitor the state of their documents with defined routing, reviews, approvals, and notifications between multiple users. The application performs no input validation on the name of a saved Workflow, allowing an attacker to include HTML, JavaScript, and other active content. Exploitation occurs when an administrator logs into the Xythos administrative interface and exports Workflow definitions. Attackers can trigger arbitrary XSS and CSRF payloads, thereby gaining complete control of the administrative interface and performing such actions as changing server configuration options and creating, modifying, or deleting XEDM users Vulnerability #2: Persistent XSS Vulnerability in a File Workflow Name There is an additional exploitation vector for Workflow names that contain active content. When a user deletes a Workflow template that contains such content, the payload is triggered. Due to likely attack scenarios, this vulnerability is less significant than the others described in this advisory Vulnerability #3: Persistent XSS and CSRF Vulnerability in a File Content-Type Value All XEDM users are able to change the Content Type of all files in their directories to ensure they are handled by the correct client applications. In addition to being displayed in HTTP Response headers when downloading a file, this information is also displayed within XEDM when users view a file?s properties. The web form to set a file?s Content Type uses a MAXLENGTH value in an <INPUT> tag to enforce a maximum length of 30 characters. However, it is trivial to set Content-Types of an arbitrary length above this limit by using a client Web proxy, a custom browser, or an HTTP API. The only server-side validation performed on a user-supplied Content-Type is that it must contain a forward slash, allowing an attacker to include HTML, JavaScript, and other active content. Exploitation occurs when another XDEM user views the file?s properties or "manages" the file. Attackers can trigger arbitrary XSS and CSRF payloads, thereby gaining complete control of the user?s account, and performing actions including changing file permissions, and creating, modifying and deleting files and directories Vulnerability #4: Reflected XSS Vulnerability in the File Upload Action XEDM is also vulnerable to a reflected XSS vulnerability that is exploited when the user uploads a file that contains HTML, JavaScript, or other active content in the filename. Successful exploitation can result in the standard XSS payloads. Due to likely attack scenarios, this vulnerability is less significant than the others described in this advisory. Vulnerability #5: Distributing Malicious Content due to Misleading URLs and User-Supplied File Content Types As mentioned in the details of Vulnerability #3, all XEDM users are able to change the Content Types of all files in their directories. While this behavior is similar to functionality offered by other web applications and web servers (such as the AddType directive in an Apache .htaccess file), there is no way for an administrator to globally set MIME types for certain file extensions or override user-set options (such as an 'AllowOverride None' directive in an Apache HTTP server configuration file). As a result, malicious users have an easy way to distribute URLs from a trusted XEDM server that link to files which may appear to be "safe," but actually contain dangerous content. For example, a URL of the syntax https://some.xythos.server.tld/home/jdoe/perfectlysafe.txt and a Content Type of application/msword could really distribute a payload such as a zero-day Microsoft Office exploit. Other payloads include hostile executables, HTML, JavaScript, or any other malicious content with an arbitrary filename and the appropriate MIME type set Vendor Response: Xythos has confirmed potential security vulnerabilities in earlier versions of the 5.0 and 6.0 releases of its server products, the Xythos WebFile Server, Xythos Digital Locker (XDL), and Enterprise Document Manager (XEDM). We recommend that Xythos customers upgrade to the 5.0.25.8 or 6.0.46.1 versions of these products, planned for release by the end of June 2007. Important note: One of the identified vulnerabilities, listed as issue #5 in the Symantec advisory (Distributing Malicious Content due to Misleading URLs and User-Supplied File Content Types), is addressed only in the 6.0 release of these server products, but not in release 5.0. Xythos considers the resolution to this vulnerability (allowing administrators to disallow the editing of a file's content type by end users) to be a new feature, introduced in release 6.0 of XEDM/XDL. We encourage Xythos customers to contact Xythos Customer Support (support (at) xythos (dot) com [email concealed]) if you have questions about these security issues, and to get the identified upgrades, when available. Recommendation: To address the vulnerabilities identified in this advisory, current XEDM and XDL customers are strongly encouraged to upgrade to version 5.0.25.8 or 6.0.46.1 (or higher) of the XEDM/XDL. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information: The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the following names to these issues. These are candidates for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for security problems. CVE-2007-3254 - XSS (#1, #2, #3, #4) CVE-2007-3255 - CSRF (#1, #3) CVE-2007-3256 - dangerous content type specification (#5) - -------Symantec Vulnerability Research Advisory Information------- For questions about this advisory, or to report an error: research (at) symantec (dot) com [email concealed] For details on Symantec's Vulnerability Reporting Policy: http://www.symantec.com/research/Symantec-Responsible-Disclosure.pdf Symantec Vulnerability Research Advisory Archive: http://www.symantec.com/research/ Symantec Vulnerability Research GPG Key: http://www.symantec.com/research/Symantec_Vulnerability_Research_GPG.asc - -------------Symantec Product Advisory Information------------- To Report a Security Vulnerability in a Symantec Product: secure (at) symantec (dot) com [email concealed] For general information on Symantec's Product Vulnerability reporting and response: http://www.symantec.com/security/ Symantec Product Advisory Archive: http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/security/SymantecAdvisories.html Symantec Product Advisory PGP Key: http://www.symantec.com/security/Symantec-Vulnerability-Management-Key.a sc - --------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright (c) 2007 by Symantec Corp. Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted as long as it is not edited in any way unless authorized by Symantec Consulting Services. Reprinting the whole or part of this alert in any medium other than electronically requires permission from cs_advisories (at) symantec (dot) com. [email concealed] Disclaimer The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. Symantec, Symantec products, and Symantec Consulting Services are registered trademarks of Symantec Corp. and/or affiliated companies in the United States and other countries. All other registered and unregistered trademarks represented in this document are the sole property of their respective companies/owners. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) iD8DBQFGfAweuk7IIFI45IARAgSvAKCQJY6MBmmTgZP+dBal/rrr5gcgPQCgjMNt f8Esmfxk62cN2zACl5Pvst0= =VNpO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----