Madwifi xrates element remote DOS

2007.10.14
Risk: Low
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-20


CVSS Base Score: 4.3/10
Impact Subscore: 2.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 8.6/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Medium
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: None
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: Partial

SEC Consult Security Advisory 20071012-0 ======================================================================== =========== title: Madwifi xrates element remote DOS program: Madwifi linux wlan driver for atheros chipsets vulnerable version: Madwifi <= 0.9.3.2 homepage: www.madwifi.org found: July 2007 by: Clemens Kolbitsch, Sylvester Keil Secure Systems Lab / Technical University of Vienna http://seclab.tuwien.ac.at/ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab http://www.sec-consult.com/ perm. link: http://www.sec-consult.com/298.html ======================================================================== =========== Vendor description: --------------- MadWifi is one of the most advanced WLAN drivers available for Linux today. It is stable and has an established userbase. The driver itself is open source but depends on the proprietary Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) that is available in binary form only. Vulnerability overview: --------------- A specially crafted beacon frame causes the driver to exit(), leading to a kernel panic on the affected machine. An attacker could crash client machines that are listening for beacons using a fake access point. Vulnerability details: --------------- In short, the driver exits (via the BUG() macro) if a beacon frame with a high length value (>15) in the extended supported rates element is received. This leads to a kernel panic. >From net80211/ieee80211_scan_sta.c: 217 static int sta_add(...): KASSERT(sp->rates[1] <= IEEE80211_RATE_MAXSIZE, ("rate set too large: %u", sp->rates[1])); memcpy(ise->se_rates, sp->rates, 2 + sp->rates[1]); if (sp->xrates != NULL) { /* XXX validate xrates[1] */ KASSERT(sp->xrates[1] <= IEEE80211_RATE_MAXSIZE, ("xrate set too large: %u", sp->xrates[1])); memcpy(ise->se_xrates, sp->xrates, 2 + sp->xrates[1]); } else ise->se_xrates[1] = 0; IEEE80211_RATE_MAXSIZE is defined as 15. If the KASSERT() fails the BUG-macro, which exits the driver, is called. Vulnerability status: --------------- The bug has been fixed in SVN revision 2736 [1]. Timeline: --------------- vendor notified: 2007-10-11 vendor response: 2007-10-11 patch available: 2007-10-12 Additional info --------------- This vulnerability has been found using a novel wireless fuzzing approach developed in a joint project by the Secure Systems Lab (Technical University of Vienna) and the SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab. The technique, which allows very effective stateful fuzzing of wireless drivers by using emulated wireless chipsets, will be presented in detail on the Blackhat Briefings Japan [2] as well as the DeepSec IDSC in Vienna, Austria [3] in the talks by Sylvester Keil and Clemens Kolbitsch. References ---------- [1] http://madwifi.org/changeset/2736 [2] http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-japan-07/bh-jp-07-main.html [3] https://deepsec.net/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ EOF Bernhard Mueller / research [at] sec-consult [dot] com


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