Following information/research provided by Alexander Klink, a new
release is out, fixing a low priority security issue as detailed below.
The release is on the primary Apache-SSL ftp server and should hit the
mirrors over the next few hours, according to their schedules.
See http://www.apache-ssl.org for mirrors.
||| Security Advisory AKLINK-SA-2008-005 |||
||| CVE-2008-0555 (CVE candidate) |||
Apache-SSL memory disclosure
Date released: 02.04.2008
Date reported: 17.01.2008
$Revision: 1.1 $
by Alexander Klink
a.klink (at) cynops (dot) de [email concealed]
Vendor: Adam & Ben Laurie
Vulnerability: memory disclosure, potential privilege escalation in web
Releases known to be affected: apache_1.3.34+ssl_1.57
Releases known NOT to be affected: apache_1.3.41+ssl_1.59
Apache-SSL is a secure Webserver, based on Apache and SSLeay/OpenSSL.
Apache-SSL provides environment variables that are filled with
(client) certificate data. If the subject of a client certificate
contains special characters, parts of these variables can be overwritten
or be filled with other parts of memory.
The certificate DN as returned by the OpenSSL X509_NAME_online is
passed into the following function:
static void ExpandCert(pool *p,table *pEnv,char *szPrefix, char *szDN,
/* Expand a X509_oneline entry into it's base components and register
them as environment variables. Needed if you want to pass
information to CGI's. The naming convention SHOULD be fairly
with CGI's written for stronghold's certificate info - Q */
/* FIXME - strtok() and strcspn() may cause problems on some
systems - Q */
for(s=strtok(buf,"/") ; s != NULL ; s=strtok(NULL,"/"))
The function assumes that the relative distinguished name does not
contain a '/'. If a / is contained in for example the common name,
strcspn(s,"=") returns the size of s, so s+n+1 points beyond the
Furthermore, environment variables can be overwritten by including '/'
and '='. For example, to overwrite the OPENSSL_S_CLIENT_DN_OU variable,
one could use a certificate with a CN of "/OU=Fake OU".
If an application relies on this information to distinguish certificates
into different authorization classes, it can be fooled this way.
* 17.01.2008: Reported the bug to Ben Laurie
* 17.01.2008: Ben replies and acknowledges the bug
* 01.02.2008: Checking back with Ben on the status
* 01.02.2008: Ben replies that he'll be looking into a patch over the
* 06.02.2008: Ben sends patch and asks for help with testing it
* 07.02.2008: Reply with test results (still a small problem unrelated to
the original issue)
* 09.02.2008: Ben sends updated patch
* 11.02.2008: Told Ben that patch works fine
* 18.02.2008: Requested update
* 18.02.2008: Ben replies that he'll deal with it in the next week or so
* 27.02.2008: Requested update
* 27.02.2008: Patch for Apache 1.3.41 is ready, but release is normally
managed by Adam Laurie, who is on holiday till March, 11th
* 28.02.2008: Agreed to wait for Adam to return
* 12.03.2008: Ben informs Adam of the new release
* 25.03.2008: Requested update
* 25.03.2008: Ben replies, they are waiting for an updated advisory from me
* 25.03.2008: Sent out updated advisory
* 27.03.2008: Adam says sorry for the delays and that he will try to work
on this while he is at "a conference in Amsterdam"
* 01.04.2008: Coordination with Adam and Ben on a release
Upgrade to apache_1.3.41+ssl_1.59.
- Alexander Klink, Cynops GmbH (discovery)
Adam Laurie Tel: +44 (0) 1304 814800
The Bunker Secure Hosting Ltd. Fax: +44 (0) 1304 814899
Ash Radar Station
Sandwich mailto:adam (at) algroup.co (dot) uk [email concealed]
UNITED KINGDOM PGP key on keyservers