Chrome For Android Bypassing SOP Flaw

2013.01.08
Risk: Medium
Local: Yes
Remote: No
CWE: CWE-264


CVSS Base Score: 7.5/10
Impact Subscore: 6.4/10
Exploitability Subscore: 10/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: Partial
Availability impact: Partial

CVE Number: CVE-2012-4908 Title: Chrome for Android - Bypassing SOP for Local Files By Symlinks Affected Software: Confirmed on Chrome for Android v18.0.1025123 Credit: Takeshi Terada Issue Status: v18.0.1025308 was released which fixes this vulnerability Overview: Chrome for Android's Same-Origin Policy for local files (file: URI) can be bypassed by using symbolic links. It results in theft of Chrome's private files by malicious Android apps. Details: Chrome for Android seems to forbid a local file to read another file, except for the originating file itself. http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=37586 However, it is possible to circumvent the restriction by a trick using symbolic link. This issue enables malicious Android apps to steal Chrome's private files such as Chrome's Cookie file, bookmark file, and so on. As an example, steps to steal Chrome's Cookie file are described below: 1. An attacker's app creates a malicious HTML file, and makes Chrome load its URL with file: URI. The malicious HTML contains JavaScript code which, a few seconds later, tries to read the content of same URL with the malicious HTML itself via XMLHttpRequest. <body> <u>Wait a few seconds.</u> <script> function doitjs() { var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest; xhr.onload = function() { alert(xhr.responseText); }; xhr.open('GET', document.URL); xhr.send(null); } setTimeout(doitjs, 8000); </script> </body> 2. Before XHR fires, the attacker's app replaces the malicious HTML file with a symlink pointing to Chrome's Cookie file. 3. When XHR fires, Chrome follows the symlink and provides the content of the Chrome's Cookie file to the malicious HTML. The attacker's app can also get the content of Chrome's other private files in a similar manner. Proof of Concept: HTML/JavaScript is shown above. At present I do not have plans to disclose PoC of malicious Android app. Timeline: 2012/08/19 Reported to Google security team 2012/08/25 Re-reported to Chrome security team 2012/09/12 Vender announced v18.0.1025308 2013/01/07 Disclosure of this advisory Recommendation: Upgrade to the latest version. Reference: http://googlechromereleases.blogspot.jp/2012/09/chrome-for-android-update.html https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=144866

References:

http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=37586
http://googlechromereleases.blogspot.jp/2012/09/chrome-for-android-update.html


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