Canon Printer DoS / Secret Disclosure

2013-06-20 / 2014-03-31
Credit: mattandreko
Risk: Medium
Local: Yes
Remote: No
CWE: N/A

The below 3 issues have been tested and verified working on the following Canon Printer models (May affect more, but this is all I was able to test against): MG3100, MG5300, MG6100, MP495, MX340, MX870, MX890, MX920 #1 (CVE-2013-4613): Canon printers do not require a password for the administrative interfaces by default. Unauthorized users on the network may configure the printer. If the printer is exposed to the public internet, anonymous users may make configuration changes as well. This should be corrected by requiring a password, even if only a default, but should recommend users to change it upon initial setup of the device. #2 (CVE-2013-4614): The administrative interface on these printers allow a user to enter a WEP/WPA/WPA2 pre-shared key. Once a key is entered, when a user browses the configuration page again, they can view the current password in clear-text. Once a password is configured, it should not allow the user to read it again. If the user wants to change the password, they should be required to enter a new one, which then overwrites the old one. #3 (CVE-2013-4615): There is a denial of service condition in the administrative interface on the devices. Using specially crafted HTTP requests, it is possible to cause the device to no longer respond. This requires the device to be turned off, and then back on again, to which the printer will display a message about not being properly turned off, on the display (if model has a display). I have disclosed all 3 of these issues to Canon, and unfortunately they do not feel it is necessary to fix them (In all fairness, they're not super high severity). More details, along with PoC and Metasploit modules are available here: * http://www.mattandreko.com/2013/06/canon-y-u-no-security.html* Timeline: May 27, 2013: Initial Email to vendor's support May 28, 2013: Vendor support emailed for additional details May 28, 2013: Sent a proof-of-concept exploit for the DoS vulnerability to vendor May 30, 2013: Vendor escalated issue internally June 4, 2013: Vendor notification that issue has been escalated to manufacturer June 14, 2013: Vendor notification that they will not fix issues June 18, 2013: Public Disclosure

References:

http://www.mattandreko.com/2013/06/canon-y-u-no-security.html
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Mar/412


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