pyOpenSSL hostname check bypassing vulnerability

2013.09.07
Risk: Medium
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-20


CVSS Base Score: 4.3/10
Impact Subscore: 2.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 8.6/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Medium
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: None
Integrity impact: Partial
Availability impact: None

The pyOpenSSL module implements hostname identity checks but it did not properly handle hostnames in the certificate that contain null bytes. In all releases prior to 0.13.1, the string formatting of subjectAltName X509Extension instances incorrectly truncated fields of the name when encountering the null byte. When a CA than an SSL client trusts issues a server certificate that has a null byte in the subjectAltName, remote attackers can obtain a certifcate for 'www.foo.org\0.example.com' from the CA to spoof 'www.foo.org' and conduct man-in-the-middle attacks between the pyOpenSSL-using client and SSL servers. [1] https://mail.python.org/pipermail/pyopenssl-users/2013-September/000478.html

References:

https://mail.python.org/pipermail/pyopenssl-users/2013-September/000478.html
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1005325
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2013/q3/560


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