LastPass Android Container PIN / Auto-Wipe Bypass

Risk: Medium
Local: Yes
Remote: No
CWE: CWE-592

LastPass Android container PIN and auto-wipe security feature bypass Product: LastPass (Android) Project Homepage: Internal Advisory ID: c22-2013-02 Vulnerable Version(s): Android version 2.0.4 (and prior) Tested Version: Android 2.0.4 (Android 4.2/4.3) Vendor Notification: Aug 13, 2013 Public Disclosure: November XX, 2013 Vulnerability Type: Authentication Bypass Issues [CWE-592] CVE Reference: CVE-2013-5113, CVE-2013-5114 Issue Severity: Important impact CVSSv2 Base Score: 6.6 (AV:L/AC:L/AU:N/C:C/I:C/A:N) Discovery: Chris John Riley ( ) Advisory Details: Effected versions of LastPass on the Android platform allow for users with limited access via the ADB (Android Debug Bridge) interface of an Android device (USB debugging enabled, no root access required) to perform backup and restore of applications and application data. The ADB backup functionality requires an Android device running the Ice-Cream Sandwich version of Android (4.x) or above. LastPass on Android allows the user to store the username and password within the Android container, and set a PIN to prevent unauthorized access in the event the device is lost or stolen. This PIN protection also sets an auto-wipe feature that will delete application data after 10 false logons. Due to the way recent versions of Android implements the backup and restore process, both the implemented PIN protection and the enforced auto-wipe can be avoided and entirely bypassed to allow attackers the ability to clear or recover the PIN from application settings data stored in LPandroid.xml. Using a simple process, it is possible for an attacker with physical access to a device to backup the LastPass Android container and remove any PIN protections present on the application. It is also possible to restore the LastPass Android container to a secondary device and maintain live access to changes made by the user either via the web interface or the original device's LastPass Android application. This exposes not only cached username and password data stored within the LastPass Android container acquired by an attacker, but also any changes made after the fact. Impact: Attackers can extract and possibly maintain access to a users LastPass data from a lost or stolen device. This effectively allows an attacker the ability to use the recovered credentials from LastPass to perform account takeover using the LastPass data. Process: 1) Gain physical access to an Android device containing the LastPass application 2) Enable USB debugging (if not already enabled) 3) Perform backup of the LastPass application using ADB (adb backup com.lastpass.lpandroid) 4) Extract the resulting Android Backup file (using for example the tool available here --> backup 5) Edit the extracted LPandroid.xml file to remove the following values passwordrepromptonactive pincodeforreprompt requirepin 6) Repack the directory structure (using for example the tool available here --> backup 7) Restore to either the original device or a secondary attacker controlled Android device using ADB (adb restore edited_backup.ab) Solution: LastPass have released a new version to the Google Play store that corrects these issue by disabling the ability to perform an ADB backup of the LastPass container. It has been confirmed that the version 2.5.1 is no longer directly susceptible to this attack method. References: At this time LastPass have not provided an advisory discussing the issue Vulnerability Timeline: May, 2013 - Initial discovery of vulnerability Aug 13, 2013 - LastPass contacted with request for secure communications Aug 13, 2013 - Response from LastPass setting up secure communications Aug 13, 2013 - Details reported to LastPass Aug 13, 2013 - Clarification of issue Aug 13, 2013 - Response from LastPass that allowBackup:false is now set in all new releases (change already implemented in testing prior to the report being received) Aug 16, 2013 - CVE numbers sent to LastPass Aug 28, 2013 - Name added to LastPass acknowledgements page June 30, 2013 - Initial Answer from GOOD Aug 8, 2013 - Telephone conference with GOOD (cancelled) Sept 05, 2013 - Response that issues resolved to LastPass's satisfaction Sept 05, 2013 - Re-Tested and advised of new bypass Sept 05, 2013 - Blog post released demonstrating process Sept 06, 2013 - Acceptance of risk associated with new Bypass (low risk) Nov 13, 2013 - Advisory released (delayed)

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