( , ) (, . '.' ) ('. ', ). , ('. ( ) ( (_,) .'), ) _ _, / _____/ / _ \ ____ ____ _____ \____ \==/ /_\ \ _/ ___\/ _ \ / \ / \/ | \\ \__( <_> ) Y Y \ /______ /\___|__ / \___ >____/|__|_| / \/ \/.-. \/ \/:wq (x.0) '=.|w|.=' _=''"''=. presents.. Kaseya BYOD Gateway Multiple Vulnerabilities Affected Versions: Kaseya BYOD Gateway 7.0.2 PDF: http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/Kaseya_BYOD_Gateway_Multiple_Vulnerabilities.pdf +-------------+ | Description | +-------------+ This advisory details multiple vulnerabilities found within the Kaseya BYOD Gateway software. By chaining a combination of lacking SSL verification, poor authentication mechanisms and arbitrary redirection vulnerabilities, a malicious entity may potentially compromise any Kaseya BYOD installation. The Kaseya BYOD Gateway software uses a redirection feature, wherein users are redirected to their local Kaseya installation via Kaseya?s hosted servers. The update request from the BYOD Gateway software to the Kaseya hosted servers was not found to verify SSL certificates and fails to implement any form of authentication, instead relying on the length of the gateway identifier to provide security. Thus, the security of the solution depends on an attacker?s ability to enumerate the gateway identifier. Once a malicious user enumerates the Gateway identifier, then they may update the redirect rule for that customer in Kaseya?s hosted servers, redirecting customers to a malicious Kaseya BYOD Gateway. +--------------+ | Exploitation | +--------------+ --[ Lack of SSL Certificate Validation The Kaseya BYOD Gateway was not found to validate SSL certificates when contacting the Kaseya hosted servers. Requests were found to be made to the Kaseya hosted servers when updating redirection information (for local-network-only instances of Kaseya) and when submitting licensing information. This allows a malicious entity with network access somewhere between the BYOD Gateway and Kaseya?s servers to perform a Man-In-The-Middle attack. --[ Arbitrary Redirection By intercepting and replaying the request below, a malicious entity may specify an arbitrary ?url? parameter within the ?siteinfo? XML tag. The Kaseya provisioning relay server then updates the BYOD Gateway redirect with the URL specified. The redirection takes place when a user queries https://provision.relay.kaseya.net/siteinfo/<code> (where code is the installation?s 6 digit access code). The https://provision.relay.kaseya.net/siteinfo/<code> page is queried during the Kaseya BYOD mobile applications? start up process in order to determine the location of the BYOD Gateway. POST /checkin/gateway/rq-be9781109e7111e3afa822000ab9104f HTTP/1.1 Accept-Encoding: identity Content-Length: {content length} Host: provision.relay.kaseya.net Content-Type: text/xml Connection: close User-Agent: Kaseya-Tetra/7.0.2 (CL 7) <checkin><gateway version="7.0.2" clevel="7" appname="Kaseya-Tetra"/><platform kind="windows" version="6.2.9200"/><users owner={email address}" active="3"/><devices active="0"/><siteinfo url={site url}"/><connectors><connector version="1.1" id="ProxyConnector"/><connector version="1.1" id="DirConnector"/><connector version="1.1" id="FileConnector"/><connector version="1.0" id="HomeConnector"/><connector version="1.0" id="LinkConnector"/><connector version="1.1" id="MenuConnector"/><connector version="1.2" id="StaticSiteConnector"/></connectors></checkin> Once an installation?s Gateway Identifier is known (rq-be9781109e7111e3afa822000ab9104f in the example above), a malicious entity may control the redirection and send users to their own malicious Kaseya BYOD Gateway. This code was found to be disclosed in a number of locations, including device logs, in the Kaseya BYOD Gateway?s pages or by Kaseya?s hosted relay servers. The installation gateway identifier is disclosed during the sign up process. Thus, an attacker that can enumerate the customer's six digit numeric registration code can step through the registration process, retrieve the gateway identifier and hijack the installation. +----------+ | Solution | +----------+ No official solution is currently available for this issue. +---------------------+ | Disclosure Timeline | +---------------------+ 03/10/2014 - Initial contact with Kaseya Support 09/10/2014 - Established Kaseya security contact 13/10/2014 - Advisories sent to Kaseya 21/10/2014 - Additional information sent to Kaseya 22/11/2014 - Update from Kaseya 29/01/2015 - Advisory Release +-------------------------------+ | About Security-Assessment.com | +-------------------------------+ Security-Assessment.com is Australasia's leading team of Information Security consultants specialising in providing high quality Information Security services to clients throughout the Asia Pacific region. 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